In re Estate of Dalton

• Decision Date: 24 June 1918
• Docket Number: 32029
• Citation: 168 N.W. 332,183 Iowa 1013
• Parties: IN RE ESTATE OF JAMES DALTON, Deceased
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

168 N.W. 332

183 Iowa 1013

IN RE ESTATE OF JAMES DALTON, Deceased

No. 32029

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

June 24, 1918

Appeal from Plymouth District Court.--WILLIAM D. BOIES, Judge.

APPEAL by the heirs from an order overruling certain objections to a final report of Margaret Dalton, as administratrix of the estate of James Dalton, deceased.--Reversed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Molyneux & Maher, for appellant.

Shull Gill, Sammis & Stilwill, for appellee.

LADD J. PRESTON, C. J., EVANS and SALINGER, JJ., concur.

OPINION

LADD, J.

James Dalton died intestate, October 27, 1914, leaving him surviving a widow and nine children. At the time of his death, he was seized of 384 acres of land in Cherokee County, a house and lot where he lived in Le Mars, household furniture, $ 585.66 on deposit in a bank, $ 150 in cash, and notes given for rent. The widow's share of his life insurance was $ 583, and she was allowed $ 600 for support. She was appointed administratrix of the estate; and shortly thereafter, suit for the establishment of a lost will was brought by some of the heirs, making her a party defendant, both individually and as administratrix, but was subsequently dismissed without trial. Her final report was filed April 26, 1916; whereupon, the children of decedent, other than Helen, interposed objections, several of which were sustained, and others overruled. With the latter only are we concerned.

I. The administratrix appears to have paid the taxes on the land, as well as the house and lot, levied in 1914 and 1915. These were not liens, and had not become payable at the time of decedent's death. They did not then constitute personal obligations of the decedent, and might not be paid by the administratrix out of the proceeds of the personal property of the estate, even on the reasoning of Findley v. Taylor, 97 Iowa 420, 66 N.W. 744; but see Plymouth County v. Moore, 114 Iowa 700, 87 N.W. 662; Crawford County v. Laub, 110 Iowa 355, 81 N.W. 590. There is no showing that administratrix took possession of the land; and, therefore, she was not concerned, as such administratrix, therewith, or with the taxes not payable thereon. Exceptions to the payment from the proceeds of the personalty should have been sustained. They were paid from rents to accrue after Dalton's death; and, as this worked no prejudice to the heirs, save in charging same against the heirs' two-thirds interest in the rents, this will be corrected by charging one third of these taxes against the administratrix and two thirds thereof only against the shares of the heirs.

II. There was a mortgage on the land, and, as we understand it, one on the house and lot. The administratrix paid interest on each of these. Exception was taken to this, for that, as is said, the interest should be taken from the future rents of the estate. But the widow's distributive share was not subject to the payment of the husband's debts, even though secured by these mortgages, until the shares of the heirs therein had been exhausted. Mock v. Watson, 41 Iowa 241; Kendall v. Kendall, 42 Iowa 464. That the mortgages might be enforced against the realty did not impair the obligations as those of decedent; and claims for the indebtedness secured might have been filed against the administratrix, and payment enforced from the personal estate. Sharpless v. Gregg, 45 Iowa 649; Boyd v. Collins, 70 Iowa 296, 30 N.W. 574; James v. Weisman, 161 Iowa 488, 143 N.W. 428. That the widow's distributive share may not be subjected to the payment of a particular indebtedness does not relieve the personalty from being charged with its satisfaction. Real estate may not be resorted to for the payment of debts until personal property is exhausted or shown to be inadequate for that purpose, and the widow may share in the personal property only after the debts of the estate have been satisfied therefrom. This appears from Section 3362 of the Code:

"The personal property of the deceased not necessary for the payment of debts of decedent therefrom; and of this distributed to the same persons and in the same proportions as though it were real estate."

