In re Forest C., H030989 (Cal. App. 2/8/2008)
| Decision Date | 08 February 2008 |
| Docket Number | H030989 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re FOREST C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FOREST C., Defendant and Appellant. |
Appeal from the Santa Cruz County, Super. Ct. No. J21051.
This juvenile proceeding involves defendant Forest C., a minor. On appeal, the minor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's true findings on the charges of arson and vandalism and on the enhancement for excessive loss. The minor also contends that his statement to law enforcement was involuntarily obtained. Furthermore, with respect to the vandalism count, the minor first asserts that the court should have stayed punishment and he also argues that the court was required to declare that count as either a felony or a misdemeanor. The People concede the last point. For reasons explained below, we accept both of the minor's contentions concerning the vandalism count but we reject his other appellate challenges.1
To establish the proper framework for our review, we first briefly summarize the law governing juvenile proceedings. Against that framework, we describe the factual and procedural history of this case. We then address the specific contentions raised here.
Juvenile delinquency proceedings are governed by the Welfare and Institutions Code, starting with section 602. Among the statute's express purposes are "the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court...." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202.) Thus, a "fundamental premise of delinquency adjudication" is concern for both "the best interests of the minor and public protection." (In re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684.) As a general rule, juvenile delinquency proceedings are bifurcated, commencing with a jurisdictional phase and concluding with a disposition order. (In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 859; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602, 706.)
The events giving rise to these proceedings took place in the early morning hours of September 16, 2006. At about 2:30 a.m. on that date, the Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department received a report of a fire alarm at the San Lorenzo Valley High School campus.2
At least eight separate fires were set — seven at the high school and one at the junior high school — igniting the contents of three metal garbage cans and two plastic recycling cans, as well as three posters.3 Seven of the fires were described as "small" and they burned out without extensive damage.
The largest of the fires severely damaged the high school library, with the loss estimated at $1.25 million or more. Its point of origin was a recycling container outside the library door, which was more than half-full of paper products. The fire marshal opined that fire from the recycling can entered the library building through an adjacent glass window that broke out.
Three persons were suspected of setting the fires: the minor, who was 15 years old at the time; Sam N., a 16 year old; and Garrett Frasca, who was 18. Within minutes of the fire alarm, the three had gotten a ride from Sam's friend, Sonia B., who picked them up at a location near the high school and took them to the minor's home. Several days later, Sonia placed a telephone call to Sam, which was surreptitiously recorded at the behest of law enforcement. During that conversation, Sam implicated the minor and Garrett in the fires at the school.
On September 19, 2006, Santa Cruz Sheriff's Deputy Steve Christensen contacted the minor at his home and told him that he was under arrest for starting the fires at the high school. Christensen advised the minor of his Miranda rights. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.) The minor indicated that he understood those rights.
Christensen drove the minor to the sheriff's office. During the drive, he questioned him about "why this happened." According to the deputy's testimony, the minor said
Once at the sheriff's office, Christensen took the minor to an interview room with recording capability. Christensen again gave the Miranda advisements, and the minor again expressed an understanding of his rights. The minor then became uncooperative, refusing to answer questions, intimating that the deputy had arrested the wrong person, and denying "everything that he had already admitted to in the car." The recorded interview lasted about an hour and twenty minutes. Throughout, the minor insisted "that he was merely a witness and he was watching others do certain things." The minor swore that he did not personally light anything on fire. But he admitted seeing Sam start a fire in a display case just outside the library, which grew rapidly and "spooked" the minor. Garrett then retrieved a fire extinguisher from a janitor's closet, but when he attempted to use it, it "started to expel its contents uncontrollably." Christensen questioned the minor about whether he had a cigarette lighter in his possession that night; after initially denying it, the minor admitted having one.
The recorded interview concluded when the room was needed for an interview with another suspect, and Christensen moved the minor into an office occupied by Detective Joe Ramsey. The minor was there with Ramsey for 20-30 minutes; Christensen was also present for part of that time. While in Ramsey's office with both officers present, the minor admitted igniting one or more posters at the school after being told that Sam had implicated him.
On September 21, 2006, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney's Office filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The petition alleged that the minor had committed arson and vandalism. (Pen. Code, §§ 451, 594.)4 It also contained a special enhancement allegation, which asserted property damage exceeding $1 million. (§ 12022.6.)
A contested jurisdictional hearing was conducted in October 2006, over the course of four court days. The minor and Sam N. were tried together. In limine motions were presented by all parties.
The District Attorney's witnesses included Deputy Christensen, other law enforcement officials, a fire marshal, an insurance claims adjustor, the school librarian, and Sam's friend, Sonia B. The minors presented two witnesses: Felton's fire chief and a defense investigator. Both parties presented documentary evidence. Neither minor testified, and the court refused to allow the statements of either to be used against the other.
Following the parties' presentation of evidence, the parties argued several motions, including the minor's motion to exclude his statements to law enforcement as involuntary. The juvenile court denied that motion. The minor also moved for a judgment of acquittal as to the excessive loss enhancement, on the grounds of insufficient evidence. (See § 1118; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 701.1.) The court indicated its intent to deny the motion, but stated its desire to first read the cases cited by counsel. Counsel then argued the merits of the case, and the court took the matter under submission, announcing its ruling the following day.
As relevant here, the court found true the allegations that the minor had committed arson and vandalism, sustaining both counts of the petition. The court also sustained the special allegation of excessive loss.
In November 2006, the juvenile court conducted the dispositional hearing. The juvenile court placed the minor on probation. It ordered the minor to serve 139 days in juvenile hall, with credit for 49 days, the balance to be served on an electronic monitoring program. The minor was released to the custody of his mother and stepfather. As stated in the wardship order, the court imposed a nine-year maximum term of confinement.
The minor brought this timely appeal. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 800.) He raises several issues. First, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's findings. Next, the minor contends that the court erred in refusing to exclude his statements to law enforcement, or, alternatively, that his counsel was ineffective in connection with the suppression motion. Finally, the minor makes two additional arguments concerning the vandalism count: that the court should have stayed punishment on that count and that it should have declared the offense as either a felony or a misdemeanor.
We address the minor's appellate arguments in turn. As to each, we start by setting forth the applicable review standard. We then summarize and apply the relevant legal principles to the facts of this case.
We begin with the minor's claims of insufficient evidence, which he directs at all of the charges of the petition.
"To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1128.) In making this determination, the reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (See, e.g., People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) All conflicts in the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the judgment. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal. 4th 342, 396; In re Charles G. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 62, 67.) ...
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