In re Feddersen, 06-30088.
Decision Date | 15 November 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 06-30088.,06-30088. |
Citation | 355 B.R. 738 |
Parties | In re: Ronald L. FEDDERSEN and Karen L. Feddersen, Debtors. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Marilyn J. Washburn, St. Louis, MO, for Creditor-Objector.
Karl J. Wulff, Collinsville, IL, for Debtor.
ORDER OVERRULING DAIMLERCHRYSLER'S OBJECTION TO DEBTORS' CHAPTER 13 PLAN
This matter came before the Court on DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Americas, L.L.C.'s, as successor in interest to DaimlerChrysler Services North America L.L.C., ("Daimler") Objection to Confirmation of Debtors Ronald L. Feddersen and " Karen L. Feddersen's ("Debtors") Chapter 13 plan (the "Plan"). The Court conducted a hearing on October 19, 2006, and having reviewed the parties' various submissions, now issues the following Order.1
Debtors filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on January 25, 2006. Within 910 days of the petition date, Debtor had entered into a purchase-money security agreement with Daimler for the purchase of a 2004 Dodge Caravan (the "Vehicle"). Pursuant to their Plan, Debtors have proposed to surrender the Vehicle to Daimler in full satisfaction of Daimler's claim. Daimler has objected to that treatment.
The parties' dispute arises as a result of sweeping changes made to the United States Bankruptcy Code, and in particular to Code § 1325(a)(5), by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), which went into effect on October 17, 2005. As amended by BAPCPA, § 1325(a)(5) now provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if—
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan—
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B) the plan provides that—
* * * * * *
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; and (iii) if—
(I) property to be distributed pursuant to this subsection is in the form of periodic payments, such payments shall be in equal monthly amounts; and
(II) the holder of the claim is secured by personal property, the amount of such payments shall not be less than an amount sufficient to provide the holder of such claim adequate protection during the period of the plan; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder....
* * * * * *
For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor has a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910 — day [period] preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1 — year period preceding that filing.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (italics added)2
Pre-BAPCPA, § 506(a)3 of the Code provided for the bifurcation of secured claims into unsecured and secured portions based on the value of the collateral, without regard as to when such collateral was purchased. If a debtor chose to retain and pay for the collateral through the Chapter 13 plan, he could "cram down" the debt by paying the value of the collateral as a secured claim, while paying the unsecured portion pro rata with other unsecured creditors. If a debtor chose instead to surrender the collateral, the creditor would file either an estimated unsecured deficiency claim using the § 506(a) bifurcation process or would first sell the collateral as prescribed under state law and then file a claim for a deficiency. Either way, the claim would be paid pro rata with other unsecured claims. Under BAPCPA, a debtor may still "cram down" a secured claim, so long as the collateral was not purchased within 910 days of the petition date or otherwise within the scope of the Anti-Cramdown Paragraph.
Here, the Debtors concede that Daimler's claim is subject to the Anti-Cramdown Paragraph in that the Vehicle was purchased within 910 days of the petition date for their personal use but argue that they may nevertheless surrender the Vehicle through their plan pursuant to § 1325(a)(5)(C) in full satisfaction of Daimler's "secured" claim. In other words, the Debtors contend that pursuant to the Anti-Cramdown Paragraph, Daimler is no longer allowed to bifurcate its claim under § 506 to assert either an unsecured or secured "deficiency" claim.
A growing number of courts have already addressed this issue and have almost universally concluded that a creditor may not assert a deficiency claim upon the surrender of collateral subject to the Anti-Cramdown Paragraph. The leading case on the issue is In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2006). As here, the debtors in Ezell proposed to surrender a 910 — vehicle in full satisfaction of the creditor's secured claim, arguing that the Anti-Cramdown Paragraph eliminated the creditor's ability to assert a deficiency claim. The creditor argued that, in the absence of bifurcation under § 506, its entire claim must be treated by the plan as secured and paid in full. Various intervenors-consisting mostly of lending institutions-further argued that § 506 did not apply pre-BAPCPA in cases involving the surrender of collateral and, thus, that it did not apply post-BAPCPA.
In ruling in favor of the Debtor, the Ezell court examined the mechanics and historical application of §§ 1325(a)(5) and 506 and found that § 506 clearly applied under pre-BAPCPA law to situations in which the debtor surrendered the subject collateral to the secured creditor pursuant to § 1325(a)(5)(C). Ezell, 338 B.R. at 338. From there, the court concluded that the Anti — Cramdown Paragraph's language that § 506 "shall not apply" to 910-Vehicles was clear and, as such, that it had "no choice but to interpret the Anti-Cramdown paragraph as written, i.e., that it applies to both Revised § 1325(a)(5)(B) and (C)." Id. at 341. Other courts have reached consistent conclusions. See, e.g., In re Payne, 347 B.R. 278, 283 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio2006) (); In re Long, 2006 WL 2090246 *1 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2006) (); In re Brown, 346 B.R. 868, 874 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.2006) () ; In re Sparks, 346 B.R. 767, 773 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2006) () ; and In re Osborn, 348 B.R. 500, 505 (Bankr. W.D.Mo.2006) () .
The Court agrees that the Anti-Cramdown Paragraph, while arguably awkwardly incorporated into § 1325(a)(5), is clear and unambiguous. On its face, the provision's application is not limited to claims treated under § 1325(a)(2)(3). Rather, it clearly states that "for purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply to a claim described in that paragraph ...." Accordingly, the Court Ends that it applies equally to claims treated under § 1325(a)(2)(C). That conclusion, however, does not necessarily resolve the parties' dispute. A court may look past "the express language of a statute ... where a literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result or thwart the purpose of the overall statutory scheme." United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1090, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991); see also Marlowe v. Bottarelli, 938 F.2d 807, 812 (7th Cir.1991) () (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190, 111 S.Ct. 599, 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 608 (1991)) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982)).
While the Court may be justified under the rules of statutory construction to look past the unambiguous language of the Anti-Qramdown Paragraph, there is not much at which to look. As explained by Ezell, "a review of the legislative history ... does not provide any...
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