In re Grant, 556.
| Decision Date | 22 July 1940 |
| Docket Number | 556. |
| Citation | 104 P.2d 602,4 Wn.2d 617 |
| Parties | In re GRANT. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Proceeding for the disbarment of Thomas S. Grant, an attorney at law.
Respondent disbarred.
This proceeding was instituted by S. M. Brackett, as counsel for the Washington State Bar Association, by direction of its board of governors, for the disbarment of Thomas S. Grant, of Aberdeen (who will hereinafter be referred to as respondent) an attorney authorized since June 30, 1922, to practice law Before the courts of this state.
The record of the hearing Before the trial committee, which hearing was held at Aberdeen on March 1, 1940, together with the findings of fact and recommendations of the trial committee, and the record of the review of the proceedings of the trial committee by the board of governors of the Washington State Bar Association, have been transmitted to this court for our consideration.
The complaint filed herein sets out two causes of action against respondent. Relative to the first cause of action, it appears from the findings of the trial committee, which findings were, after an examination, adopted by the board of governors, and which findings are fully supported by the evidence, that during the month of March, 1936, Andrew J Meyers employed respondent, as attorney, to probate the estate of Swan Nelson, deceased; that the heirs entitled to share in this estate were Andrew J. Meyers, W. J. Meyers, and E. J. Meyers, nephews of deceased; that pursuant to such employment, respondent, on April 8, 1936, procured the appointment of himself as administrator of such estate; that respondent was ordered to file a bond in the sum of five hundred dollars, the value of the estate then being conjectural; that respondent filed and had approved a bond for five hundred dollars, without sureties; that after respondent's appointment and qualification, there came into his hands securities and bank deposits which were inventoried and appraised at $8,982.85; that no order increasing the administrator's bond was ever entered, and thereafter, on February 21, 1938, an order was entered approving respondent's final account as such administrator and directing distribution of the estate equally between the heirs mentioned.
It further appears from the findings that, according to such final account and order of distribution, claims in the sum of $256.80 had been allowed and ordered paid, and the fees of the administrator fixed at $650; that respondent had in his possession in cash the sum of $1,577.50 and certain securities, among which were 330 Corporate Trust shares, of the appraised value of $907.50, which shares were ordered distributed; that a copy of the final account was not served upon or sent to Andrew J. Meyers; that by a supplemental report filed February 4, 1938, respondent reported that he had collected the additional sum of $64.50 making a total of $1,641.05 for distribution.
It also appears from the findings that subsequent to the entry of the order of distribution, respondent volunteered to procure the transfer of certain stock and securities registered in the name of deceased, and their re-issuance to the heirs; that during the year 1938, the heirs employed Clarence J. Coleman as their attorney, who, after negotiating with respondent, secured distribution of all the securities save the 330 Corporate Trust shares; that during the month of November, 1938, respondent sold the Corporate Trust shares, realizing therefrom the sum of $750, and converted the money to his own use; that contrary to the order of distribution, respondent has failed, neglected and refused to distribute to the heirs the sum of $1,641.05, or any part thereof, save and except that at the request of counsel for the Washington State Bar Association, on June 21, 1939, respondent forwarded to the association savings bank book No. 10540 of Seattle First National Bank, upon which the heirs have realized the sum of $69.38.
It further appears from the findings that respondent failed to pay the allowed claims of the estate, and at the time of the filing of the complaint herein was withholding and had converted to his own use funds of the estate, which he was bound by order of court to distribute to claimants and to the heirs, in the sum of $924.88, and that he had...
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Rosellini, Matter of
...170, 176 P. 2 (1918); In re Martin, 107 Wash. 372, 181 P. 880 (1919); In re Gwynn, 179 Wash. 389, 37 P.2d 1114 (1934); In re Grant, 4 Wash.2d 617, 104 P.2d 602 (1940); In re Moran, 5 Wash.2d 679, 106 P.2d 571 (1940); In re Beakley, 6 Wash.2d 410, 107 P.2d 1097 (1940); In re Scott, 12 Wash.2......
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Salvesen, Matter of, CD
...neither purges the lawyer of the offense nor does it establish that he has become a person fit to be trusted or fit to practice law. In re Grant, supra; In re Gowan, 104 Wash. 166, 176 P. 7 (1918). I recognize the above cited cases are not recent. Nevertheless, the passage of time has neith......
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Pennington, In re
...a defense to the disciplinary action. In re Simmons, supra; In re Peterson, 56 Wash.2d 187, 351 P.2d 533 (1960); In re Grant, 4 Wash.2d 617, 104 P.2d 602 (1940); In re Smith, 3 Wash.2d 455, 101 P.2d 311 Although, as indicated, we have in most cases followed the recommendation of the board, ......
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Kumbera, Matter of, CD
...note of the fact that the funds were ultimately repaid. On numerous occasions we have rejected that as an excuse. In In re Grant, 4 Wash.2d 617, 622, 104 P.2d 602 (1940), we said, in part: "An attorney who uses funds of a client for his own benefit is not excused even though he may repay or......