Wadlington v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 13 February 1957
• Citation: 92 So.2d 629
• Parties: Ruth WADLINGTON, Appellant, v. Dorothy Wadlington EDWARDS, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 629

92 So.2d 629

Ruth WADLINGTON, Appellant, v. Dorothy Wadlington EDWARDS, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division A.

Feb. 13, 1957.

Rehearing Denied March 7, 1957.

Hal H. McCaghren, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Alley & Maass and Doyle Rogers, Palm Beach, for appellee.

THORNAL, Justice.

Appellant, Ruth Wadlington, who was plaintiff below, seeks reversal of a summary final decree in favor of appellee, Dorothy Wadlington Edwards, defendant below, in a proceeding wherein appellant sought the adjudication of a constructive trust in real estate.

The determining points are whether a constructive trust once existed and if so whether the requested relief was barred by laches grounded on the Statute of Limitations.

According to the complaint the appellant, Ruth Wadlington, acquired the beneficial interest in the land in dispute by deed dated October 30, 1934. The complaint alleges that title was taken in the name of appellant's late husband, Jack G. Wadlington. She claims that the purchase price was paid with funds out of her own separate estate. She alleges that title was taken in her husband's name 'against the will of the plaintiff and without her knowledge or consent * * *' The complaint which was filed October 20, 1955, then alleges that by this transaction Jack Wadlington became a constructive trustee of the land with the plaintiff as the beneficiary.

Our problem arises out of the fact that prior to the institution of this suit appellee, Dorothy Wadlington Edwards, instituted a proceeding in the County Judge's Court of Palm Beach County seeking a determination of the heirs of Jack G. Wadlington who died March 21, 1935. By her answer in the County Court proceeding, a copy of which was filed in this cause to support the summary decree, appellant delineated the facts above summarized and stated that she discovered the error only a day or so before the death of her late husband and was in the process of correcting the same when he died. The County Judge concluded that the property involved was the homestead of Jack G. Wadlington when he died intestate March 21, 1935. He further ordered that appellant as his widow was entitled to a life estate with a vested remainder in appellee whom he found to be the only child and lineal descendant of Jack G. Wadlington (by a former marriage). No questions of res adjudicata or estoppel by judgment are tendered here by the assignments of error or questions argued.

The order of the County Judge was followed by this original proceeding in chancery whereby appellant requested the Chancellor to impress a constructive trust on the land thereby liberating the title from the claim of the appellee.

On motion for summary decree, the appellant filed an affidavit setting out the above facts. The Chancellor concluded that the claim of the plaintiff 'is barred by the Statute of Limitations' and cited authority for his position. He granted appellee's motion for summary decree and dismissed the complaint. Reversal of his decree is here sought.

Although by her complaint the appellant alleged the existence of a constructive trust, by her brief on appeal she insists that the original transaction created a resulting trust and that the Statute of Limitations would not begin to run until the repudiation of the trust which came about, so she contends, when appellee instituted the proceeding in the County Judge's Court.

The appellee contends that the factual situation produced a constructive trust which according to the authorities she cites is subject to statutes of limitations, and particularly our so-called twenty-year statute precluding an assault on a deed which has been of record for twenty years or more.

Aside from the fact that she is bound by the allegations of her complaint, the situation relied upon by appellant did create the basis for the declaration of a constructive trust.

As distinguished from an express trust, there are two types of so-called implied trusts. One is known as a 'resulting trust'. The other is known as a 'constructive trust'. Although some confusion exists as to the distinction between the two, it appears to us that our own decisions make the differences clear and dispose of the confusing elements. A resulting trust is simply a status that automatically arises by operation of law out of certain circumstances. A constructive trust is a remedy which equity applies in order to do justice. In the creation of a resulting trust it is essential that the parties actually intend to create the trust relationship but fail to execute documents or establish adequate evidence of the intent. The typical illustration is where one man furnishes the money to buy a parcel of land in the name of another with both parties intending at the time that the legal title is held by the named grantee for the benefit of the unnamed beneficiary. Sorrels v. McNally, 89 Fal. 457, 105 So. 106; Smith v. Smith, 143 Fla. 159, 196 So. 409; Grable v. Nunez, Fla. 1953, 64 So.2d 154.

By contrast, a constructive trust is a relationship adjudicated to exist by a court of equity based on particular factual situations created by one or the other of the parties. The element of intent or agreement either oral or written to create...