In re General Coffee Corp.
Decision Date | 26 August 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 85-2024 Civ.,85-2024 Civ. |
Citation | 64 BR 702 |
Parties | In re GENERAL COFFEE CORPORATION, Debtor. CITY NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI and City National Bank Corporation, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. GENERAL COFFEE CORPORATION, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Robert Schantzman, Miami, Fla., Haddad, Josephs & Jack, Bert Hellman, Coral Gables, Fla., for appellants, cross-appellees.
Alan Kluger, David Levine, Miami, Fla., for appellee, cross-appellant.
This is an appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. City National Bank of Miami and City National Bank Corporation ("City National") appeal the Bankruptcy Court's determination that the Debtor — General Coffee ("General Coffee") can avoid the imposition of a constructive trust. General Coffee and Intervenor Shawmut Boston International Banking Corporation ("SBIBC") cross-appeal the lower court's finding that City National properly traced the trust res to assets presently within General Coffee's (the debtor-in-possession) control.
For the purposes of this appeal, the undisputed facts are succinctly set forth in the Bankruptcy Court's Memorandum decision:
In Re General Coffee, 41 B.R., 781, 782-83 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 1984).
City National does not challenge the Bankruptcy Court's factual determinations (1) that General Coffee defrauded City National; (2) that City National properly traced a constructive trust res of $6,488,011 to assets within the control of the debtor-in-possession; and (3) that City National proved a factual basis to justify the imposition of a constructive trust. Rather City National takes issue with the court's legal conclusions (1) that under Florida law a constructive trust comes into existence only after judicial determination; and (2) that the provisions of § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code override those of § 541 to bring the trust property within the estate notwithstanding the absence of the debtor's beneficial ownership. The threshold question posed by these issues is whether the trust-impressed property was held by General Coffee for City National's benefit at the "commencement of the case". See § 542(d). That question, in turn, depends upon when a constructive trust comes into existence.1
There are two prevailing views on when a constructive trust arises: The majority view is that a trust is created when the fraud or other wrong is perpetrated; the minority view is that a trust is not formed until such time as a court decrees it. The Bankruptcy Court applied the minority rule and did so based upon the authority of Palmland Villas I Condominium v. Taylor, 390 So.2d 123 (Fla.4th DCA 1980).
The battleground is drawn; and Palmland is the situs. City National contends that Palmland is not an accurate statement of Florida Law but rather an aberration in it. General Coffee counters that Palmland was correctly decided and points to subsequent decisions. Since the contentions of the parties rise or fall upon the correctness of Palmland, it is axiomatic that any analysis must begin with that decision.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Palmland held for the first and only time in Florida jurisprudence that a constructive trust is not created by the facts themselves but by a court order or judgment. 390 So.2d at 124. In other words, the trust remains inchoate absent a judicial decree.
The basis for the court's conclusion came from two earlier cases which did not address the "creation" issue but held essentially that an action for an imposition of a constructive trust could be time barred. Wadlington v. Edwards, 92 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1957); and Yawn v. Blackwell, 343 So.2d 906 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). Based upon these decisions, the Palmland court reached the "inevitable" conclusion that if the "beneficiary" could be precluded from equitable relief it is the adjudication not the facts which give rise to the trust's creation. A determination of the correctness of this conclusion requires an analysis of these cases as well as a historical review of Florida law on constructive trusts.
In Wadlington, supra the plaintiff sought to have a constructive trust imposed on a parcel of land which her husband had allegedly purchased with her funds. She further contended that title to the property was taken "against her will."2 The Florida Supreme Court first espoused the general principle that "a constructive trust is a remedy which equity applies in order to do justice." 92 So.2d at 631. The court then compared resulting trusts to constructive trusts opining that "a constructive trust is a relationship adjudicated to exist by a court based on particular factual situations created by one or more of the parties." Id. "The trust is `constructed' by equity to prevent an unjust enrichment at the expense of another as the result of fraud. . . ."3 Although the court ultimately found that the facts warranted equitable relief, it nonetheless determined that the plaintiff's excessive delay in seeking judicial assistance barred her from such extraordinary relief.4
Yawn v. Blackwell, supra, the second case relied upon by the Palmland court, similarly did not address the creation issue but instead whether summary judgment has been properly granted. Appellants, plaintiffs below, initially sought the imposition of a constructive trust on a parcel of land. Plaintiffs subsequently amended their pleadings to describe the trust claimed as a resulting trust. The trial court determined that the claim was stale because of the twenty year limitation regarding the assertion of claims against recorded deeds. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded holding that material issues of fact existed regarding the formation of the resulting trust. The creation issue was never considered by the court. In passing, however, the court noted the distinction between a resulting trust and a constructive trust vis-a-vis the statute of limitations.
Wadlington and Yawn hold that a "beneficiary" will be precluded from obtaining equitable relief when he has sat on his rights. In essence, these cases support the basic maxim that "equity aids the vigilant". Because a beneficiary is denied equitable relied in these circumstances, it does not "inevitably" follow that a constructive trust is created only by judicial decree. This Court concludes that the reasoning applied in Palmland is in error. This conclusion is supported by a review of other Florida precedent.
To continue reading
Request your trial