In re Expulsion of A.D. from United S. Cent. Pub. Sch. No. 2134
| Decision Date | 20 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | A14-1587 |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Expulsion of A.D. from United South Central Public Schools No. 2134. |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Reversed
Minnesota Department of Education
Andrea L. Jepsen, Amy J. Goetz, School Law Center, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator A.D.)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Martha J. Casserly, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Brenda Cassellius, commissioner of Department of Education)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson, Judge .
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
The United South Central School District suspended a student, A.D., after staff found a knife in her purse during a search of her locker. After an evidentiary hearing, the school board found that A.D. violated a school policy that forbids the possession of weapons on school property and that she engaged in conduct that endangered herself andothers. Based on those two findings, the school board expelled A.D. for the remainder of her junior year of high school, a period of approximately six weeks. The commissioner of education affirmed the expulsion. On appeal, A.D. argues that her expulsion violates the Pupil Fair Dismissal Act. We conclude that each of the bases for A.D.'s expulsion is improper. The first basis is improper because the school board did not find that A.D. willfully violated the applicable school policy when she carried the knife to school. The second basis is improper because the evidentiary record does not support the school board's finding that A.D. willfully engaged in conduct that endangered herself or others. Therefore, we reverse the expulsion.
On the morning of Tuesday, April 15, 2014, members of the staff of United South Central High School, which is located in the city of Wells, conducted a random search for contraband. The school building was placed on lockdown status while a drug-sniffing dog walked past students' lockers. Students were required to remain in their classrooms. A dog alerted on A.D.'s locker. School liaison officer Rick Herman performed a search of the locker. He found a purse and, inside the purse, a three-inch-long "hunting-style pocketknife." Herman did not find any drugs in A.D.'s locker; he testified that the dog may have alerted on A.D.'s locker because of the strong odor of perfume.
Herman secured the knife in his office and informed the school's principal, Kelly Schlaak, of the results of his search. Schlaak called A.D. to her office. Schlaak asked A.D. whether she knew why she had been called to the principal's office; A.D. answered, "you probably found my knife." A.D. said that she had put the knife in her purse over theweekend after using it to help with chores on her boyfriend's family's farm. She said that she intended to remove it from her purse afterward but forgot to do so. She said that she remembered that the knife was in her purse when the lockdown was announced. She confirmed that she was aware that the school has a policy that does not allow her to possess a knife at school.
Schlaak explained to A.D. that the school's policy obligated her to suspend A.D. for up to five days. Schlaak imposed a three-day suspension because A.D. was cooperative and appeared to be telling the truth. Schlaak prepared a written statement describing the incident, which A.D. signed. Schlaak informed A.D. that the school would investigate further and refer the matter to the district superintendent for a determination whether the district would commence expulsion proceedings.
On April 21, 2014, the school district served A.D. and her parents with a notice of proposed expulsion. Three days later, the school board held a hearing on the proposed expulsion. Herman, Schlaak, and superintendent Jeremy Jensen testified for the district. A.D. testified on her own behalf, along with her father, her part-time employer, the high school's athletic director, and a former pre-school teacher. Both Schlaak and A.D.'s witnesses testified that A.D. was an outstanding student who participated in sports and a mentoring program.
On the same day as the hearing, the school board issued written findings of fact, conclusions, and a recommendation that A.D. be expelled until the end of the 2013-2014 school year, a period of approximately six weeks. A.D. appealed the school board's expulsion decision to the commissioner of education pursuant to the Pupil Fair DismissalAct (PFDA). See Minn. Stat. § 121A.49 (2014). On July 10, 2014, the commissioner issued an order in which she affirmed the finding that expulsion is appropriate but concluded that the school board had failed to adequately explain its reasons for the duration of the expulsion. The commissioner remanded the matter to the school board with directions to provide additional justification for the duration of the expulsion. The school board reconvened on July 15, 2014, and issued a three-page letter to the commissioner in which it explained the factors it considered when deciding to expel A.D. for six weeks. On August 8, 2014, the commissioner issued a second order in which she affirmed the six-week duration of the expulsion. A.D. appeals to this court by way of a writ of certiorari.
In its responsive brief, the school district argues that A.D.'s appeal should be dismissed as moot. The school district contends, "The period of [A.D.]'s expulsion has passed and she has already returned to enrollment in the district." In her reply brief, A.D. argues that her appeal should not be dismissed as moot because she may suffer collateral consequences as a result of her expulsion.
In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 1989). An exception to the mootness doctrine exists if "collateral consequences attach to the judgment." In re McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d 326, 327(Minn. 1999). Under this exception, an appeal will not be dismissed as moot if the appellant can identify collateral consequences arising from the judgment, and an appellate court will presume that collateral consequences exist if "real and substantial disabilities attach to a judgment." Id. at 329 (quotation omitted).
A.D. contends that, without a decision from this court, she may suffer collateral consequences from the expulsion because, for example, she will be required to disclose the expulsion on applications to colleges and universities, and the expulsion may cause her to be denied acceptance. The school district contends in turn that there is no evidence in the record to support A.D's argument concerning collateral consequences and that A.D. will have been accepted to a college or university by the time this decision is released. But "if real and substantial disabilities attach to a judgment, we do not require actual evidence of collateral consequences but presume such consequences will result." Id. (quotation omitted). We presume that these collateral consequences exist because the possible disadvantages that A.D. could suffer if she is required to disclose her expulsion in undergraduate, postgraduate, or job applications are "real and substantial disabilities." See id.; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736 (1975) (); State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 546-47 n.1 (Minn. 1994) (). "A party may rebut this presumption of collateral consequences only by showing there is no possibility" of collateral consequences. McCaskill, 603N.W.2d at 329 (quotation omitted). The school district has not shown that there is no possibility that A.D. will be disadvantaged by her expulsion. Thus, A.D.'s appeal should not be dismissed as moot.
A.D. argues that the school board erred by expelling her in violation of the PFDA and that the commissioner erred by upholding the school board's decision.
Minn. Stat. § 14.69. We may affirm the commissioner's decision, remand for further proceedings, reverse, or modify the decision. Id. "Although in form we are reviewing the commissioner's decision . . . in substance we are reviewing the school board'sdecision directly." In re Expulsion of N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. App. 2008). We defer to the school board's factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. See In re Denial of Eller Media Co.'s Applications for Outdoor Advert. Device Permits, 664 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2003); see also In re Expulsion of I.A.L, 674 N.W.2d 741, 746 (Minn. App. 2004) (...
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