In re Guerra-Hernandez, Case No. 2:19 CV 61 DDN
| Decision Date | 17 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19 CV 61 DDN |
| Parties | LAZARO V. GUERRA-HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. DAN REDINGTON, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This action is before the Court upon the petition of Missouri state prisoner Lazaro V. Guerra-Hernandez for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The parties have consented to the exercise of plenary authority by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set forth below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
On June 8, 2015, in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County, Missouri, petitioner Guerra-Hernandez, then 50 years of age, was charged by an amended Information with one count of felony second-degree assault on a law enforcement officer "by striking him and biting him," one count of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated, and one count of misdemeanor driving while his license was revoked. The information also alleged he was a prior and persistent offender. (Doc. 15-1 at 12-15.) Also on June 8, 2015, petitioner pled guilty to all three counts of the amended Information. (Id. at 33-37.) On July 20, 2015, the circuit court found petitioner was a prior and persistent offender and sentenced him to concurrent terms of confinement for ten years for the assault, six months for the driving while intoxicated, and one year for the driving while his license was revoked. (Id. at 27-30.)
Petitioner did not directly appeal the sentences. However, on January 15, 2016, he filed a pro se post-conviction motion ("PCR motion") to set aside or correct his judgment and sentence pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035. (Id. at 43.) In this motion petitioner alleged his plea counsel was ineffective and that the guilty plea was induced by counsel's lies and promises that he would receive a sentence of 120 days "shock" confinement. He also alleged he was "excessively charged with no factual basis." (Id. at 48.) On November 28, 2016, with the advice of appointed counsel, petitioner filed an amended PCR motion. In it petitioner alleged his plea counsel advised him that, if he pled guilty, he would be placed in a 120-day treatment program under Rev. Stat. Mo. § 559.115. Petitioner alleged that but for counsel's ineffective assistance, he would have not pled guilty, but would have proceeded to trial. (Id. at 60-61.) Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing on this motion. On March 1, 2017, the Circuit Court denied the PCR motion without an evidentiary hearing.
On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Circuit Court for a hearing on whether appointed PCR counsel abandoned petitioner because the amended PCR motion was filed out of time. The Circuit Court made that finding and petitioner's appellate proceeding resumed. (Doc. 15-5 at 1-6.) Before the Court of Appeals petitioner argued only "Counsel erroneously advised Appellant Hernandez that - if he pleaded guilty - he would be placed in the one-hundred-twenty- (120-) day treatment program under § 559.115." (Doc. 15-7 at 2.) On June 18, 2019, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Guerra-Hernandez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019) ().
On July 25, 2019, petitioner filed the instant federal petition. Respondent admits petitioner filed his petition in a timely manner.
Petitioner alleges one ground for relief: He received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because his plea counsel advised him, if he pled guilty, he would be placed in a 120-day treatment program under § 559.115. Respondent argues this ground for relief is without merit.
For federal habeas grounds adjudicated by the state courts, such as petitioner's, Congress has provided that federal habeas relief may not be granted unless the state court adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonableapplication of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
"A state court's decision is contrary to clearly established law if the controlling case law requires a different outcome either because of factual similarity to the state case or because general federal rules require a particular result in a particular case." Tokar v. Bowersox, 198 F.3d 1039, 1045 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted). Further, a state court's decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when "the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). The standard for deciding whether a state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent is whether the ruling is "objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error would not suffice." Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S. Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017) (quoting Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015).
A state court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010). Review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182-83 (2011) (). Clear and convincing evidence that factual findings lack evidentiary support is required to grant habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wood, 558 U.S. at 293. The existence of some contrary evidence in the record is not enough to show that the state court's factual finding was unreasonable. Wood, 558 U.S. at 302.
The merits of petitioner's ground for relief depend upon clearly established federal law regarding a claim of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal case decided upon the petitioner's plea of guilty. The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). Where adefendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice "was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel provides the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Marcrum v. Luebbers, 509 F.3d 489, 502 (8th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court's established test for deciding whether an attorney provided effective assistance of counsel is two-part: first, the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was so seriously deficient that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the Sixth Amendment; second, he must show that deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. When considering the first prong, a court must apply a strong presumption that counsel's representation was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 d(2011).
The second prong, the prejudice prong, is different from the original Strickland test when applied in the context of guilty pleas. While Strickland asks whether or not there is a reasonable probability that but for the counsel's unprofessional errors the result would have been different, the petitioner who pled guilty must show that there is a reasonable probability that he would have insisted on going to trial. See Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59.
Both prongs need to be proved for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to prevail. This means that the question of prejudice need not to be reached if a petitioner fails to show the performance of counsel is deficient, and vice versa. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Williams v. Locke, 403 F.3d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 2005).
In his habeas petition, petitioner's sole ground for relief is that he pled guilty due to the ineffective assistance of his plea counsel. He claims the motion court erred in denying his motion because he would not have pled guilty had his plea counsel not erroneously advised him that he would be placed in the 120-day treatment program under Rev. Stat. Mo. § 559.115 if he pled guilty. Respondent argues this ground is without merit because the Missouri courtsreasonably applied federal law that was clearly established in deciding petitioner's plea counsel did not render constitutionally ineffective assistance.
In his traverse, petitioner argues his reliance upon his attorney's misrepresentation was objectively reasonable and that he should have received an evidentiary hearing opportunity to prove his reliance was reasonable. He bases this upon the facts that his counsel knew that his criminal record included only a suspended imposition of sentence, that he had never been imprisoned, and that all of his prior convictions resulted from his alcohol addiction. Based on that information, his plea counsel advised him that, if he pled guilty, he would receive a seven year sentence and placement in the 120-day treatment program. He argues his counsel also advised him that after he completed the treatment program, he would be placed on five years' probation. Before the sentencing, his counsel asked that petitioner be screened for the treatment program. As set forth below, the state court record...
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