In Re Gorham Et Al.

• Decision Date: 23 December 1901
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: In re GORHAM et al.

40 S.E. 311

129 N.C. 481

In re GORHAM et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 23, 1901.

CONTEMPT — WHAT CONSTITUTES — PUNISHMENT AS FOR CONTEMPT—IMPROPERLY INFLUENCING JUROR.

1. Under Code, c. 14, defining contempt, and providing that the acts therein mentioned shall be the only subjects of contempt, and annulling all parts of the common law recognizing as contempts other acts and omissions than those specified, improperly influencing a juror, not being specified as a contempt, is not so, though regarded as such at common law.

2. Under Code, § 654, subsec. 3, providing that any person unlawfully interfering with the proceedings in any action may be punished as for contempt, a person conversing with a juror for the purpose of improperly influencing him violates the section, and may be punished as for contempt.

3. The juror may be punished under subsection 5, § 654, Code, providing for the punishment of jurors for conversing with parties or others in relation to an action.

Appeal from superior court, Iredell county; Brown, Judge.

Proceedings against J. A. Gorham, R. A, Ramsey, and J. H. Brown to punish respondents as for contempt of court. From a judgment finding respondents guilty, and punishing them as for contempt of court, they appeal. Affirmed.

This was a proceeding to punish as for contempt. The acts were alleged to have been committed by the respondents during the trial of the civil action of B. F. Long, administrator, against the North Carolina Railroad and others, in Iredell superior court, at its May term, 1901; and upon the answers of the respondents, and the affidavits filed in the matter, his honor found the following facts: "(1) That after the jury were impaneled in said action the court instructed them, in addition to the usual instruction, that it was their duty to report to the court the name of any person who attempted to talk to them about the case or in their presence, and had each member of the jury toso promise the court upon their honor. He further advised the jury not to associate with any one connected with the case during the trial. (2) That while the trial was in progress, and just as the jury were discharged from court on Friday evening, May 24th, R. A. Ramsey placed himself at one of the exits of the court-house grounds, and there met Juror B. C. Deaton, and took him to a barroom and treated him to a drink of whisky, and remained with him for about two hours, until about the ringing of the bell for the night session of the court, and was seen in earnest conversation with him. That, after Deaton had gone back to the court house, Ramsey declared that it was his purpose in his communications with Deaton to influence his verdict in favor of the defendant in said cause, and that was his only business here. And the court also finds as a fact that he attempted to carry out his said purpose. (3) That "J. A. Gorham is the law agent of the Southern Railway Company, which company is defending said suit in behalf of the said North Carolina Railroad Company and the State University Railroad Company, and has been present during the trial, sitting in the bar and assisting counsel therein, and that the fact was known to Juror J. H. Brown. That after the adjournment of the court at its night session on Friday, May 24th, the said J. A. Gorham and the juror J. H. Brown were together, ' holding a long and close conversation, in front of the Hotel Iredell, which continued for something like two hours, and until the hotel doors were closed for the night, and most of the guests had retired. That the said law agent and juror talked about the case on trial. That about the hour of 11 o'clock the said Gorham left his seat, went into the hotel, ascended partly up the first stairway, where he remained until the juror Brown overtook him. That prior to this Juror Brown had left the seat where he sat talking with Gorham, crossed the street to the court-house well, and remained for two or three minutes, and then returned, joining Gorham on the stairway. That both of said parties then went to the room of said Gorham (No. 18, on the third floor), locked the door, and extinguished the light, and remained together until the next morning That the said Brown went to Gor-ham's room in consequence of an agreement between them that Brown should occupy a bed in said Gorham's room, and that it should cost him nothing; Gorham saying that it cost him nothing. (4) That, soon after (within a few minutes after) the said parties went to said room, three of plaintiff's attorneys, who had been advised of such proceedings, went to the said room, knocked upon the door twice, and received no response. (5) That the next morning, about 7 o'clock, Juror Brown went down to the hotel clerk and stated that he had occupied a bed in room No. 18, and would pay for it before leaving court; that said Brown had not registered as a guest; that, shortly after Brown left room 18, Gorham opened the door to start down, and saw Geo. B. Nicholson, one of the plaintiff's counsel, standing in the hallway, and dodged back; that he shortly afterwards went downstairs, and told the hotel clerk that Brown had stayed in his room the night before, but also said that he did not know he was a juror until he (Brown) told him. The court finds as a fact that said Gorham and said Brown knew each other as a juror and law agent before any of the said conversations or actions took place. (6) The court finds as a fact that the object and purpose of the said J. A. Gorham and J. H. Brown was to improperly and unlawfully influence the verdict of the said J. H. Brown in favor of the defendaut in the said cause on trial. (7) As to Juror Deaton, by consent of all parties the rule is discharged. (8) As to L. C. Caldwell, and as to his conversation with R. A. Ramsey and Juror Brown, and his connection with J. A. Gorham at the hotel, the court is not able to find as a fact that said L. C. Caldwell had any unlawful or corrupt or wrongful purpose, and the rule as to him is therefore discharged."

