In re Flynn

Decision Date24 June 2020
Docket NumberNo. 20-5143,20-5143
Citation961 F.3d 1215
Parties IN RE: Michael T. FLYNN, Petitioner
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Sidney Powell argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the petition for a writ of mandamus were Molly McCann and Jesse R. Binnall, Alexandria, VA.

Jeffrey B. Wall, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent United States of America. With him on the response to the petition for a writ of mandamus were Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Washington, DC, Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Kenneth C. Kohl, Acting Principal Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Jocelyn Ballantine, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

David Yost, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Ohio, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, Steve Marshall, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama, Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alaska, Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Arkansas, Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Florida, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Georgia, Jeff Landry, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Mississippi, Eric Schmitt, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Missouri, Timothy C. Fox , Attorney General, Of fice of the Attorney G eneral for the State o f Montana, Mike Hunter, Attorney General, Office of the Attorne y General for the State of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, Ken Paxton, Attorney General, Office of th e Attorney Gen eral for the S tate of Texas, Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Utah, and Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of West Virginia, were on the brief for amici curiae the States in support of petitioner.

William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, Herbert W. Titus, Vienna, VA, and Robert J. Olson were on the brief for amici curiae Former United States Attorney General Edwin Meese III and Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund in support of petitioner.

Jerome M. Marcus, Wyncote, PA, was on the brief for amici curiae Eleven Members of the United States House of Representatives in support of petitioner.

John Reeves, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae John M. Reeves in support of petitioner and the United States.

Michael H. McGinley, Philadelphia, PA, was on the brief for amici curiae Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Senators Tom Cotton, Mike Braun, Kevin Cramer, Ted Cruz, Charles E. Grassley, and Rick Scott in support of the United States.

Leslie McAdoo Gordon was on the brief for amicus curiae Federal Practitioners in support of petitioner and the United States.

Eric B. Rasmusen, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae Professor Eric Rasmusen in support of petitioner.

Beth A. Wilkinson, Washington, DC, argued the cause for respondent Judge Emmet G. Sullivan. With her on the response to the petition for a writ of mandamus were Kosta S. Stojilkovic and Rakesh Kilaru, Washington, DC.

Eugene R. Fidell, Washington, DC, Stanley J. Marcus, and Gershon M. Ratner were on the brief for amicus curiae Lawyers Defending American Democracy, Inc. in support of respondent.

Lawrence Robbins, Alan E. Untereiner, Washington, DC, D. Hunter Smith, and William W. Taylor III, Washington, DC, were on the brief for amicus curiae Watergate Prosecutors in support of respondent.

Daniel E. Jackson and John W. Keker, San Francisco, CA, were on the brief for amicus curiae Former Federal District Court Jurists in support of respondent.

Gregory S. Smith was on the brief for amicus curiae New York City Bar Association in support of respondent.

Before: Henderson, Wilkins, and Rao, Circuit Judges.

Opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge Wilkins.

Rao, Circuit Judge:

Michael Flynn, former National Security Advisor to President Donald J. Trump, pleaded guilty to making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Before sentencing, Flynn moved to withdraw his plea, alleging that the government failed to produce material exculpatory evidence and breached the plea agreement. Several months later, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia filed a motion to dismiss all charges. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) ("The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint."). In its motion, the government explains that in light of newly discovered evidence of misconduct by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the prosecution can no longer prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any false statements made by Flynn were material to a legitimate investigation—an element the government contends is necessary under Section 1001. See United States v. Gaudin , 515 U.S. 506, 509, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). The government's motion to dismiss also explains that "continued prosecution of the charged crime does not serve a substantial federal interest." Gov't Mot. Dismiss Criminal Information, No. 1:17-cr-232, ECF No. 198, at 2 (May 7, 2020). The district judge currently presiding over the case has yet to decide the government's motion. Instead, he has appointed an amicus to present arguments in opposition to the government's motion and to address whether Flynn should be held in criminal contempt for perjury. The district judge has also scheduled a hearing on these questions for July 16, 2020.

