IN RE FORFEITURE OF 1994 HONDA PRELUDE, 98-2889.
| Decision Date | 05 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-2889.,98-2889. |
| Parties | In re FORFEITURE OF ONE (1) 1994 HONDA PRELUDE Brad Webb, Petitioner, v. Department of Highway Safety, etc., Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jerome Henningan, Orlando, for Petitioner.
Enoch J. Whitney, General Counsel, and Gabrielle Taylor, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
Petitioner, Brad Webb, files a petition for writ of prohibition seeking review of the trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss a forfeiture complaint filed by respondent, Department of Highway Safety. The sole issue for this court's consideration is whether respondent timely filed its forfeiture complaint.
The record shows that on June 3, 1997, respondent seized petitioner's 1994 Honda Prelude. On April 23, 1998, petitioner received by mail a notice of seizure and right to adversarial preliminary hearing which said that a 1994 Honda Prelude had been seized pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act and that a forfeiture action "may" be filed against the property. The document also said that anyone having a legal interest in the property could request an adversarial preliminary hearing in writing within fifteen days of his receipt of the notice.
On May 19, 1998, an adversarial preliminary hearing was held before the trial court. It is undisputed that a Florida Highway Patrol Trooper testified at the hearing that the Prelude had been in respondent's possession for 325 days and that it had been seized because the vehicle identification number had allegedly been switched from another car that had been written off by an insurance company as a loss. Apparently, this was based upon the trooper's belief that the Prelude could not have been involved in such a serious accident. Upon cross-examination, the trooper admitted that he had no formal training in automobile body work. He also testified that the Prelude had not been reported to have been stolen.
Respondent argued at the hearing that the Prelude had been seized as evidence in a criminal investigation and was therefore not subject to the filing requirements of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. Section 932.704, Florida Statutes (1997) requires the seizing agency to "promptly proceed" in its forfeiture of contraband by filing a complaint in the trial court within the jurisdiction where the seizure or offense occurred. Section 932.701(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997) defines "promptly proceed" as filing the complaint within 45 days after seizure. Petitioner's attorney moved for dismissal of respondent's forfeiture complaint based upon its failure to comply with the statutory filing requirement and the trial court denied the motion.
On May 27, 1998, the trial court presiding at the adversarial preliminary hearing entered an order finding probable cause for respondent's seizure and detainment of the Prelude. The court ordered respondent to file a forfeiture complaint within 20 days of the date of its order. Respondent filed its forfeiture complaint on June 16, 1998.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss again based upon respondent's failure to comply with the statutory filing requirement. Petitioner's attorney argued at the hearing that the filing requirement was mandatory. Respondent's attorney argued in response that petitioner had not been prejudiced by respondent's delay in filing the forfeiture complaint and that the trial court had properly extended the 45-day time period for filing the complaint to 60 days. She relied upon section 932.703(3), Florida Statutes (1997) which says:
(3) Neither replevin nor any other action to recover any interest in such property shall be maintained in any court, except as provided in this act; however, such action may be maintained if forfeiture proceedings are not initiated within 45 days after the date of seizure. However, if good cause is shown, the court may extend the aforementioned prohibition to 60 days.
Petitioner's attorney argued in response that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to preside over the forfeiture proceeding on the ground that it did not have discretion to extend the mandatory filing...
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...of One 1988 Lincoln Town Car, 826 So.2d 342 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), which certified conflict with In re Forfeiture of One (1) 1994 Honda Prelude, 730 So.2d 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We must determine the effect of the deadlines for filing ......
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IN RE FORFEITURE OF 1988 LINCOLN TOWN CAR, 2D01-1249.
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