In re First Merit Bank

Decision Date14 June 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-0548,00-0548
Citation52 S.W.3d 749
Parties(Tex. 2001) In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A. f/k/a Signal Bank, N.A. and Mobile Consultants, Inc., Relators
CourtTexas Supreme Court
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Justice Enoch delivered the opinion of the Court.

FirstMerit Bank and Mobile Consultants seek mandamus relief after the trial court denied their motion to compel arbitration. Because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires the trial court to compel arbitration in this case, we conditionally grant their petition and order the trial court to compel arbitration in accordance with the parties' agreement.

I. BACKGROUND

Pete and Janie de los Santos purchased a mobile home for their daughter, Sarah, and her husband, Gary Alvarez. They bought the home from Verde Homes under Verde's retail installment financing agreement. Verde assigned this contract, which Pete and Janie signed, to Signal Bank (now FirstMerit Bank). The agreement contained an Arbitration Addendum, which required binding arbitration for "all disputes, claims, or other matters in question arising out of or relating to this Loan, its interpretation, validity, performance or the breach thereof." The word "Loan" referred to "all manufactured home loan documents, including but not limited to the retail installment contract. . . ." The Addendum further stated that "the scope of arbitrability is broad and includes, without limitation, contractual, tort, statutory, and caselaw claims." The Addendum also permitted the bank to seek judicial relief to enforce its security interest, recover the buyers' monetary loan obligation, and foreclose. But aside from these three exceptions, the Addendum required arbitration for all other disputes relating to the installment contract.

After Verde delivered the home, the de los Santoses tried to revoke their acceptance, claiming that the home was defective and that Verde failed to perform certain promised repairs. Although Verde Homes refused to rescind the sale, the de los Santoses apparently stopped making their monthly loan payments. In response, Signal Bank took possession of the home. The de los Santoses then sued Signal Bank, Mobile Consultants (Signal's servicing agent), Verde Homes, and two Verde employees, alleging breach of contract, revocation of acceptance, breach of warranty, negligence, and fraud. They also alleged violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and Fair Credit Reporting Act. Additionally, the de los Santoses claimed that their successful revocation of acceptance entitled them to a security interest in the home, equal to the amount they had paid on the installment contract. To enforce their security interest, they requested an injunction forcing FirstMerit to return possession of the home until it refunded the de los Santoses' loan payments.

In response, FirstMerit and Mobile moved to compel arbitration.1 The trial court denied their motion. FirstMerit Bank and Mobile then petitioned the Third Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus, which the court denied. FirstMerit and Mobile now ask this Court for mandamus relief.

II. WHETHER TO ORDER ARBITRATION

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only in limited circumstances.2 A court should issue mandamus only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a legal duty when there is no other adequate remedy at law.3 When a trial court erroneously denies a party's motion to compel arbitration under the FAA, the movant has no adequate remedy at law and is entitled to a writ of mandamus.4 Thus, we must determine whether the movants established their right to arbitration.

A party seeking to compel arbitration by mandamus must first establish the existence of an arbitration agreement subject to the FAA.5 Once the movant establishes an agreement, the court must then determine whether the arbitration agreement covers the nonmovant's claims.6 Because state and federal policies continue to favor arbitration,7 a presumption exists favoring agreements to arbitrate under the FAA,8 and courts must resolve any doubts about an arbitration agreement's scope in favor of arbitration.9 Once the trial court concludes that the arbitration agreement encompasses the claims, and that the party opposing arbitration has failed to prove its defenses,10 the trial court has no discretion but to compel arbitration and stay its own proceedings.11

A. SCOPE OF ARBITRATION

Here, there is no dispute about the Arbitration Addendum's existence. The de los Santoses instead contend that the installment contract was completed entirely in Texas, did not involve interstate commerce, and, accordingly, was not subject to the FAA. As defined in the FAA, however, "interstate commerce" is not limited to the interstate shipment of goods, but includes all contracts "relating to" interstate commerce.12 In fact, the United States Supreme Court has construed the FAA to extend as far as the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution will reach.13 In this case, the evidence demonstrates that the loan was made in interstate commerce. Signal Bank and Mobile Consultants were Ohio corporations, while the de los Santoses were Texas residents. The installment contract stated that Signal Bank was located in Ohio. The record includes several photocopies of loan payment checks drawn on a Texas bank that Signal Bank had deposited in Ohio. And both Signal and Mobile Consultants corresponded with the de los Santoses from Ohio. The de los Santoses also listed Signal's Ohio address at the top of their revocation of acceptance letter. Moreover, the Arbitration Addendum, which Pete and Janie de los Santos both signed, states that the loan "involves interstate commerce . . . and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act . . . ." In light of these facts, we conclude that the installment contract relates to interstate commerce and is subject to the FAA.14

Because FirstMerit and Mobile have established the existence of an agreement to arbitrate under the FAA, we must next determine whether the Arbitration Addendum covers the de los Santoses' claims. To determine whether a party's claims fall within an arbitration agreement's scope, we focus on the complaint's factual allegations rather than the legal causes of action asserted.15 And again, we resolve any doubts about the Arbitration Addendum's factual scope in favor of coverage. Further, we reiterate that the parties' Arbitration Addendum covers "all disputes, claims, or other matters in question arising out of or relating to this Loan, its interpretation, validity, performance, or the breach thereof" and states that "the scope of arbitrability is broad and includes, without limitation, contractual, tort, statutory, and case law claims."

