In re Furniture Distributors, Inc.
Decision Date | 14 September 1984 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 84-879-HL. |
Citation | 45 BR 38 |
Parties | In re FURNITURE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Debtor. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Massachusetts |
Henry J. Boroff, Framingham, Mass., for debtor.
Judy K. Mencher, Goodwin, Proctor & Hoar, Boston, Mass., for movants P & W Distributors, Inc., Jofran Sales, Inc., and Stoneville Furniture Co.
Richard E. Mikels, Peabody & Brown, Boston, Mass., for Creditors Committee.
MEMORANDUM DENYING RECONSIDERATION AND REOPENING
This matter most recently came before the Court on counsel's Motion for Reconsideration, for an Amendment of the Findings or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial on the Denial of the Reclamation Claims based upon the failure to prove insolvency.1 Hearing was held on August 30, 1984. Counsel conceded that "bankruptcy," or "balance sheet," insolvency was unproven. Counsel, however, argued that 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)2 tracked the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), UCC § 2-702,3 which permits proof of equity insolvency— the inability of the debtor to pay its bills as they come due. Further, it was argued that the Court prevented counsel from exploring this area or, in the alternative, that counsel had decided that, not needing to prove balance sheet insolvency, counsel should be provided with an additional opportunity to prove equity insolvency based upon events subsequent to the initial hearing. Counsel also argued that the filing of the involuntary coupled with the debtor's answer converting to Chapter 11 constituted an admission of equitable insolvency. Finally, it was argued that as a matter of equity, counsel's clients are entitled to another opportunity to prove their case. Motion denied.
Transcript pp. 66-67. Counsel was not able to point to any specific evidence. Instead, counsel alluded to the reclamation motions and the 2-702 telegram. Those items were rejected by the Court as unproven allegations, obviously not admitted or the present contested proceeding would have been unnecessary. Additionally, counsel noted the debtor's assent to the bankruptcy involuntary petition (transcript p. 73). That was also rejected by the Court as containing no probative weight as evidence. Actually, there was no admission but an answer assenting to the court jurisdiction and converting the case to Chapter 11 which did not require insolvency in either sense. Despite the Court's proposed rulings, the Court took a supper recess from the "long, hot day" to consider counsel's oral motion to reconsider the Court's finding and to reopen the evidence. When court resumed, the Court reopened the evidence despite the objection of at least one party on counsel's assurances that insolvency could be proven "easily," and in equity and fairness to the clients, she should be given an opportunity to correct the oversight of an obvious fact. No request for additional time was made. Accordingly, a witness was called and examined without any limitation imposed by the Court, but no evidence was produced of insolvency in either the balance sheet or equity sense. Counsel did not claim surprise and request a continuance. The motions for reclamation were denied.
Reconsideration is permitted in the cases of:
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a), made applicable to bankruptcy procedure by Bankruptcy Rule 9023. Although the rules have granted the Court broad discretion to decide the motion in question, such discretion cannot be described as limitless.
Of all of the arguments presented by counsel, the most intriguing is that "insolvency" for the purposes of reclamation includes not only a "balance sheet" analysis, 11 U.S.C. § 101(26)(A), but also an "equity" test, the non-payment of debts in the ordinary course of business. Mass.Gen. Laws ch. 106 (UCC) § 1-201(22). In sum, 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) is the exclusive remedy for creditor reclamation claims. In re Koro Corp., 20 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. 1st Cir.1982), affirming 10 B.R. 767 (Bankr.D. Ma.1981). However, § 546(c) recognizes the "statutory right or common law right of a seller, in the ordinary course of such seller's business, of goods to the debtor to reclaim such goods. . . ." "The purpose of the provision is to recognize, in part, the validity of section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code. . . ." Senate Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong.2d Sess. 86-87 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 5872-5873. Accordingly, § 546(c)'s endorsement of statutory and common law rights would imply use of similar statutory and common law definitions to construe and interpret such rights. In re Maloney Enterprises, Inc., 37 B.R. 290, 11 B.C.D. 764, 766 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. 1983); see also, In re Creative Buildings, Inc., 498 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.1974); In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968); In re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 393 F.Supp. 798, 15 U.C.C.R.S. 746, 748 (Bankr. M.D.Ga.1975). Thus, the UCC definition of insolvency would apply to any application of a UCC remedy. See, Mann & Phillips, Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act: An Imperfect Resolution of the Conflict Between the Reclaiming Seller and the Bankruptcy Trustee, 54 Am.Bankr. L.J. 239, 262, n. 116 (1980) ( ). Moreover, when the writers of the Bankruptcy Code wanted to draw specific exception to the UCC, a specific subsection was written. Yet, all the terms of a statute must be read as meaningful. Still, one could argue that the term "insolvent" could be read merely to excluded non-insolvency reclamation rights. Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 106 (UCC) § 2-507; see also, Quinn's Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest, § 2-507(A) (1978 Ed. and 1984 Cumulative Supplement No. 1).
But, is § 546(c) a mirror image of the UCC provisions of § 2-702? A careful reading reveals at least four important differences. First, they start from a different point of reference. Section 546(c) is a limitation on the avoiding powers of the trustee and, like all limitations, are generally strictly construed7 while § 2-702 is intended as a liberal provision to aid the seller. Second, in keeping with this difference in emphasis, the demand for reclamation in bankruptcy must be in writing while no such limitation is required by the UCC. Third, § 547(c) has an ordinary course of business requirement. Finally, § 547(c) requires that the goods be delivered while insolvent, a rather superfluous statement unless the words are to have a meaning other than those of the UCC.
The proper application of § 547(c) involves a two-step process—first, the Bankruptcy Act requirements must be met and then, and only then, do we look to see if there is any statutory or common law right.
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