In Re Farmer.

• Decision Date: 24 February 1926
• Citation: 131 S.E. 661
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: In re FARMER. In re DUKE.

131 S.E. 661

In re FARMER. In re DUKE.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 24, 1926.

(191 N.C.)

In the matter of the applications of Rex L. Farmer and of Otis W. Duke for licenses to practice law. Applications denied.

Protests having been duly filed against the issuance of licenses to Rex L. Farmer and Otis W. Duke, two of the applicants for license to practice law at the January examination, 1926, on the ground, as alleged, that each is wanting in upright character, and the said applicants having met every other requirement, hearings to determine the merits of the protests were had before the Supreme Court in Raleigh, February 11, 1926, after due notice to protestants and respondents.

Application of Rex L. Farmer.

STACY, C. J. [1] Rex L. Farmer was one of the applicants for license to practice law in this state at the January examination, held in the city of Raleigh on Monday, January 25, 1926. Before entering upon the examination and some time prior thereto, said applicant was notified of a protest on file in the clerk's office against the issuance of a license to him, on the ground that "he isnot a citizen of upright character." ' Not-withstanding this protest, which is signed by a number of residents of Wilson county, the applicant, who had complied with all the preliminary requirements, persisted in taking the examination and has tendered a creditable paper showing that he has a competent knowledge of the law; hence the question raised by the protest is directly presented. See rule 3 1/2 (a), 190 N. C.—.

C. S. § 194, provides that no person shall practice law in this state without first obtaining license to do so from the Supreme Court; that all examinations shall be in writing, and based upon such course of study, and conducted under such rules, as the court may prescribe; and, further, that all applicants who satisfy the court of their competent knowledge of the law and upright character shall receive license to practice law in all the courts of the state. Due notice having been issued to protestants and respondent, the matter was heard in open court on February 11, 1926, the protestants being represented by R. F. Mintz, of Wilson, and the respondent by O. P. Dickinson, of Wilson.

The protest, among other things, is based upon allegations, supported by affidavits, to the effect that the respondent Rex. L. Farmer is a man of questionable character; that, in his office as a justice of the peace of Wilson county, he has not only failed to make due returns and account for moneys and things intrusted to him, but, in some instances, he has converted them to his own use; and that he has generally engaged in unethical practices.

It is alleged that on or about September 15, 1925, one Olive Crayer (or Clary) issued a state warrant against J. W. Miller before the said Rex L. Farmer, charging the defendant with "fraudulently obtaining a diamond ring"; that the ring was delivered to the justice of the peace in lieu of an appearance bond, but was not reported to the clerk of the superior court, as the papers in the case were never sent up by the justice of the peace; and that in response to a writ of recordari issued by the superior court of Wilson county, the said justice of the peace incorporated the following statement in his return:

"Warrant served, and defendant and prosecuting witness both appearing before the undersigned, the defendant agreed to return to the prosecuting witness the ring in question, whereupon the prosecuting witness withdrew the prosecution. Cost in the case being paid by the prosecuting witness.

"A statement was made to the undersigned justice of the peace by the defendant that he did not believe the ring was the legal property of the prosecuting witness; however the defendant admitted he had no claim upon the ring, and upon this statement the undersigned informed the prosecutrix that she would have to show how she came by the ring before the justice of the peace felt justified in returning to her the ring, whereupon the prosecuting witness, Olive Clary, agreed that it would be to her satisfaction for the undersigned to hold said ring until such time as she could prove her legal ownership.

"The ring in question is now in the possession of the undersigned as a trustee and not in custodia legis, and will be delivered to the rightful owner at the proper time.

"In consequence of the foregoing, the papers in the case were destroyed.

"Rex L. Farmer, Justice of the Peace."

The above return was accompanied by three affidavits, no reason being assigned therefor, in which the affiants, purporting to speak of their own knowledge, corroborate the statement of the justice of the peace as to how he came into the possession of the ring and why he continued to hold it. But, as against this return, it is alleged, and not denied, that in December, 1925, the said J. W. Miller sued out a claim and delivery against the said Rex L. Farmer in the county court of Wilson county to recover the possession of the diamond ring in question, and that it was adjudged in said county court that J. W. Miller was legally entitled to its possession.

There are several charges, supported by affidavits, of bad checks being turned over to the respondent as a justice of the peace, collected by him, and no satisfactory accounting made of them. It is also alleged, but without supporting affidavit and vigorously denied, that the respondent has failed and refused to account for all the funds received by him while an officer of the Wilson Ku Klux Klan. It is further alleged, as tending to show the respondent's attitude toward the law and the courts, that on or about October 30, 1925, while hearing a case, some reference was made to a Supreme Court ruling, in reply to which the respondent said:

"To hell with the d—— Supreme Court. I don't give a d—— for the Supreme Court or any other court. I am running my own court as I d—— please."

The respondent denies that any such language was ever used by him.

In addition, the protestants have offered a number of affidavits to the effect that the res]Kindent is not generally regarded as a reliable man or as a man of good moral character, but, on the other hand, that he is generally considered to be a man of bad character.

In answer to these charges, the respondent has offered a large number of affidavits from citizens of Wilson county who testify to his general good character, and one in particular which states that, while he may have exhibited some faults and frailties in his immature years, it has been a matter of gratification to his friends to witness the calm, equable, and well-poised manner in which hehas approached his riper manhood. The respondent further contends that the matters and things herein complained of should not be held to bar his right to receive license to practice law in this state, because he alleges, the protestants are not actuated by proper motives, but by ill will towards him. However this may be, the court must base its judgment on the record.

After a careful and painstaking consideration of all the matters contained in the papers before us, and with a full appreciation of the effect of our decision, we are constrained to believe that the evidence adduced shows such a lack of moral perception, or careless indifference to the rights of others, as to render the court unable to say that the respondent Rex L. Farmer possesses the necessary upright character to entitle him to license to practice law.

This "upright character, " prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often in the will to do the. unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. "Character, " said Mr. Erskine in the trial of Thomas Hardy for high treason, "is the slow-spreading influence of opinion arising from the deportment of a man in society, as a man's deportment, good or bad, necessarily produces one circle without another and so extends itself till it unites in one general opinion." Even more is this true when the restoration of character, as here, is the subject of consideration. It is then a matter of time and growth.

The reason and policy underlying the statute were fully discussed on a former occasion (In re Applicants for License, 55 S. E. 635, 143 N. C. 1, 10 L. R. A. [N. S.] 2S8, 10 Ann. Cas. 187), at which time, Brown, J., gave the following expression to his views:

"The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he possessed an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling—a curse instead of a benefit to his community—a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin."

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper....