In re Guardianship Komara
| Decision Date | 10 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | A16-1022 |
| Parties | In re: Guardianship of Laye Komara, minor |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Affirmed
Hennepin County District Court
Michael D. Gavigan, Wilson Law Group, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant Ishamel Komara)
Laye Komara, Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (pro se respondent)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this appeal from orders denying a guardianship petition and a motion to appoint a guardian nunc pro tunc, appellant argues that (1) the district court erred by declining to appoint a guardian on the ground that the proposed ward had reached the age of majority and no longer met the statutory criteria for appointment of a guardian, and (2) the district court should have applied equitable principles in deciding whether to appoint a guardian. We affirm.
Respondent Laye Komara is an orphan who was born in Liberia on February 10, 1998, and arrived in the United States on August 27, 2014, when he was sixteen years old. Upon landing in New York, respondent was picked up and brought to live in Brooklyn Park by his adult cousin, appellant Ishamel Komara. Respondent has lived with appellant and his family since that time. Appellant filed a petition on November 9, 2015, seeking to be appointed respondent's guardian on the ground that respondent was an orphaned minor. The petition alleges that respondent has an older brother and sister, a 70-year-old uncle who lives in Philadelphia, and two aunts who live in Guinea, all with unknown addresses. A hearing on the petition was scheduled to be held on December 22, 2015.
On November 23, 2015, the district court directed a Hennepin County social worker to conduct a "welfare report . . . covering the home environment and . . . assess[ing] . . . whether the proposed guardian of the said minor . . . would be suitable." On December 3, 2015, the court visitor filed a visitor's report that recommended appointing appellant as respondent's guardian. A home study conducted by a county social worker was filed on December 16, 2015, and recommended approval of respondent's placement and appointment of appellant as guardian. That study, however, expressed concern that the family had not completed a required background check.
The district court's hearing notes from December 22, 2015, indicate that the background check had not been completed and that none of the other documents required to create a guardianship had been filed. The notes also state that "[o]ther family membersin the U.S. have expressed interest in being appointed as G but Resp wants to be w/Petitioner."
The Minnesota Department of Human Services filed a background study on appellant on January 6, 2016, and a background study on appellant's wife, Bindu Komara, on January 27, 2016. The studies indicated no criminal history or other findings that would affect appellant's ability to serve as respondent's guardian.
Affidavits from respondent's siblings living in Liberia, Assata Komara and Farouk Komara, were filed on January 14 and supported appointment of appellant as guardian. On January 15, 2016, appellant filed an affidavit demonstrating that he made diligent efforts but was unable to locate respondent's other relatives.
The district court held a "notice-only" hearing on February 5, 2016, and no relatives other than appellant appeared; respondent did not appear. On February 9, respondent's attorney sent the district court a letter stating that appellant had provided the necessary information to complete the background checks and had exhausted a search for respondent's relatives. The attorney stated that it was "imperative" that the district court sign an order to establish the guardianship before respondent's birthday, warning that respondent would otherwise "lose an opportunity to apply for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status through the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service." On February 10, the district court issued an order denying the guardianship petition as moot. The district court concluded that appointment of a guardian was not necessary because respondent had reached the age of 18 years, but noted that respondent "would have met the standard for minor conservatorship prior to his 18th birthday."
Appellant then moved for appointment of a guardian nunc pro tunc, asserting that he had complied with all statutory requirements by January 15, the district court did not issue the guardianship order before respondent reached the age of 18, and the failure to establish the guardianship was caused by the "delay of the [c]ourt." In a supplemental memorandum of law, appellant also asked the district court to apply equity in order to retain jurisdiction over the matter.
Following a hearing on April 5, 2016, the district court denied the motion, ruling that the petition was properly denied as moot, rejecting the argument that its handling of the matter was untimely, and rejecting as not "convincing" a Massachusetts case that applied equitable principles to decide an action involving a special immigrant juvenile, Recinos v. Escobar, 46 N.E.3d 60 (Mass. 2016).
This appeal followed.
Appellant seeks reversal of the denial of the guardianship petition. The decision whether to grant or deny a petition to appoint a guardian is discretionary. In re Guardianship of Wells, 733 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007). On review, this court will not reverse a guardianship decision unless there has been "a clear abuse of discretion." Id. at 509. This court reviews the district court's interpretation of the guardianship statute de novo. See In re Guardianship of Tschumy, 834 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. App. 2013), aff'd, 853 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 2014).
Under Minnesota's Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, "[t]he [district] court may appoint a guardian for a minor if the court finds the appointment is in the minor's best interest, and . . . both parents are deceased." Minn. Stat. § 524.5-204(a), (2016). A minor is defined as "an unemancipated individual who has not attained 18 years of age." Minn. Stat. § 524.5-102, subd. 10 (2016). A guardianship terminates by operation of law "upon the minor's death, adoption, emancipation, attainment of majority, or as ordered by the court." Minn. Stat. § 524.5-210(a) (2016).
After a person interested in the welfare of a minor petitions for appointment of a guardian, the district court sets a hearing date, and the petitioner must provide notice of the hearing to the minor and others who may have an interest in the establishment of the guardianship, including "each living parent of the minor or, if there is none, the adult nearest in kinship that can be found." Minn. Stat. § 524.5-205(a), (b) (2016). The court must appoint the guardian "if it finds that a qualified person seeks appointment, venue is proper, the required notices have been given, the conditions of section 524.5-204, paragraph (a), have been met, and the best interest of the minor will be served by the appointment." Minn. Stat. § 524.5-205(c) (2016).
Because respondent reached the age of 18 before the district court made its decision regarding the guardianship petition, the district court lacked proper grounds for appointing appellant as respondent's guardian. See id. Furthermore, any guardianship would have terminated by operation of law when respondent reached age 18 on February 10, 2016. See Minn. Stat. § 524.5-210(a). As the district court ruled in its order denying the petition, the issue of whether to appoint a guardian for respondent, which was based on his status as aminor, became moot when respondent reached the age of 18. See Isaacs v. Am. Iron & Steel Co., 690 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Minn. App. 2004) (), review denied (Minn. Apr. 4, 2005) .
While the district court's findings in both of its orders recognize that, but for respondent's reaching the age of 18, he "would have met the standard" for minor guardianship, the compelling nature of the underlying facts does not dictate the outcome when a statutory requirement for the guardianship does not exist. See Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 439-40 (Minn. 2009) ().
Appellant argues that the district court erred by requiring that respondent be incapacitated in order for appellant to be appointed as his guardian. In addition to finding that respondent did not qualify for a guardian because he had "attained the age of 18 years," the district court also made a finding that "[t]here is no other evidence that [r]espondent is incapacitated in any other way or needs a guardian." A guardianship may be created because the proposed ward is a minor, Minn. Stat. § 524.5-201 (2016), or because the proposed ward is an incapacitated person, Minn. Stat. § 524.5-301 (2016), and the requirements for these types of guardianships differ. The finding of respondent's lack of incapacity was not necessary for the district court's decision because the petition soughtappointment of a guardian only due to respondent's status as a minor, and appellant mischaracterizes the district court's findings by assuming that the district court ruled that a finding of incapacity was necessary for the district court to appoint a guardian for respondent. The district court reached its...
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