Flynn petitioned for a writ of mandamus before this court pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, seeking three forms of relief: (1) an order directing the district court to grant the motion to dismiss; (2) an order vacating the amicus appointment; and (3) an order reassigning the case to a different district judge. For this court to grant a writ of mandamus, "the right to relief must be ‘clear and indisputable’; there must be ‘no other adequate means to attain the relief’; and ‘the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.’ " In re Cheney , 544 F.3d 311, 312–13 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court , 542 U.S. 367, 380–81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) ). Applying these standards, we grant Flynn's petition in part.

Although Rule 48 requires "leave of court" before dismissing charges, "decisions to dismiss pending criminal charges—no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring—lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion." United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V. , 818 F.3d 733, 742 (D.C. Cir. 2016). "To that end, the Supreme Court has declined to construe Rule 48(a) ’s ‘leave of court requirement to confer any substantial role for courts in the determination whether to dismiss charges." Id. ; see also Newman v. United States , 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding ... whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought."). The Judiciary's role under Rule 48 is thus confined to "extremely limited circumstances in extraordinary cases." United States v. Hamm , 659 F.2d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 1981) ; United States v. Ammidown , 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasizing that Rule 48 motions must be granted "in the overwhelming number of cases"). More specifically, "[t]he principal object of the ‘leave of court requirement is ... to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment ... when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant's objection." Rinaldi v. United States , 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15, 98 S.Ct. 81, 54 L.Ed.2d 207 (1977). Rule 48 thus "gives no power to a district court to deny a prosecutor's ... motion to dismiss charges based on a disagreement with the prosecution's exercise of charging authority." Fokker Servs. , 818 F.3d at 742.1

Whatever the precise scope of Rule 48 ’s "leave of court" requirement, this is plainly not the rare case where further judicial inquiry is warranted. To begin with, Flynn agrees with the government's motion to dismiss, and there has been no allegation that the motion reflects prosecutorial harassment. Additionally, the government's motion includes an extensive discussion of newly discovered evidence casting Flynn's guilt into doubt. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 198. Specifically, the government points to evidence that the FBI interview at which Flynn allegedly made false statements was "untethered to, and unjustified by, the FBI's counterintelligence investigation into Mr. Flynn." Id. at 2. In light of this evidence, the government maintains it cannot "prove either the relevant false statements or their materiality beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Insufficient evidence is a quintessential justification for dismissing charges. See Ammidown , 497 F.2d at 623 (explaining that a motion to dismiss should be granted "if it is explained to the judge that there was ... an insufficiency of evidence ... or other similar consideration").

The government's representations about the insufficiency of the evidence are entitled to a "presumption of regularity ... in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary." United States v. Armstrong , 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996) (quotation marks omitted). On the record before the district court, there is no clear evidence contrary to the government's representations. The justifications the district court offers in support of further inquiry—for instance, that only the U.S. Attorney signed the motion, without any line prosecutors, and that the motion...

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4 cases
  • In re Flynn
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 31 Agosto 2020
    ...different trial judge. I dissent as to the majority's merits holding for the reasons stated in the majority opinion in In re Flynn , 961 F.3d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2020), vacated , reh'g en banc granted No. 20-5143, 2020 WL 4355389 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 2020) ; further, I join Judge Rao's dis......
  • United States v. Flynn
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 8 Diciembre 2020
    ...granted in part Mr. Flynn's petition and directed the Court to grant the government's unopposed Rule 48(a) motion. In re Flynn , 961 F.3d 1215, 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The panel majority declined to reassign the case to a new judge, id. at 1223 ; and vacated as moot the Order appointin......
  • United States v. Buckingham
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • 9 Diciembre 2020
    ...states, dismissal under Rule 48 is a mechanism of prosecutorial discretion and not a decision for this court. See In re Flynn, 961 F.3d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2020) ("the Supreme Court has declined to construe Rule 48(a)'s 'leave of court' requirement to confer any substantial role for court......
  • Lefebure v. D'Aquilla
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 5 Octubre 2021
    ...accepted amicus briefs from former federal judges, notwithstanding its earlier decision in Boumediene . See , e.g. , In re Flynn , 961 F.3d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (listing amicus brief of former federal district judges); In re Leopold , 964 F.3d 1121, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (listing ami......

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