In re Estate of Rivera
| Decision Date | 04 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-36231,A-1-CA-36231 |
| Parties | IN RE: THE ESTATE OF ENCARNACION S. RIVERA, (Deceased December 16, 1966) San Miguel Probate Court No.: D-412-PB-1967-00666. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN MIGUEL COUNTY
Domenici Law Firm, P.C.
Pete V. Domenici, Jr.
Reed C. Easterwood
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant
Rothstein Donatelli LLP
Richard W. Hughes
Caroline "KC" Manierre
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
{1} Shirley Kelley (Kelley) appeals the district court's order granting a motion to exclude 6.2 acres of land from the Estate of Encarnacion Rivera, Kelley's grandfather. Arguing judicial estoppel and the after-acquired title doctrine, Kelley asserts that the property became part of the Estate of Encarnacion Rivera, entitling her to an intestate share as an heir. Because the property at issue is not and never was a part of Encarnacion Rivera's estate, we affirm.
{2} This case involves a dispute over 6.2 acres of land (subject property) in Terrero, New Mexico, along the Pecos river. The property had been occupied by Cristino Rivera, Encarnacion's father, and his heirs for several generations beginning in the 1870s. The subject property is located within a larger area of land that was subsequently identified as "Lot 10." The United States continuously owned all of Lot 10 until 2009 when it conveyed a portion of it, composed of the subject property, to Ramona Lawson, Encarnacion's daughter, and Boyd Lawson, Ramona's husband.
{3} The genesis of the controversy involves a mistake concerning the boundaries of a patent issued to Cristino Rivera in 1888, pursuant to the Homestead Act. Cristino believed, based on an 1883 survey, that the subject property was part of the 160 acres of land for which he sought a patent. A year after the 1883 survey, Cristino Rivera applied to the General Land Office, currently the Bureau of Land Management (collectively BLM), for a patent consisting of 160 acres of land and certified in a homestead proof that he had established residence, built a corral, fences, and cultivated the land for several years. The BLM issued the patent to Cristino Rivera in 1888 (1888 patent), evidencing a conveyance of what was thought at the time to be 160 acres based on the 1883 public land survey. In 1892, the area surrounding the property described in Cristino's 1888 patent was designated as part of the Pecos River Forest Reserve, now the Santa Fe National Forest, precluding further patents in the area.
{4} In 1918, Cristino Rivera died without a will and the land described in the 1888 patent passed to his heirs. Amongst the heirs, it was decided that Encarnacion Rivera would receive the subject property, which also included a stone cellar, house, cabin, and the surrounding land. In 1925, the BLM independently resurveyed the land described in the 1888 patent to more accurately locate the boundaries of the property patented to Cristino Rivera. The 1925 survey identified the property owned by the Rivera estate as "Tract 43." However, based on the 1925 survey, the land described in Cristino Rivera's 1888 patent contained only approximately 148 acres. Further, the survey revealed that the structures Cristino Rivera had described as grounds to apply for the patent—including the stone cellar and cabin—were not part of the land described in the 1888 patent. Instead, the survey established that the area containing the improvements, identified as Lot 10, was still owned by the United States and was adjacent to Tract 43, the property actually owned by the Rivera estate pursuant to the 1888 patent. Consequently, the 1925 survey established that the 1888 patent did not describe the land Cristino Rivera had initially thought was being conveyed and that Cristino and Encarnacion had been living on land owned by the United States. Encarnacion wrote to the BLM in 1946 "indicating a desire to amend his father's homestead entry" and gain title to Lot 10, but never successfully obtained title. Likewise, although the Forest Service knew that Rivera's heirs were occupying the house on Lot 10, it never initiated any action to evict them.
{5} Encarnacion Rivera died in 1966 and his wife, Ignacita Rivera, inherited his property through probate proceedings. The parties do not dispute that the probate did not include any land in Lot 10 and consequently, did not include the subject property,because, when Encarnacion Rivera died in 1966, the United States continued to own Lot 10 where the structures were located.
