In re Gray
Decision Date | 24 May 2007 |
Docket Number | No. B197193.,B197193. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | In re Henry Richard GRAY, on Habeas Corpus. |
Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Heather Bushman, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
In this original writ proceeding, we conclude that the Governor's decision finding petitioner Henry Richard Gray (Gray) unsuitable for parole is not supported by "some evidence." (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 626, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174 (Rosenkrantz).) We therefore grant Gray's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
In 1980, a jury found petitioner Gray guilty of second degree murder with the use of a firearm. (Pen.Code, §§ 187, 12022.5.) The trial court sentenced Gray to 15 years to life in prison. The trial court stayed the two-year term for the firearm enhancement.
On January 27, 2005, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) determined Gray was suitable for parole. On June 16, 2005, the Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, reversed the decision of the Board. Gray filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court and this court summarily denied. The California Supreme Court ordered this court to vacate the summary denial and to issue an order to show cause returnable in the superior court as to why the Governor did not abuse his discretion by reversing the parole determination of the 2005 Board.1
On January 12, 2007, the trial court entered an order granting Gray's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court concluded that the Governor's reversal of the 2005 Board decision to grant parole was not supported by "some evidence." The trial court vacated the Governor's decision, and reinstated the Board's January 27, 2005 decision finding Gray suitable for parole. The trial court remanded the matter to the Governor to review the 2005 Board decision and to issue a new parole determination in accordance with due process.
Based solely upon the nature of the commitment offense, on February 8, 2007, the Governor again reversed the parole suitability determination of the 2005 Board. The Governor concluded that Gray was unsuitable for parole because his release would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society. The Governor found that Gray's commitment offense was "especially heinous" based upon his findings that the murder was carried out in a cold and calculated manner and that there was evidence showing premeditation.
Gray filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court asserting that the Governor abused his discretion and violated Gray's due process rights by reversing the 2005 decision of the Board finding Gray suitable for parole. Gray asserts that the Governor's decision is not supported by the "some evidence" standard set forth in Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 626, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174.
We conclude that the Governor's decision's finding Gray unsuitable for parole is not supported by some evidence. There is no evidence in the record to support the Governor's findings that Gray's second degree murder was cold and calculating or premeditated. Thus, the crime was not "especially heinous" under the pertinent Regulation. (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (c)(1).)2
In 1980, a jury found Gray guilty of second degree murder with the use of a firearm. (Pen.Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.5.) The trial court sentenced Gray to 15 years to life, but stayed the two-year term as to the use of the firearm. In 1990, Gray reached his minimum eligible parole date and became eligible for parole consideration.3
In 1993, 2001, and 2002, prior boards found Gray suitable for parole. In 1997, a prior board rescinded the 1993 parole suitability determination. In 2001, the Decision Review Unit of the Board disapproved the 2001 parole suitability determination. In 2002, former Governor Gray Davis reversed the 2002 parole suitability determination.
Following a hearing, on January 27, 2005, a two-member panel of the Board found Gray suitable for parole. An attorney represented Gray at the hearing. The record before us consists, in part, of a transcript of the Board's proceedings.4
At the commencement of the hearing, the presiding commissioner indicated the Board had reviewed, among other documents, Gray's "Central File," transcripts from prior parole hearings, as well as other unspecified documents. The presiding commissioner advised Gray that the purpose of the hearing was to determine whether Gray was suitable for parole. The Commissioner advised that Gray would be found unsuitable for parole "if in the judgment of the Panel the inmate would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison."
Below, we set forth in detail the contents of the transcript of the January 27, 2005 parole hearing.
Gray graduated from Whittier College in 1973. He received a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science with a minor degree in Business Administration. Gray was working for the Post Office at the time of the incident.
Gray had no juvenile record and no other offenses as an adult.
At the 2005 hearing, the presiding officer explained to Gray that she would read into the record a summary of the commitment offense from the April 2003 report of the Board. She further explained that Gray would then have the opportunity to explain what happened in this own words. The presiding commissioner read the following statement into the record:
The presiding commissioner then permitted Gray to state what happened in his own words. Gray stated the following:
Gray continued his testimony before the 2005 Board: ...
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