Thereupon the following order and judgment were entered: "Upon the foregoing facts, it is adjudged that J. A. Gorham, J. H. Brown, and R. A. Ramsey are guilty of the gross contempt of this court, and have attempted to pervert the course of justice, and to obstruct the enforcement of the civil remedies and rights of the plaintiff in the civil action pending in this court, wherein B. F. Long, administrator, is plaintiff, and the North Carolina Railroad Company et al. are defendants, in the following particulars: (1) That the said respondent J. A. Gorham has attempted to corrupt and influence J. H. Brown, one of the jurors sworn to try the said case, and lias been guilty of conduct that tended to defeat, impair, impede, and prejudice the rights and remedies of the plaintiff in the above-entitled suit. (2) That the respondent R. A. Ramsey had attempted to corrupt and influence the juror B. C. Deaton, to the prejudice of the plaintiff, B. F. Long, administrator, in the above-entitled action, and has been guilty of conduct that tended to defeat, impair, impede, the rights and remedies of the said B. F. Long, administrator, plaintiff in the said suit. (3) That the respondent J. H. Brown, one of the jurors sworn to try the said case, has permitted himself to be corrupted and influenced by the respondent J. A. Gorham to the prejudice of the plaintiff, B. F. Long, administrator, in the said suit, and has been guilty of conduct that tended to defeat, impair, and impede the rights and remedies of the said B. F. Long, administrator, plaintiff in said suit, and the due and orderly course of justice. It is therefore adjudged that the respondents, J. A. Gorham, R. A. Ramsey, J. H. Brown, are guilty as for contempt of the court in the particulars above specified and set forth, and it is further adjudged: First, that the said J. A. Gorham be committed to the common jail of this county for twenty days; and be fined fifty dollars ($50), and that he is further adjudged to pay the costs of this rule, and to be confined till the said fine and costs are paid; second, that the said R. A. Ramsey be committed to the common jail of Iredell county for twenty days, and shall pay a fine of fifty dollars ($50) and costs, and shall pay the fine and costs before being discharged; third, that the said J. H. Brown be fined fifty dollars and costs, and shall be in custody of the sheriff till said fine and costs are paid."

Osborne, Maxwell & Keerans, for Gorham.

J. F. Gamble, for Ramsey and Brown. Brown Shepherd, for the State.

MONTGOMERY, J. This proceeding in the court below, as the record discloses, had for its object the punishment of the respondents as for contempt of court, and the judgment was pronounced against them as for contempt. But the argument for the state here was also directed to the proposition that the judgment could be supported on the ground that the facts constituted a case of contempt of court In support of this proposition numerous authorities were referred to, but in none of those jurisdictions were the statutory laws like those of our state on this subject. One of them, however (People v. Wilson, 16 Am. Rep. 528-531), contains a most significant expression. It is said there: "The statute may be regarded as a limitation upon the power of the court to punish for any other than those acts committed in its presence. In this power would be necessarily included all acts calculated to impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court in the administration of justice. Such acts would be considered as done in the presence of the court." But the peculiarities of the language used in our statutory law, and the decisions of this court upon that law, forbid us from following such precedents. Chapter 14 of the Code (a compilation of the acts of 1868-69 and 1870-71 concerning contempt) embraces the whole law of our state at the present time on that subject. With the origin, history, and objects of those acts the older...