{6} Nevertheless, in 1979 Ignacita purported to convey via quitclaim deed approximately sixteen acres on Lot 10 to Ramona Lawson, her daughter, and Boyd Lawson, Ramona's husband. This conveyance presumably encompassed what would later be identified as the subject property. In 1986, Ramona and Boyd Lawson sought to confirm title to property later identified as the subject property through a color of title action, which was denied by the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). Nine years later, Ramona and Boyd Lawson filed an application with the BLM that sought to correct the 1888 patent to include 12 acres of Lot 10, which also would have included the subject property. In the application, Ramona and Boyd Lawson conceded that the United States owned Lot 10 and that it was "under the jurisdiction of the United States Forest Service," but argued that the land in Lot 10 upon which the structures sat was erroneously omitted from the 1888 patent. In 1997, the BLM denied Ramona and Boyd Lawsons' application to correct the patent, but, in 2003 the IBLA reversed the BLM's decision, concluding "that the equities clearly fall in favor of correcting the patent to include" the land originally sought by Cristino and thought to have been conveyed by the BLM. The IBLA remanded the case to the "BLM for further action in compliance with [its] decision." However, the record does not reflect that the BLM ever corrected the patent or conveyed to Ramona and Boyd Lawson the requested 12 acres, which, as we have noted, would have included the subject property.
{7} The record does not reflect any factual development immediately following the IBLA's decision. In 2007, the Forest Service conducted another survey of Lot 10 and, for the first time, demarcated the 6.2 acres consisting of the subject property in dispute here. In 2009, Congress passed the Omnibus Public Land Management Act, authorizing the Forest Service to convey the subject property to Ramona and Boyd Lawson. Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, § 3304, 123 Stat. 1134, 123 (2009). The United States Forest Service quitclaimed the subject property to Ramona and Boyd Lawson the same year.
{8} In 2016, Kelley, Encarnacion Rivera's granddaughter, filed a petition in the district court to reopen the 1967 probate of Encarnacion's estate, specifically seeking to probate the subject property. In response, Boyd Lawson and Sondra Lawson Bennett (collectively Lawsons) filed a motion to exclude the property from Encarnacion's estate and to close the probate proceedings, which the district court granted after finding that the subject property was not part of Encarnacion Rivera's estate.1 The district court concluded that the conveyance of the subject property was a result of a settlement between Ramona and Boyd Lawson and the United States Forest Service. Kelley subsequently appealed.2
{9} On appeal, Kelley argues the district court erred because: (1) the Lawsons were judicially estopped from arguing that the subject property was not part of Encarnacion's estate; and (2) the doctrine of after-acquired title gave Kelley an intestate share of the subject property. For the reasons stated below, we do need to reach Kelley's third argument that the quitclaim by Ignacita Rivera to Ramona and Boyd Lawson in 1979 did not preclude Kelly from claiming an interest in the property. We address each argument in turn.
{10} Both parties request that we apply a de novo standard of review. However, generally, "[w]here a district court denies equitable relief, such as estoppel, we review the matter for abuse of discretion." In Re Adoption Petition of Rebecca M., 2008-NMCA-038, ¶ 22, 143 N.M. 554, 178 P.3d 839; see Laughlin v. Convenient Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2013-NMCA-088, ¶ 15, 308 P.3d 992 (). Irrespective of which standard of review we apply, Kelley's arguments fail.
{11} "Judicial estoppel is a doctrine that prevents a party who has successfully assumed a certain position in judicial proceedings from then assuming an inconsistent position, especially if doing so prejudices a party who had acquiesced in the former position." Santa Fe Pac. Tr., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2012-NMSC-028, ¶ 32, 285 P.3d 595 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The purpose of judicial estoppel is to prevent a party from playing fast and loose with the court during the course of litigation." Laughlin, 2013-NMCA-088, ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To prevail under the doctrine of judicial estoppel:
First, the party against whom the doctrine is to be used must have successfully assumed a position during the course of litigation. Second, that first position must be necessarily inconsistent with the position the party takes later in the proceedings. Finally, while not an absolute requirement, judicial estoppel will be especially applicable when the party's change of position prejudices a party who had acquiesced in the former position.
Santa Fe Pac...
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