Lefebure v. D'Aquilla

• Decision Date: 05 October 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-30702 consolidated with No. 19-30989,19-30702 consolidated with No. 19-30989
• Citation: 15 F.4th 670
• Parties: Priscilla LEFEBURE, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Samuel D'AQUILLA, 20th Judicial District, individually and in his official capacity as District Attorney, Defendant— Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

15 F.4th 670

Priscilla LEFEBURE, Plaintiff—Appellee,

v.Samuel D'AQUILLA, 20th Judicial District, individually and in his official capacity as District Attorney, Defendant— Appellant.

No. 19-30702 consolidated with No. 19-30989

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED October 5, 2021

Jack Rutherford, Rutherford Law, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Ralph Roger Alexis, III, Esq., Glenn B. Adams, Porteous, Hainkel & Johnson, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, C. Frank Holthaus, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Sara A. Johnson, New Orleans, LA, for Retired Federal Judges.

ORDER:

Three retired federal judges seek leave to file a brief in this case as amici curiae. The defendant vigorously opposes their motion, citing precedents from two other circuits that categorically exclude amicus briefs such as this.

The putative amici do not mention, let alone refute, those categorical rulings. Nor do amici address the defendant's alternative contention that the court should disqualify their brief due to concerns about its origins.

I nevertheless grant the motion. Our circuit, like the Supreme Court, does not categorically exclude amicus briefs such as this. And if there is something wrong with this particular amici effort, we can judge the brief on its merits—there is no need to exclude it from these proceedings altogether.

I.

The defendant asks us to deny leave to amici based on categorical rules adopted by the D.C. and Third Circuits. I address each precedent in turn.

A.

In Boumediene v. Bush , 476 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam), the D.C. Circuit by a 2-1 vote denied leave to a group of retired federal judges who sought to file a brief as amici. In doing so, the majority invoked a 1982 advisory opinion, issued by the U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct, that forbids references to individuals as "former judges" in court proceedings. The advisory opinion states that " ‘[j]udges should insure that the title ‘judge’ is not used in the courtroom or in papers involved in litigation before them to designate a former judge, unless the designation is necessary to describe accurately a person's status at a time pertinent to the lawsuit.’ " Id . at 934–35 (quoting Advisory Opinion No. 72, Committee on Codes of Conduct, Judicial Conference of the United States).

In her dissent, however, Judge Rogers responds that the advisory opinion applies only "when a former judge appears as counsel ," and not as amici. Id. at 935 (emphasis added). The advisory opinion expressly applies only to "former judges who have returned to the practice of law" and who are "actively practicing in federal courts." Id . at 935 n.1 (quoting Advisory Opinion No. 72, Committee on Codes of Conduct, Judicial Conference of the United States). Moreover, the advisory opinion is explicitly premised on the concern that "[a] litigant whose lawyer is called ‘Mr.,’ and whose adversary's lawyer is called ‘Judge,’ may reasonably lose a degree of confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Id. (quoting Advisory Opinion No. 72, Committee on Codes of Conduct, Judicial Conference of the United States) (emphasis added).

To be sure, reasonable minds can disagree over whether the logic of the advisory opinion still applies when a retired judge participates as amici, rather than as counsel. A case could be made that it undermines confidence in the judiciary if a litigant is forced to face an adversary supported by any person who "is called ‘Judge’ "—regardless of whether that person serves as opposing counsel or merely as opposing amici. Id.

That said, there is an obvious difference in quantity (if not in quality) between a single adverse amicus brief, on the one hand, and having to face off against a former judge, day in and day out, in writing as well as in the courtroom, throughout the entire course of the litigation, on the other hand.

Perhaps that is why, in the wake of Boumediene , the Supreme Court not only continues to accept amicus briefs filed by retired federal judges, but even quotes them from time to time in judicial opinions. See , e.g. , Terry v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1858, 1868, 210 L.Ed.2d 108 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting amicus brief of retired federal judges); California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2058, 198 L.Ed.2d 584 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (same); Aurelius Capital Management, L.P. v. Tribune Media Co. , 577 U.S. 1230, 136 S.Ct. 1459, 194 L.Ed.2d 575 (2016) (granting leave to former federal judges to file brief as amici); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , 546 U.S. 1166, 126 S.Ct. 1317, 164 L.Ed.2d 45 (2006) (same).

