In re Floersheim
Decision Date | 05 May 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 18313.,18313. |
Citation | 316 F.2d 423 |
Parties | In re Sydney FLOERSHEIM. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
James McI. Henderson, Gen. Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D. C., and Charles C. Moore, Jr., and Raymond J. Lloyd, Attys. of the Federal Trade Commission, San Francisco, Cal., appointed to prosecute on behalf of this Court.
Murray M. Chotiner, Beverly Hills, Cal., for respondent.
Before ORR, BARNES and HAMLEY, Circuit Judges.
This court heretofore issued an order to show cause why the respondent herein, Sydney Floersheim, should not be adjudged in criminal contempt, and punished, for a violation of this court's order. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). The proceeding was instituted at the request of the Federal Trade Commission. The decree herein involved was the final decree (filed December 29, 1959 by this court in its Cause No. 16328, entitled Mitchell S. Mohr, et al., Petitioners, vs. Federal Trade Commission, Respondent) enforcing the order to cease and desist theretofore issued by the Federal Trade Commission originally on June 1, 1956, and modified by the order dated November 14, 1958. The modified order of November 14, 1958, required respondent Floersheim, and his predecessor in interest, "to forthwith cease and desist from:
An answer to the order to show cause was filed by Floersheim, denying any knowing, wilful or intentional violation, disobedience or failure to comply with this court's order of December 29, 1959, and as a separate defense, that the Federal Trade Commission had represented to him that certain language, if used by respondent Floersheim in his "forms," would constitute compliance by him with the Trade Commission's and this court's orders. Petitioner filed a reply denying the nature and extent of the alleged agreement as to what would constitute compliance or noncompliance.
A stipulation had previously been entered into between the parties in the Federal Trade Commission proceedings, covering all essential facts here involved.
We likewise refer to and incorporate herein paragraph five of the above mentioned stipulation.1
The various forms used are attached to the stipulation as Exhibits 1 to 14, inclusive; and to the petition filed in this Court, as Attachments 7 to 18, inclusive.2 We will herein make reference to the attachment numbers.
Each of the forms, save No. 7 (an envelope) and No. 11a (the reverse of No. 11), contained among other statements one important sentence, referring to two matters — in which the second reference was at times enlarged. Thus, on each form appeared the words:
"The purpose of this card is to obtain information concerning a delinquent debtor, * * *"
and there then followed the words:
Respondent counters with the suggestion that it would be difficult to express any more clearly the intent of the cease and desist order than by doing what he has here done, use the precise language of the order, which in paragraph one required respondent to represent "that the purpose for which the information is requested is that of obtaining information concerning delinquent debtors." Having stated specifically "the purpose of this card is to obtain information concerning a delinquent debtor," respondent could do no more unless he so printed or composed the card's form as to obscure, or hide, or weaken in some appreciable degree, the bald statement quoted. This was so done, urges the Federal Trade Commission, by placing such language in small type in the middle of larger paragraphs. "Not so," replies respondent,
"Like the small print exclusions in an insurance policy," urges petitioner — "the average recipient would pay no attention to it!"
We cannot assume that which is clearly expressed in plain English language on any form sent to any literate recipient in this country would not be read, or not be understood. If that were true, no notice of any kind would be sufficient. It may be difficult to make the American public heed or read a printed statement of fact, but it is there so that all who look...
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Gustafson, In re
...F.2d 561, 564 (D.C.Cir.1973); see also United States v. Marx, 553 F.2d 874, 876 (4th Cir. 1977) (§ 401(3) contempt); In re Floersheim, 316 F.2d 423, 428 (9th Cir. 1963) (same). Tested against this standard, Gustafson's behavior was contemptuous. He repeatedly ignored objections sustained by......
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Richmond Black Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Richmond, Va.
...1914), that a person willfully, Panico v. United States, 375 U.S. 29, 84 S.Ct. 19, 11 L.Ed.2d 1 (1963), contumaciously, In Re Floersheim, 316 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1963), intentionally, In Re Brown, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 156, 454 F.2d 999 (1971), with a wrongful state of mind, In Re Farquhar, 160 U......
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United States v. Bukowski
...trial. Cf. United States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168, 172-173 (7th Cir. 1947); In re Floersheim, 316 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1963). Courts certainly have no interest in punishing nonexistent contempts or convicting accused contemnors upon questionable proof. ......
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In re Brown
...397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Cliett v. Hammonds, 305 F.2d 565, 569-570 (5th Cir. 1962); In re Floersheim, 316 F.2d 423, 428 (9th Cir. 1963); Yates v. United States, 316 F.2d 718, 725 (10th Cir. 43 See note 3, supra. 44 See text supra following note 3. 45 See text supr......