Estate of Hall v. Madrid

• Decision Date: 02 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2 CA-CV 2015-0073,2 CA-CV 2015-0073
• Parties: IN RE THE ESTATE OF BRYANT BENSON HEIDI HALL, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF BRYANT BENSON, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. OLIVIA MADRID, AN INDIVIDUAL; JULIE MADRID, AN INDIVIDUAL, Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

IN RE THE ESTATE OF BRYANT BENSON

HEIDI HALL, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF BRYANT BENSON, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. OLIVIA MADRID, AN INDIVIDUAL; JULIE MADRID, AN INDIVIDUAL, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 2015-0073

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO

March 2, 2016

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f).

Appeal from the superior Court in pima County

No. PB20071337

The Honorable Kyle A. Bryson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Munger Chadwick, P.L.C., Tucson

By Mark E. Chadwick

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Mesch, Clark & Rothschild, P.C., Tucson

By Mark Rubin

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Miller concurred.

ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge:

¶1 Plaintiff/appellant Estate of Bryant Benson, acting through its personal representative, Heidi Hall, challenges the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants/appellees Olivia and Julie Madrid based on statutes of limitations. We affirm for the reasons that follow.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 We state the facts in the light most favorable to the estate, the party against whom summary judgment was entered. See Ness v. W. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 174 Ariz. 497, 500, 851 P.2d 122, 125 (App. 1992). The decedent passed away in December 2004. His wife, Olivia Madrid, continued to live in the decedent's residence and control his assets. In November 2007, Heidi Hall, who is the decedent's daughter, filed a probate petition seeking formal appointment as the estate's first personal representative. The trial court appointed her in January 2008.

¶3 In March 2008, when Olivia refused to cooperate with the probate proceeding, the personal representative filed an "emergency motion" to enter the decedent's residence "to inventory,collect and secure [his] personal property." The motion contained an extensive list of property that the personal representative believed remained at the home, including, among other things, several automobiles, inherited jewelry, and equestrian and fishing-related items. The trial court granted the motion in May 2008. Upon entering the residence and conducting the inventory, the personal representative learned that nearly all the decedent's property was missing. By September 2008, at the latest, she believed Olivia had taken the estate's assets.

¶4 Nearly five years later, in June 2013, the personal representative filed a complaint against Olivia Madrid and her daughter Julie. Count one of the complaint sought recovery and possession of the estate's assets pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-3709(A). Count two asserted a claim of conversion. Count three sought double damages against only Olivia pursuant to § 14-3709(D) based on the concealment, embezzlement, conveyance, or disposal of estate property. All property identified in the complaint is the same property originally identified in the emergency motion.

¶5 The Madrids filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the complaint was barred by various limitations periods. In granting the motion, the trial court determined that the estate's statutory claims, counts one and three, were barred by the general four-year statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 12-550. The court further determined that the two-year limitations period provided by A.R.S. § 12-542 precluded the estate's conversion claim, rejecting the estate's argument that the discovery rule should apply.

¶6 After the trial court entered a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P., the Madrids filed a timely motion under Rule 59(l), Ariz. R. Civ. P., to alter or amend the judgment to include sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, Ariz. R. Civ. P., and A.R.S. § 12-349. We revested jurisdiction in the trial court to resolve the substantive issues presented in the motion. With that motion now denied, we have jurisdiction over the estate's appeal pursuant to Rule 9(e)(2), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).

Discussion

Statutory Claims: Counts One and Three

¶7 The estate first maintains "[t]here is no applicable statute of limitations for the personal representative's duty to marshal assets while a probate case is open." From this premise the estate reasons that there is no temporal limitation on an action to recover property and receive damages under § 14-3709 so long as the administration of the estate is still pending. The estate therefore concludes the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment on the claims under § 14-3709 by applying the catch-all statute of limitations, § 12-550.

