Farnham v. Pierce
| Decision Date | 26 February 1886 |
| Citation | 141 Mass. 203,6 N.E. 830 |
| Parties | FARNHAM v. PIERCE and another. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
H. & G.E. Williams, for petitioner.
F.V Fuller, for respondents.
The father of an infant four years of age, who has been committed to the custody of the overseers of the poor of the city of Taunton by the First district court of Bristol, on findings that she was, by the neglect of her parents, growing up without education or salutary control, and in circumstances exposing her to lead an idle and dissolute life, and that she had a settlement in Taunton, seeks her discharge from the control, on a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that St.1882, c. 181, § 3, under which the court acted, is contrary to the twelfth article of the declaration of rights of this state. The section of the statute is as follows:
"Whenever it shall be made to appear to any court or magistrate that within his jurisdiction any child under fourteen years of age, by reason of orphanage, or of the neglect, crime, drunkenness, or other vice of his parents, is growing up without education or salutary control, and in circumstances exposing him to lead an idle and dissolute life, or is dependent upon public charity, such court or magistrate shall, after notice to the state board of health, lunacy, and charity, commit such child, if he has no known settlement in this commonwealth, to the custody of said board, and, if he has a known settlement, then to the overseers of the poor of the city or town in which he has such settlement, except in the city of Boston, and, if he has a settlement in said city, then to the directors of public institutions of said city, until he arrives at the age of twenty-one years, or for any less time; and the said board, overseers, and directors are authorized to make all needful arrangements for the care and maintenance of children so committed, in some state, municipal, or town institution, or in some respectable family, and to discharge such children from their custody whenever the object of their commitment has been accomplished."
This is not a penal statute, and the commitment to the public officers is not in the nature of punishment. It is a provision by the commonwealth, as parens patriae, for the custody and care of neglected children, and is intended only to supply to them the parental custody which they have not. In this respect, the statute manifestly differs from the construction given to the statutes under which People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, and State v. Ray, (decided in New Hampshire in July, 1885,) were decided, and resembles more the statutes considered in Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors, etc., 40 Wis. 328; In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367; McLean Co. v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378; Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184; House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio St. 197; Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9; and Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329. It does not punish the infant by confinement, nor deprive him of his liberty; it only recognizes and regulates, as in providing for guardianship and apprenticeship, the parental custody which is an incident of infancy.
It is argued that the right of the father to the society education, and earnings of his child is taken from him by a summary proceeding, without notice or trial. If the statute is to be construed as authorizing a final adjudication upon the rights of the father, taking from him the custody and care of his child, it would be a grave question whether it could be sustained. But we do not so construe the statute. It provides custody for a child who is suffering for the need of it in consequence of the death or unfitness of its parent. The fact of the death or neglect or crime or vice of the parent shows the condition of the child,--that he is in need of parental custody. The fact that he is suffering morally for want of parental restraint calls for immediate and appropriate relief, as would the want of food or shelter. The inability or failure of the parent to furnish the relief is intended to...
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