In re Garesche

• Decision Date: 30 April 1885
• Citation: 85 Mo. 469
• Parties: IN RE GARESCHE.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

85 Mo. 469

IN RE GARESCHE.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

April Term, 1885.

Mandamus.

WRIT DENIED.

R. A. Bakewell for petitioner.

A. R. Taylor for respondent.

BLACK, J.

By article six, section twelve, of the constitution of 1875, the St. Louis court of appeals had conferred upon it appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with a defined and limited territory. This court was given appellate jurisdiction from that court in certain classes of cases, among which are “in all cases where the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars.” Thus the matter stood until the adoption of the constitutional amendment in November, 1884, by which the jurisdiction of that court was extended territorially to a number of additional counties. There was also thereby created the Kansas city court of appeals with jurisdiction over the remainder of the counties in the state. This constitutional amendment provided for the transfer of causes pending in the Supreme Court to the Kansas City court of appeals. The third section also gave to the general assembly power to create one additional court of appeals with a new district to be carved out of the others and power “to change the limits of the appellate districts * * * to increase or diminish the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals; to provide for the transfer of causes from one court of appeals to another court of appeals; to provide for the transfer of cases from a court of appeals to the Supreme Court.” As to those cases pending in the St. Louis court of appeals at the time of the adoption of the amendment that court, in the absence of any further legislation, would proceed to a determination and this court would entertain appellate jurisdiction therefrom as before.

The power of the general assembly to transfer causes from one court to another may be conceded to be confined to such actions as the courts to which the transfer should be made have jurisdiction by the then existing law. It may be further conceded that this power extends to cases which, for some reason, get to one court when they should be in another; and to the necessities of the case which may arise when there shall be a change in the districts or in the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, but it does not follow that these are the only instances in which the power to make transfers of causes may be exercised by the legislative department of the government. The act of March...