In fact, the Supreme Court accepted an amicus brief from a group of former federal judges in Boumediene itself. See Boumediene v. Bush , 553 U.S. 723, 731 n.†, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008) (listing amicus brief of former federal judges). Even the D.C. Circuit on various occasions has accepted amicus briefs from former federal judges, notwithstanding its earlier decision in Boumediene . See , e.g. , In re Flynn , 961 F.3d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (listing amicus brief of former federal district judges); In re Leopold , 964 F.3d 1121, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (listing amicus brief of former federal magistrate judges).

So it's not surprising that our circuit has accepted amicus briefs from retired federal judges—including the same three who seek to file as amici here. See United States v. Gozes-Wagner , 977 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2020).

B.

In American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh , 699 F.2d 644 (3rd Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit, again by a 2-1 vote, denied leave to a group of law professors seeking to file a brief as amici. The majority held that the putative amici law professors "do not purport to represent any individual or organization with a legally cognizable interest in the subject matter at issue." Id . at 645 (emphasis added). The proposed amici sought only to express "their concern about the manner in which this court will interpret the law as the basis for their brief." Id. The majority denied leave for that reason. And that same logic would presumably bar the proposed amicus brief here as well—after all, none of the three judges who seek leave today claim a "legally cognizable interest" in Priscilla Lefebure's claims, but rather only a concern about the court's previous decision in this appeal.

But the filing of amicus briefs is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29. And nothing in that rule requires amici to have a "legally cognizable interest" in the matter. It only requires amici to state their "interest" in the case—along with "the reason why an amicus brief is desirable and why the matters asserted are relevant to the disposition of the case." Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(3).

So I'm inclined to agree with Judge Higginbotham, who concluded in his dissent that there is "no justification" for denying leave due to amici's lack of "legally cognizable interest" anywhere "in our rules, our precedent or our longstanding practices." 699 F.2d at 645. See also id. ("Candidly, I am baffled by the majority's decision."). As noted, our circuit often accepts briefs from a wide variety of amici—including those that neither allege nor possess a "legally cognizable interest" in the litigation. See , e.g. , Gozes-Wagner , 977 F.3d 323. Notably, the Third Circuit itself has accepted amicus briefs from former federal judges, notwithstanding its earlier decision in American College of Obstetricians . See , e.g. , Reeves v. Fayette SCI , 897 F.3d 154, 165 (3rd Cir. 2018) (McKee, J., concurring) (discussing amicus brief of retired federal judges).

C.

Courts enjoy broad discretion to grant or deny leave to amici under Rule 29. See , e.g. , In re Halo Wireless, Inc. , 684 F.3d 581, 596 (5th Cir. 2012) (" ‘Whether to permit a nonparty to submit a brief, as amicus curiae, is, with immaterial exceptions, a matter of judicial grace.’ ") (quoting Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler , 223 F.3d 615, 616 (7th Cir. 2000) ).

But that does not mean the decision need not be a principled one. We should always "be on guard for the risk of judicial bias when it comes to discretionary practices" such as this. Rollins v. Home Depot USA , 8 F.4th 393, 398 (5th Cir. 2021). As then-Judge Alito once noted, "[a] restrictive policy with respect to granting leave to file may ... create at least the perception of viewpoint discrimination." Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue , 293 F.3d 128, 133 (3rd Cir. 2002). "Unless a court follows a policy of either granting or denying motions for leave to file in virtually all cases, instances of seemingly disparate treatment are predictable." Id. See also Boumediene , 476 F.3d at 936 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (same).

Our circuit has never adopted either of the categorical rules urged by the majorities in Boumediene and American College of Obstetricians . To the contrary, as noted, we have allowed amicus briefs like the one proposed here. See , e.g. , Gozes-Wagner , 977 F.3d 323. I see no principled basis for suddenly adopting new categorical rules in this case—particularly when even the circuits where those rules originated no longer follow them.

II.

The defendant alternatively asks us to deny leave to the putative amici based on the motivations of one of its originators. The defendant cites a news account that chronicles how the amicus effort originated with a former law clerk to one of the amici judges. The defendant points out that the law clerk "served time in the Louisiana State Penitentiary" and personally knows the assistant warden who is the co-defendant and alleged assailant in this case, and that this was a "motivating factor in seeking out potential amici curiae ." The implication is that the amici's sharp criticisms are not sincere or well-founded in the law, but are instead driven by some...