We now turn to the de los Santoses' factual allegations. The de los Santoses asserted that the sellers misrepresented that they owned the homesite, and that the homesite included a driveway and septic system. They also claimed that the sellers were not properly licensed, misrepresented the terms of the loan, failed to provide a credit report to Sarah and Gary Alvarez, and failed to make other disclosures regarding interest rates and credit. The de los Santoses further alleged that the sellers fraudulently double-charged them for insurance that was already paid for in the installment contract. In addition, the de los Santoses asserted that after taking possession of the home, they learned that the home was not yet complete, that it lacked carpeting and air conditioning, and that it was not installed properly. They also charged that the sellers failed to repair these defects in a timely and workmanlike manner, that they never installed an air conditioner, and that the sellers' attempts to repair the septic tank were untimely and defective. Finally, the de los Santoses asserted that the bank wrongfully denied their attempt to revoke the contract, criminally trespassed on their property, and wrongfully repossessed the home.

In light of the Addendum's broad language, all of the de los Santoses' factual allegations fall within the Addendum's scope. The de los Santoses contend that because the Addendum "relat(es) to the Loan," it only covers claims that relate directly to the home's financing, and does not cover their allegations about the home's post-sale condition and repairs. But this interpretation ignores the Addendum's broad definition of "Loan" to include the installment contract and all other loan documents. Further, irrespective of the Addendum's broad language, we also note that the home was the bank's collateral under the Loan. The de los Santoses alleged that the sellers' failure to remedy the home's physical problems entitled them to a security interest in the home, which would prevent the bank from repossessing its collateral.16 Thus, the home's post-sale condition, and the sellers' post-sale failure to remedy the home's problems, relate to the bank's right to repossess its collateral under the loan. In sum, all of the de los Santoses' factual allegations arise out of or relate to either the sellers' conduct in selling the home and negotiating the installment contract, or to the performance or alleged breach of the installment contract. Furthermore, while fraud in the inducement of an arbitration agreement is a defense to arbitration, whether the sellers made any misrepresentations in the inducement of the underlying contract relates to the contract's validity and can be arbitrated.17 As for the de los Santoses' wrongful repossession allegations, the Addendum provides that "any counterclaims in suits brought by Seller/Assignee pursuant to this provision," including complaints about foreclosure, may be arbitrated. Given the Addendum's language on counterclaims, the Arbitration Addendum covers all of the de los...

To continue reading

Request your trial
854 cases
  • Cronus Offshore, Inc. v. Kerr Mcgee Oil & Gas
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
    • February 9, 2004
    ...Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177-78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 966, 118 S.Ct. 412, 139 L.Ed.2d 315 (1997); In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex.2001); Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 524 (Tex.1998); Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, ......
  • Dallas County Community College v. Bolton
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • December 2, 2005
    ...if he refuses or fails to comply. State v. Akin Prods. Co., 155 Tex. 348, 286 S.W.2d 110, 111-12 (1956); see also In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex.2001). We have applied these rules to the imposition of illegal fees as well as illegal taxes, holding that a party may seek......
  • Berent v. CMH Homes, Inc.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • June 5, 2015
    ...; Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., 73 N.Y.2d 133, 538 N.Y.S.2d 513, 535 N.E.2d 643, 646 (1989) ; see also In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex.2001) (noting that “[m]ost federal courts ... have rejected” claims of unconscionability because “an arbitration clause does not re......
  • In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. Fsb
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • August 24, 2007
    ...validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator."); In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Tex.2001). 13. See In re AdvancePCS Health L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Tex.2005); EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias, 934 S.W.2d 87, 90 (T......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 books & journal articles
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Texas DTPA Forms & Practice
    • March 31, 2016
    ...(Tex. 1998), §§8.01.5, 8.01.6 In re Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. , 258 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. 2008), §8.01.7.2 In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A. , 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001), §§8.01.7, 8.01.7.1, 8.01.7.3 In re Fleetwood Homes of Tex., L.P. , 257 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2008), §8.01.7.2 In re Halliburton Co. , ......
  • Pre-Trial Proceedings
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Texas DTPA Forms & Practice
    • March 31, 2016
    ...Act will apply coextensively with the TGA. Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps , 842 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992); see In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A. , 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001) (“interstate commerce” includes contracts “relating to” interstate commerce). In such cases, the FAA will preempt the TGA (and any......
  • Chapter 25-3 Resisting Arbitration
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Texas Commercial Causes of Action Claims Title Chapter 25 Pleading to Avoid or Compel Arbitration*
    • Invalid date
    ...924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. 1996).[26] In re First Merit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W. 749, 753 (Tex. 2001).[27] In re First Merit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001); In re Poly-Am., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 348 (Tex. 2008).[28] In re First Merit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001).[29] Hen......
  • Show Me the Money?: Washington Adopts the Cost Prohibitive Defense to Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts
    • United States
    • Seattle University School of Law Seattle University Law Review No. 27-02, December 2003
    • Invalid date
    ...See Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, 111 Wash. App. 446, 45 P.3d 594 (2002); Conseco, 47 S.W.3d 335 (Ky. App. 2001); In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 9. 111 Wash. App. 446, 45 P.3d 594 (2002). 10. Id. at 464, 45 P.3d at 604. 11. Id. at 450, 45 P.3d at 597. 12. Id. 13. E.g., id. at 458......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT