In re Forcha-Williams

• Decision Date: 01 December 2022
• Docket Number: 100051-1
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the Personal Restraint of: Derrius FORCHA-WILLIAMS, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

520 P.3d 939

In the MATTER OF the Personal Restraint of: Derrius FORCHA-WILLIAMS, Petitioner.

No. 100051-1

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 26, 2022

Filed December 1, 2022

Amy R. Meckling, King County Prosecutor's Office, 516 3rd Ave. Ste. W554, Seattle, WA, 98104-2390, for Petitioner.

Jeffrey Erwin Ellis, Law Office of Alsept & Ellis, 621 Sw. Morrison St. Ste. 1025, Portland, OR, 97205-3813, for Respondent.

Randall Avery Sutton, Kitsap County Prosecutor's Office, 614 Division St., Port Orchard, WA, 98366-4614, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.

OWENS, J.

¶1 A jury found Derrius Forcha-Williams guilty of second degree rape for an incident that occurred when he was 16 years old. He was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence with a minimum term of 120 months and a maximum term of life. On collateral review, the Court of Appeals held Forcha-Williams was entitled to resentencing because State v. Houston-Sconiers , 188 Wash.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), was a significant and material change in the law that applies retroactively to Forcha-Williams’ sentence. In granting the petition for resentencing, the Court of Appeals held that Houston-Sconiers gives judges the discretion to impose a determinate sentence instead of the indeterminate sentence required by the legislature for offenders convicted of second degree rape. Additionally, the Court of Appeals held a petitioner establishes actual and substantial prejudice if they show the sentencing court failed to consider the mitigating qualities of the offender's youth and/or failed to understand their absolute discretion to impose an exceptional sentence downward.

¶2 We reverse the Court of Appeals on both issues. First, Houston-Sconiers gives judges the discretion to impose a sentence below the minimum term in an indeterminate sentence but not the discretion to alter the maximum punishment chosen by the legislature or to impose a determinate sentence in lieu of an indeterminate sentence. Second, a Houston-Sconiers procedural error by itself does not constitute per se prejudice on collateral review. Because Forcha-Williams fails to show prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence, we dismiss his petition.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 In 2015, a jury convicted Forcha-Williams of committing rape in the second degree when he was 16 years old and enrolled in a juvenile drug diversion program. The trial court imposed an indeterminate sentence as required by RCW 9.94A.507.

¶4 Under RCW 9.94A.507(1) and (3)(b), nonpersistent offenders convicted of rape in the second degree must be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of the maximum statutory sentence for the offense and a minimum term within the standard range for the offense. Rape in the second degree is a class A felony that carries a maximum term of life in prison. RCW 9A.44.050(2) ; RCW 9A.20.021(1)(a). Meanwhile, the standard range for second degree rape for a defendant with an offender score of 3 is 102-130 months. RCW 9.94A.510. Under these parameters, the trial court sentenced Forcha-Williams to a midrange minimum term of 120 months and the mandatory maximum term of life in prison.

¶5 At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel, the victim, and two witnesses raised Forcha-Williams’ youth as a mitigating factor. The victim first raised Forcha-Williams’ youth, stating, "I am sorry that he is however young he is, and that he is facing this, but basically he did it to himself." State's Resp. to Pers. Restraint Pet., App. C (Sent'g Tr.) at 918. She explained, however, "I don't want him put away for life, you know, but—because of his age. That's the only reason. You know, he is young, and maybe he will learn from his mistakes; maybe he will take this opportunity to get an education." Id.

¶6 Defense counsel spoke next about Forcha-Williams’ youth. He noted the effect that Forcha-Williams’ childhood environment had on him, stating, "[T]here was also a real dark side to Derrius's childhood—issues of homelessness, parents with problems with the criminal justice system, some really chilling physical and psychological abuse that he went through as a kid." Id. at 919. Defense counsel tied Forcha-Williams’ poor decision-making to his youth and noted his capacity for change.

And you know when we look at adolescent development, when we look at choices and decision-making, and I think we put them in that context , Derrius had a lot against him, and as a young man ... he is going to have a lot stacked against him, but he is an intelligent man, and even sitting downstairs when he was talking during the PSI, he was talking about his goals of getting an education, of getting a job, of doing something with his life when he gets out of the system.

Id. at 920 (emphasis added). After requesting the minimum term of 102 months, defense counsel explained Forcha-Williams had difficulty understanding the sentence he faced, given his age: "I think, particularly for folks as young as Derrius, the sentence concepts like life and indeterminacy are really hard for them to wrap their heads around. And that's why Derrius and I had a lot of discussions about it." Id. at 921.

¶7 Jocelyn Conway, a juvenile probation counselor and juvenile drug court program manager at King County Superior Court also spoke on Forcha-Williams’ behalf. She described Forcha-Williams as "a young man with much promise ... and I still think he still possesses that promise." Id. at 923. And like defense counsel, Ms. Conway also discussed the impact of Forcha-Williams’ home life.

There was a lot of transition in the home. There was a lot of transition around him, supervision—of adults in his life—was challenging.

So I would say today we take all those things into consideration—not minimizing the charge that is before, what he has been found guilty of.

Id. at 924. She implored the court to look at sentencing from a broader perspective, pointing out that Forcha-Williams volunteered to enter drug court as "a 16-year-old kid" and has "gained a lot from us staying on board." Id. at 924-25.

¶8 Stephen Dozier, a mentor at Royal Project, an intensive case management mentor program, also discussed Forcha-Williams’ capacity to rehabilitate: "I'm sure that punishment is going to be imposed today, but Derrius is redeemable. He's very redeemable. He is very open to treatment. He was very open to drug court. He's very open to help." Id . at 926. Mr. Dozier also spoke about the effect of trauma on Forcha-Williams.

You know, for a lot of our kids—a lot of our kids, you know, we see it over and over in the news. A lot of our kids are facing—are dealing with a lot of trauma.

Derrius is not, he is not the exception. He is—he has dealt with a lot of trauma in his life.

Id. Mr. Dozier continued, emphasizing Forcha-Williams’ youthfulness and the effect his disadvantaged childhood had on him: "As you impose the sentence, I really beg of you to understand that this child is redeemable. ... I'm sure that if this child was born into a household ... if the playing field were level all the way around, this child would be going to an institute of higher learning. He wouldn't be going to an institution of corrections." Id. at 927.

¶9 In addition to this testimony, the sentencing court also reviewed the "Pre-Sentence Investigation Report" (PSIR) prepared by the Department of Corrections. The PSIR contains information on Forcha-Williams’ family and home environment, school history, disciplinary record, and criminal history. According to the PSIR, Forcha-Williams had one felony conviction and two deferred dispositions at the time of sentencing. He had also been expelled from Federal Way High School and had a history of assaultive behavior at school.

¶10 After hearing the testimony, Judge Thorpe addressed Forcha-Williams’ youthfulness.

Mr. Forcha-Williams, I have thought—thought a lot about your case, sir. It is incredibly indicative of what happens when kids step out of schooling. I see it time and time again.

You are a young man. You had a lot of support systems around you at the time that—things were really going down—expulsion, substance use—and all of those things are considerations, but ultimately I think in the course of time that this case has pended, and in the course of the trial, you learned a lot more about the consequences of what your actions can do.

I will never know if at the time this happened you thought for a second about what the consequences or results could have been, but that doesn't change the fact that it happened. It just doesn't.

Id. at 929-30.

¶11 Judge Thorpe then spoke about the limits she perceived on her discretion.

I know that the juvenile system is very different than the adult system—little discretion, available remedies. And so I want you to understand, and I have no doubt in my mind that [defense counsel] has explained this to you a lot, but as your sentencing judge, the legislature has passed the Sentencing Reform Act.

What the legislature has done is it tells me what range I have. It tells me what I can do.

I understand that a lot of people think that sentencing is where judges have the most discretion, but I am fairly certain your counsel probably told you about ranges and how in particular with this type of charge it is a life sentence. There is nothing I can do that changes that.

What I do today is set the minimum amount of time that you will serve.

After that, the indeterminate review board decides when you get released.

I have no control over the indeterminate review board. No one in this room does. It is ultimately their decision.

Id. at 930. She stated, "You are a young man and I truly hope that you make the best use of your time and become a fully functional member of society, but you have a lot of growth to do. I am imposing 120 months." Id. at 931. Acknowledging the path ahead, Judge Thorpe told Forcha-Williams, "It's not easy. I think as you sit here you have seen how not easy it is to go from being a teenager to an adult, from...