¶8 Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence produced creates no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 305, 802 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1990). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo and will uphold a trial court's ruling if it is legally correct for any reason. Pi'Ilkea, LLC v. Williamson, 234 Ariz. 284, ¶ 5, n.7, 321 P.3d 449, 450, 454 n.7 (App. 2014). The interpretation and application of statutes similarly present questions of law that we consider de novo. Patterson v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff's Office, 177 Ariz. 153, 156, 865 P.2d 814, 817 (App. 1993). Here, we agree with the trial court's ultimate conclusion that the statutory actions are time barred, but we anchor our reasoning in A.R.S. §§ 14-3108(4) and 14-3709, not § 12-550.¹

¶9 Arizona's probate code is designed, in part, "'[t]o promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors.'" In re Estateof Winn, 214 Ariz. 149, ¶ 20, 150 P.3d 236, 240 (2007), quoting A.R.S. § 14-1102(B)(3). A probate action generally must be brought within two years of a decedent's death, § 14-3108, and a proceeding that remains inactive for two years is subject to dismissal. Ariz. R. Probate P. 15.2(A)(1). Section 14-3108(4) allows for the later appointment of a personal representative in cases such as the one before us in which "no court proceeding concerning the succession or administration has occurred within the two year period." But as we explain in greater detail below, if a proceeding is brought under this exception, the personal representative may possess estate assets only to the extent "necessary to confirm title" in the estate's successors. Id.

¶10 Regardless of whether appointment first occurs within two years of a person's death, the personal representative must create a detailed inventory of a decedent's property within ninety days of appointment, A.R.S. § 14-3706(A), and "[a] personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent . . . as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate." A.R.S. § 14-3703(A). "[D]elay in the administration of estates is not to be tolerated." In re Shields' Estate, 15 Ariz. App. 447, 449, 489 P.2d 294, 296 (1971).

¶11 Section 14-3709 empowers a personal representative to discover, inventory, and repossess estate property. Section 14-3709(A) generally creates a right and duty of the personal representative to "take possession or control of" the decedent's property, and the provision expressly authorizes the personal representative to "maintain an action to recover possession of property or to determine its title." The remainder of the statute creates a process for examining people suspected of concealing estate property or information and, when necessary, coercing its surrender through incarceration. § 14-3709(B) through (D). Section 14-3709(D) specifically provides that a court's order to disclose documents or information

is prima facie evidence of the right of the personal representative to the property in an action brought for recovery of that property, and a judgment shall be fordouble the value of the property, or for return of the property and damages in addition to the property equal to the value of the property.

Because § 14-3709 does not clearly address the issues before us regarding timing and any other limitations, it is appropriate to look to the broader statutory context and historical background to divine the legislature's intended meaning. See State ex rel. Winkleman v. Ariz. Navigable Stream Adjudication Comm'n, 224 Ariz. 230, ¶ 24, 229 P.3d 242, 252-53 (App. 2010).

¶12 Section 14-3709 is a blended statute that combines a provision from the 1969 Uniform Probate Code (UPC), 8 U.L.A. (1998), with older Arizona laws. See Estate of Winn, 214 Ariz. 149, n.4, 150 P.3d at 240 n.4; Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 117 Ariz. 64, 66, 570 P.2d 1077, 1079 (1977); In re Estate of Jorgenson, 159 Ariz. 214, 216 n.2, 766 P.2d 87, 89 n.2 (App. 1988). Subsection (A) of § 14-3709 dates to 1974 and enacts § 3-709 of the UPC with only minor stylistic differences; subsections (B) through (D) of § 14-3709 were codified some years later, in 1976, and combine earlier laws dating from our territorial period that were originally adopted from California. See In re Estate of Newman, 219 Ariz. 260, ¶¶ 20-21 & nn.5-6, 196 P.3d 863, 870 & nn.5-6 (App. 2008); Estate of Jorgenson, 159 Ariz. at 216 n.2, 766 P.2d at 89 n.2; see also A.R.S. §§ 14-544, 14-545 (1956); Ariz. Code Ann. §§ 38-812, 38-813 (1939); Ariz. Rev. Code §§ 3969, 3970 (1928); Ariz. Civ. Code §§ 862, 863 (1913); Ariz. Civ. Code §§ 1722, 1723 (1901); cf. Levy v. Superior Court, 38 P. 965, 965-66 (Cal. 1895) (quoting California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1459, 1460).

¶13 Those earlier Arizona statutes provided a summary proceeding in the probate court to discover an estate's assets. First Nat'l Bank v. Superior Court, 42 Ariz. 467, 470-71, 27 P.2d 525, 527 (1933); accord Kay v. Kay, 53 Ariz. 336, 343, 89 P.2d 496, 499 (1939). The proceeding was "in the nature of a bill of...