The personal estate is distributed only after provision for the payment of debts of decedent therefrom; and of this remainder, one third goes to the widow and two thirds to the heirs. As observed in Herriott v. Potter, 115 Iowa 648, 89 N.W. 91:

"While the right to the distributive share of personal property vests in the heirs at the time of the decedent's death, title to specific property and the amount to be received is not determined until distribution through the probate court is effected. This merely ascertains and segregates the particular portion to which each heir is entitled, and his title immediately attaches, and relates back to that of decedent, of whom he takes. Sections 3362, 3364, Code; Moore v. Gordon, 24 Iowa 158; Weaver's Estate v. State, 110 Iowa 328, 81 N.W. 603. See Foss v. Cobler, 105 Iowa 728, 75 N.W. 516. But at decedent's death, it passes to the possession and control of the executor or administrator, subject to his disposal; and only after the payment of the debts and costs of administration is it to be distributed. On the other hand, the title to real estate descends to the heirs eo instanti upon the death of the ancestor, with the quantity of each definitely ascertained. From that instant, subject to the right of the administrator to resort thereto for the payment of the debts of the deceased, they may dispose of the particular property as the owners, by sale, devise, or gift, and are entitled to possession and the rents and profits."

See Ritchie v. Barnes, 114 Iowa 67, 86 N.W. 48; Christe v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 104 Iowa 707, 74 N.W. 697.

We are of opinion that the mortgage indebtedness might have been established as a claim against the estate. Whether claim therefor or for the interest accruing was filed, does not appear; but, inasmuch as the matter of filing or proving of such a claim is not mentioned in argument, we may well assume that it was duly filed and established. No error in overruling this exception appears.

III. The administratrix credited herself with $ 20.45 paid Thomas Rinehart in December, 1914. She testified that this "was for repairs on the pump in the basement and on the furnace. Some of it was done before Mr. Dalton's death and some of it after, but it was all done on the homestead. Some of the bill was for connecting the sewer."

The bills or vouchers disclose that but $ 1.35 of the amount was for services or material furnished decedent, and that amount should have been allowed. The other items were dated long after his death, and while she was occupying the premises without rental charge. She had the right to the occupancy of the homestead until otherwise disposed of (Section 2985, Code); but this did not authorize her to keep it in repair at the expense of the estate, nor did it impose upon her, as administratrix, any duty to do anything in the way of keeping the same in repair; since her possession was that of widow, and she did not pretend to have taken possession as administratrix. As such, she had no concern with the realty, and the court erred in the allowance of more than $ 1.35 on this claim.

IV. The decedent had leased the farm, taking notes for rents payable for its use. Of the rent for 1914, one note for $ 201.50 became due November 1, 1914, and $ 1,200, February 1, 1915; and the rental for 1915 was evidenced by one note for $ 910.90, due November 1, 1915, and another for $ 1,200, due February 1, 1916. These notes were inventoried as personal property. The administratrix, however, retained one third thereof, on the theory that the moneys received were for rent to accrue, and should be treated as realty. The general rule is that rents accruing after the owner's death belong to the heirs or devisees, as an incident to the ownership of the land which descends to them. Swift v. Flynn, 145 Iowa 630, 124 N.W. 626; In re Pennock's Estate, 122 Iowa 622, 98 N.W. 480; Dexter v. Hayes, 88 Iowa 493, 55 N.W. 491; Crane v. Guthrie, 47 Iowa 542; Laverty v. Woodward, 16 Iowa 1. In the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, rent does not accrue until the tenant has enjoyed the use of the land during the period for which it is payable: that is, at the expiration of the term, unless shorter periods are designated in specifying the rent reserved. Dixon v. Niccolls, 39 Ill. 372 (89 Am. Dec. 312); Castleman v. De Val, 89 Md. 657 (43 A. 821); Wood v. Partridge, 11 Mass. 488; Kistler v. McBride, 65 N.J.L. 553 (48 A. 558). By agreement it may come due at an earlier date; and in this cause, the first rent note was payable November 1st following Dalton's death. When the crops may have matured was of no significance; for the rent was payable in money at a time in no manner dependent on the maturity or marketing thereof. Had the rental been a share of the crop, payable at maturity, then, of course, the rent would accrue at that time. Rents to accrue are chattels real, and, as said, pass upon the death of the owner to those who succeed to such ownership, i. e., the widow and heirs of said owner. 1 Woerner's American Law of Administration, Section 300; 24 Cyc. 1170, and cases collected in note.

No point is made as to whether the administratrix, as widow, had previously elected to take her distributive share in lieu of homestead; and we decide only that the rent had not accrued at the time of decedent's death, and that the right thereto...