In Re Gomez.

• Decision Date: 04 May 1943
• Docket Number: No. 1715.,1715.
• Citation: 32 A.2d 138
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: In re GOMEZ.

32 A.2d 138

In re GOMEZ.

No. 1715.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

May 4, 1943.

Exceptions from Barre Municipal Court; H. William Scott, Judge.

Proceeding in the matter of Casimir Gomez, a minor under sixteen years of age. The minor was found to be a delinquent child and was ordered committed to the Weeks School at Vergennes until he should reach the age of eighteen years, and he brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled and cause remanded.

Before MOULTON, C. J., and SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, STURTEVANT, and JEFFORDS, JJ.

Reginald T. Abare, State's Atty., of Barre, for plaintiff.

Cornelius O. Granai, of Barre, for defendant.

STURTEVANT, Justice.

This proceeding was commenced before the Barre Municipal court acting as a juvenile court under the provisions of P.L. chapter 226, sec. 5445. In a petition filed in that court it was alleged that one Casimir Gomez, a minor under the age of sixteen years, is a delinquent child within the meaning of P.L. 5444. At the time of the hearing on the petition the minor appeared before the court with his counsel and demanded a jury trial. This demand was refused and the court proceeded to hear the case and to dispose of it in a summary manner in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 5450. Upon consideration of the evidence introduced the court found the minor to be a delinquent child as alleged in the petition and ordered him committed to the Weeks School at Vergennes until he shall reach the age of eighteen years. The case is here upon the minor's exceptions saved to the refusal of the court to grant him a jury trial and in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 1431.

The minor contends that in the proceedings below he was charged with having committed a breach of the peace and so being charged with the commission of a crime he was entitled to a jury trial under the provisions of Chapter 1, article 10, of the constitution of Vermont. Therefore, he insists that the provisions of P.L. chapter 226, by authority of which the court proceeded to hear and dispose of this case, are unconstitutional and void.

However, the nature and quality of the provisions of P.L. chapter 226, formerly G.L. chapter 319, were considered by this Court in the Hook case, In re Hook, 95 Vt. 497, 499, 115 A. 730, 731, 19 A.L.R. 610. We there held that: “Chapter 319 of the General Laws, being passed for the protection of a class of minors unable adequately to protect itself, was enacted in a valid exercise of the police power of the state. Tiedeman §§ 52, 196A; Ex parte Januszewski, (C.C.), 196 F. 123; State v. Isenhuth, 34 S.D. 218, 148 N.W. 9; In re Johnson, 173 Wis. 571, 181 N.W. 741. In none of its aspects is it criminal. [Cincinnati] House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio St. 197; State v. Bryant, 94 Neb. 754, 144 N.W. 804; Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203, 6 N.E. 830, 55 Am.Rep. 452; Ex parte Januszewski, supra; In re Antonopulos, 171 App.Div. 659, 157 N.Y.S. 587; In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 P. 871, Ann.Cas.1916E, 1022. It is not penal, but protective. It does not seek to punish the child or its parents for misdeeds or shortcomings. It steps in merely to save the child from the evil tendencies of its situation, and to give it more efficient care and training, to the end that it may become a more worthy and useful member of society.” Also see Annotation, 67 A.L.R. 1082;...