In re Estate of Harris

• Decision Date: 30 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. DA 14–0605.,DA 14–0605.
• Citation: 2015 MT 182,379 Mont. 474,352 P.3d 20
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Dorothea E. HARRIS, Deceased.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

379 Mont. 474

352 P.3d 20

2015 MT 182

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Dorothea E. HARRIS, Deceased.

No. DA 14–0605.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs March 4, 2015.

Decided June 30, 2015.

For Appellant: Stephen R. Brown, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, PLLP, Missoula, Montana.

For Appellee: C. Mark Hash, Hash, O'Brien, Biby & Murray, PLLP, Kalispell, Montana.

Opinion

Justice BETH BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The surviving adult children (Contestants) of decedent Dorothea Harris (Dorothea) dispute both the informal probate process brought by their stepfather Lincoln Harris (Harris) as well as the validity of a will that devised to Harris all of the mineral rights from their mother's estate. Contestants appeal an order of the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, granting summary judgment in favor of Harris and concluding that Contestants had not offered sufficient evidence to challenge Dorothea's testamentary capacity or to support their allegations of undue influence. We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

1. Whether the District Court's order allowing probate of Dorothea's estate complies with § 72–3–122, MCA.

2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Harris on Contestants' objections.

¶ 2 We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Dorothea married Harris in 1965 after the death of her first husband, Frank Kinniburgh, in 1963. Frank Kinniburgh is the natural father of the three Contestants. Dorothea and Frank Kinniburgh also had a fourth child, Theodore, who died in 1997.

¶ 4 Dorothea's maiden name was Whiteman. Dorothea inherited certain mineral interests in Richland County from her Whiteman ancestors. On March 4, 1983, Dorothea executed a will (1983 Will) that devised in equal shares to her children, Contestants and Theodore, and her husband, Harris, all of her mineral interests in Richland County. During 1997, Theodore became ill from a heart condition and died. Dorothea acted as Theodore's primary caregiver while he was ill. Dorothea also was sick during the time she cared for Theodore and, following his illness and death, Dorothea's health declined. Dorothea died two years later, in 1999.

¶ 5 On April 9, 1997, during the time that Dorothea was caring for Theodore, she executed a new will (1997 Will). The 1997 Will left Dorothea's entire estate to Harris, including all of the mineral interests in Richland County, and named Harris as Personal Representative. Harris believed that he and Dorothea held all assets jointly with rights of survivorship and therefore that he did not need to probate Dorothea's 1997 Will. Earnings from the oil and gas royalties apparently were made payable to both Dorothea and Harris during their marriage.

¶ 6 Fourteen years later, in 2013, while preparing to drill a well involving the Richland County interests, Diamond Resources, an oil and gas company, determined that Harris was not, in fact, the legal owner of the mineral interests. Diamond Resources informed Harris that a Montana probate proceeding would be required before proceeds from those interests could be distributed. Specifically, Diamond Resources required a deed of distribution conveying Dorothea's mineral interests. Accordingly, in July 2013, Harris filed an application for informal probate of the 1997 Will and for appointment as Personal Representative.

¶ 7 The Clerk of Court granted Harris's application, admitted the 1997 Will to informal probate, and—as specified in the will—appointed Harris as Personal Representative. After receiving notice of the informal probate, Contestants filed pro se requests for a hearing to contest the transfer of all the mineral interests to Harris. Contestants maintained that it was their mother's intent that they inherit the mineral rights in Richland County. Responding to Contestants' filings, the District Court ordered that no hearing would be held until Contestants filed verified objections under § 72–1–310, MCA. Contestants filed objections and the District Court held a status conference, at which time the court determined that no distribution of the mineral interests would occur until the objections were resolved.

¶ 8 A few months later, Harris, in his capacity as Personal Representative, moved for summary judgment and requested that the court allow informal probate of the estate in accordance with the 1997 Will. Contestants, through counsel, opposed the motion on the grounds of untimeliness of the probate of the will, undue influence, and lack of testamentary capacity. Both parties submitted affidavits. Following a hearing, the District Court determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding Dorothea's testamentary capacity when she executed the 1997 Will, or any genuine issues regarding whether Harris exerted undue influence on Dorothea. The District Court entered a written order allowing Harris to continue with probate of the estate. Contestants appeal.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 9 The interpretation of a statute is a matter of law that we review de novo. Reichert v. State, 2012 MT 111, ¶ 19, 365 Mont. 92, 278 P.3d 455. We also review a district court's summary judgment rulings de novo. Victory Ins. Co. v. Mont. State Fund, 2015 MT 82, ¶ 10, 378 Mont. 388, 344 P.3d 977. Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”M.R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) ; Victory, ¶ 10.

DISCUSSION

¶ 10 1. Whether the District Court's order allowing probate of Dorothea's estate complies with § 72–3–122, MCA.

¶ 11 Contestants argue that, under the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) § 72–3–122, MCA, the District Court erred by permitting Harris to initiate probate proceedings on Dorothea's estate fourteen years after her death. Under the UPC (and with one exception not applicable here), “to be effective to prove the transfer of any property ..., a will must be declared to be valid by an order of informal probate by the clerk or an adjudication of probate by the court.” Section 72–3–102, MCA. Section 72–3–122(1), MCA, states that, generally, no formal or informal probate or appointment proceeding “may be commenced more than 3 years after the decedent's death,” but proceeds to list exceptions to this rule. See also § 72–3–203(1)(d), MCA (“An application for informal probate of a will must state ... that the time limit for informal probate ... has not expired either because 3 years or less have passed since the decedent's death or, if more than 3 years from death have passed, the circumstances as described in 72–3–122 authorizing tardy probate have occurred”). Harris invokes the exception found in § 72–3–122(1)(d), MCA. That subsection states,

an informal appointment or a formal testacy or appointment proceeding may be commenced after the time period if no proceedings concerning the succession or estate administration have occurred within the 3–year period after the decedent's death, but the personal representative has no right to possess estate assets as provided in 72–3–606 beyond that necessary to confirm title to the property in the successors to the estate, and claims other than expenses of administration may not be presented against the estate.

¶ 12 Subsection (d) therefore permits an informal appointment or formal testacy proceeding to be initiated more than three years after the decedent's death with three limitations. First, the subsection is inapplicable if there has been any other proceeding regarding succession or estate administration during the three-year period. Second, no claims other than for expenses of administration may be considered in a late-filed proceeding.

Third, the personal representative's right to possess estate assets is limited to the possession necessary to confirm title to the estate's assets in the estate's successors. We examine whether Harris's initiation of the probate proceedings in this case runs afoul of any of subsection (d)'s requirements.

¶ 13 As to the first requirement, the record establishes that there was no proceeding regarding succession or estate administration during the three-year period following Dorothea's death. Harris's action therefore does not overstep the first limitation.

¶ 14 Regarding the second limitation, a “claim” is a liability of the decedent or of the estate arising at or after the decedent's death, including funeral expenses and expenses of administration, but does “not include ... demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific assets alleged to be included in the estate.” Section 72–1–103(6), MCA. A claim against the estate is made for matters such as a debt owed by the decedent or by the estate, or for fees of the personal representative. See In re Estate of Barber, 239 Mont. 129, 140, 779 P.2d 477, 484 (1989). The definition of a “claim” is distinct from the definition of a “devise,” which “means a testamentary disposition of real or personal property.”Section 72–1–103(11), MCA. See also Estate of Yogiji, 311 P.3d 1224, 1228 (N.M.Ct.App.2013) (holding that a wife's action seeking to identify assets representing her share of community property is not a “claim” against husband's estate). Harris is not pursuing a debt owed by Dorothea or her estate. Accordingly, he has not overstepped the limitation that no claims other than for expenses of administration may be considered.

¶ 15 Our focus therefore turns to the third limitation, which permits a personal representative to possess estate assets only to the extent “necessary to confirm title to the property in the successors¹ to the estate.” Section 72–3–122(1)(d), MCA. Under the UPC, both real and personal property devolve to a devisee immediately upon the testator's death, “subject to” the estate's administration. Section 72–3–101(2), MCA. Section 72–3–606(1), MCA, provides a personal representative the...