In re Estate of Enyart
| Decision Date | 17 November 1916 |
| Docket Number | 18966 |
| Citation | 160 N.W. 120,100 Neb. 337 |
| Parties | IN RE ESTATE OF LOGAN ENYART. KATHERINE ENYART, APPELLEE, v. ALBERT F. ENYART ET AL., APPELLANTS |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the district court for Otoe county: JAMES T. BEGLEY JUDGE. Affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Jesse L. Root, L. F. Jackson, George W. Berge, Matthew Gering, John C. Watson, W. W. Wilson and D. W. Livingston, for appellants.
Paul Jessen, B. F. Good, William H. Pitzer and Edwin Zimmerer contra.
Appeal from a judgment of the district court which affirmed an order of the county court of Otoe county awarding Katherine Enyart, the widow of Logan Enyart, an allowance of $ 200 a month pending the settlement of the estate of her deceased husband. The appeal is taken by the administrator and the heirs and devisees of Logan Enyart, deceased. The question as to whether such allowance should be made has been made by the parties to depend upon the validity of an antenuptial agreement entered into by the parties. The estate of the deceased is a valuable one, and, while the amount involved in the present issue is comparatively small, the decision in the case is of great importance, as it affects the disposition of much valuable property. The contract is as follows:
This contract was acknowledged before Mr. Hawke, who was a notary public.
Objections to the claim were filed in the county court by the appellants, which set forth the antenuptial contract and pleaded that it was valid; that the contract was entered into in contemplation of marriage, for the purpose of making settlement of all property rights; that $ 7,500 has been paid on the contract; that Enyart gave to his wife in money and real estate before his death under the last clause of the agreement property of the value of $ 90,000; and gave about $ 40,000 worth to her daughter and grandson.
By reply Katherine Enyart denies that the conveyance and gifts to her were made under and in pursuance of the contract; denies that she ever received or retained any benefits under it; alleges that she had no knowledge of Enyart's business affairs or property at the time of marriage more than that he was able to comfortably provide for her, and that, being ignorant of her rights, and having no information as to the amount and value of his property, she signed the contract; that at the time, Enyart was worth nearly $ 300,000 and by reason of the facts she was defrauded of her marital rights; that afterwards her husband contended that the contract relieved him of any obligation to support her and other members of her family; that the contract is contrary to public policy and void; that the money paid to her by Enyart during his life had been spent for the support and maintenance of the family and the furnishing and supplying his home; that deeds to certain real estate delivered to her which were placed for safekeeping in a bank at Nebraska City were altered by inserting a clause that they were made in lieu of dower in Enyart's estate, which clause was inserted subsequent to delivery, and without her consent; that she has refused to accept the deeds or to claim title thereunder with said clause therein. She tenders these deeds to the administrator "until the validity of the clause which was placed in said deeds, without her knowledge or consent, can be determined." She also tenders a note for $ 10,000, signed by Enyart, payable to herself, and found with his papers after his death.
A number of assignments of error are relied upon for a reversal of the judgment of the district court. The first six of these relate to the alleged errors in receiving incompetent evidence. The remaining assignments are practically embraced within the contention that the decree upon the evidence should have been for the appellants.
The assignments of error with regard to the introduction of testimony must be overruled. We have repeatedly held that in a trial before a judge the admission of incompetent evidence does not furnish ground for the reversal of a judgment, provided that there is sufficient competent testimony in the record to convince this court that the judgment of the trial court is the judgment which should have been rendered upon the evidence. Smith v. Garbe, 86 Neb. 91, 124 N.W. 921; Clark Implement Co. v. Wiltfang, 87 Neb. 796, 128 N.W. 516; Kemmerling v. State, 89 Neb. 98, 130 N.W. 988; Smith Bros. v. Woodward, 94 Neb. 298. This is practically conceded in the brief of appellants.
Does the evidence justify the decree? The record is very voluminous, consisting of nearly 2,000 typewritten pages. The printed briefs cover 369 pages. Yet, the principles which determine the case are few and simple. We think it unnecessary to set out more of the evidence than its substance as to the incidents preceding the execution of the contract, since in our view the contract itself, when considered in connection with all the circumstances of its execution, furnishes sufficient data wherewith to test its validity.
In 1898, at the time of the marriage, Logan Enyart was a man of large means, owning several farms and a great deal of other property in this and other states. It is stipulated that at this time he was worth about $ 225,000. His first wife died in March, 1896. He was 68 years of age, and had no children. It was his custom when he visited Nebraska City, near which the farm upon which he resided was situated, to make his headquarters at a certain hotel. The appellee, then Katherine Richardson, was living at this hotel, where her husband had deserted her. She was about 34 years of age, and had a daughter about 15 years old. It was necessary for her to support herself and child. She assisted in the work in the hotel, and was treated practically as one of the family of the proprietor. She lived in the hotel for about two years after her husband deserted her, and during this time procured a divorce. Part of the time she was employed in a millinery store and in a dressmaking shop, but she worked at the hotel mornings and evenings. Enyart and the hotel proprietor were intimate friends, and when he came to the hotel he often was served at the family table, where Mrs. Richardson also sat. About a year before the marriage the parties became acquainted. After several months time, during which she often met Enyart at the hotel, Mrs. Richardson went to Auburn to act as housekeeper for a family there. She was gone about six months, and was visited by Enyart twice while there. She came back to the hotel from Auburn about a week or two before the marriage, announced her engagement, and lived at the hotel until the marriage took place.
Two days before the marriage Enyart, using a form book in part, dictated to Mr. Catron, a business associate and confidential friend, who reduced it to writing, the essential features of the contract. On the same day, at Enyart's request, Mr. Catron went to the hotel for Mrs. Richardson and brought her to his own home, where Enyart was waiting with Mr. Hawke, the notary, who was also a close friend of his. The proposed contract was read, either by her or to her, and it was there signed by both parties.
The contract was kept by Mr. Enyart, and was filed for record in December, 1902, in the office of the register of deeds of Otoe county. Enyart died on November 9, 1912. He made two wills and also left a large amount of valuable property undisposed of by will. One will disposed of certain property in Colorado and other states in which he had a partnership interest with his brother, A. F. Enyart. The will gave the brother all of this except $ 5,000, which was directed to be paid to the widow. The other will gave his interest in a cattle company owning 2,840 acres of land in Nebraska to six persons, Hazel R. Black, Mrs. Enyart's daughter, being one of them.
Whether an antenuptial contract,...
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