In re H.D.

• Decision Date: 07 December 2018
• Docket Number: DOCKET NOS. A-5321-16T1,A-5322-16T1
• Citation: 457 N.J.Super. 205,198 A.3d 1007
• Parties: In the MATTER OF Registrant H.D. In the Matter of Registrant J.M.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

457 N.J.Super. 205

198 A.3d 1007

In the MATTER OF Registrant H.D.

In the Matter of Registrant J.M.

DOCKET NOS. A-5321-16T1

A-5322-16T1

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued October 29, 2018

Decided December 7, 2018

Fletcher C. Duddy, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant H.D. (in A-5321-16) (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Fletcher C. Duddy, of counsel and on the briefs; Stephanie A. Lutz, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs).

Jesse M. DeBrosse, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant J.M. (in A-5322-16) (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Jesse M. DeBrosse, on the briefs).

Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (in A-5321-16) (Theodore Stephens II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat and Maria I. Guerrero, Special Deputy Attorneys General/Acting Assistant Prosecutors, of counsel; Frank J. Ducoat, on the brief).

David M. Galemba, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (in A-5322-16) (John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney; David M. Galemba, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges Messano, Gooden Brown and Rose.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MESSANO, P.J.A.D.

We consolidate these two appeals that were argued back-to-back to issue a single opinion because they involve only one common legal issue.

Appellants J.M. and H.D. were convicted of sex offenses, see N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b), in 1994 and 1998 respectively, and sentenced to periods of probation. Pursuant to the provisions of Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to 11, both were sentenced to community supervision for life (CSL) as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a), the Violent Predator Incapacitation Act (VPIA), "enacted as a ‘component’ of Megan's Law at the time of its passage in 1994." In re G.H., 455 N.J. Super. 515, 524, 190 A.3d 1059 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 305, 53 A.3d 1210 (2012) ).¹ J.M. and H.D. also registered as sex offenders pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a) and (c).

In 2001, J.M. was convicted of computer-related theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-29, a disorderly persons offense, and sentenced to one year of probation.² Also in 2001, H.D. was convicted of fourth-degree failure to register as a sex offender, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(3), and sentenced to one year of probation. Both J.M. and H.D. have remained offense free since 2001.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) (subsection (f) ), any registrant may apply "to the Superior Court ... to terminate the [registration] obligation upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within [fifteen] years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." In 2017, J.M. moved to be relieved of his registration obligations.

H.D. sought the same relief in 2017, and additionally moved to terminate CSL pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c), which states:

[A] judge may grant a petition for release from a special sentence of [community] supervision for life only upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that the person has not committed a crime for [fifteen] years since the last conviction or release from incarceration, whichever is later, and that the person is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others if released from [community] supervision.

[ (Emphasis added).]

The provision "mirrors [subsection (f) ]." G.H., 455 N.J. Super. at 524, 190 A.3d 1059 (quoting In re J.S., 444 N.J. Super. 303, 312, 133 A.3d 282 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 225 N.J. 339, 137 A.3d 1198 (2016) ).

Following oral argument, the Law Division judge denied J.M.'s motion to terminate his registration requirements, reasoning J.M. was "precluded from being relieved from his Megan's Law obligations because of [his subsequent] disorderly persons conviction."

In support of his motion before a different Law Division judge, H.D. provided the report of Dr. James Reynolds, a psychologist, who opined that H.D. did "not present a risk of harm to members of the community." In his thoughtful written opinion, citing Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 21, 662 A.2d 367 (1995), the motion judge noted that Megan's Law imposed lifetime registration requirements upon convicted sex offenders, and "registrants are not entitled to terminate their obligations as a matter of right." Only those who "fall into a narrow and admittedly strict category will ... be permitted to terminate their registration requirement. That is, they must remain [offense free] for [fifteen] years following their conviction or release from incarceration on the underlying offense that obligates them to register." (Emphasis in original).

The judge quoted our opinion in In re A.D., 441 N.J. Super. 403, 423, 119 A.3d 241 (App. Div. 2015), aff'd o.b., 227 N.J. 626, 153 A.3d 241 (2017), in which we expressed some sympathy for, but ultimately rejected the argument that "there should be no absolute bar ... to the termination of registration requirements, particularly where the repeat offenses are minor; and ... not sexual in nature ...." Noting the panel in A.D. refused to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature, id. at 424, 119 A.3d 241, the judge denied H.D.'s motion to terminate his registration obligations.

However, the judge reached a different result regarding termination of CSL. He concluded that N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c) was "unlike the statute that governs Megan's Law registration." He reasoned, "CSL may be terminated after a showing that a registrant has not committed an offense for a period of [fifteen] years. This [fifteen]-year period is measured from the date of the registrant's last conviction, not [his] underlying conviction under Megan's Law." He entered an order terminating CSL for H.D., and subsequently denied H.D.'s motion for reconsideration of the denial of the termination of his registration obligations.

I.

Before us, appellants argue subsection (f)'s clear and unambiguous language permits relief from their registration obligations because they remained offense free for fifteen years following their last conviction. They note that subsection (f)'s reference to the "conviction" that starts the fifteen-year clock is not limited to the sex-offense conviction that triggered Megan's Law's registration in the first instance.³ In other words, according to appellants, the fifteen-year clock reset in 2001, due to appellants' subsequent "conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). Alternatively, appellants contend that even if subsection (f) is ambiguous, various tenets of statutory construction, common sense and the rule of lenity require reversal.

The State also argues that subsection (f) is clear and unambiguous. However, the State argues a conviction for any offense forever bars relief when it occurs within fifteen years following a "conviction or release from a correctional facility" for the sex offense. The State contends this interpretation is consistent with the Legislature's intent in enacting Megan's Law. Additionally, the State argues the Legislature's use of different language in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c), specifically, that the applicant remain offense free for fifteen years from "the last conviction or release from incarceration," evidences an intention to treat CSL differently from registration, because registration is remedial, while CSL is penal in nature. Compare Doe, 142 N.J. at 73, 662 A.2d 367 (holding Megan's Law's registration requirements were "clearly and totally remedial in purpose"), with Schubert, 212 N.J. at 308, 53 A.3d 1210 (holding CSL was "punitive rather than remedial at its core").

II.

Because we confront a "question ... of statutory interpretation, ... we are ‘neither bound by, nor required to defer to, the legal conclusions of a trial ... court.’ " In re N.B., 222 N.J. 87, 94, 117 A.3d 1196 (2015) (quoting State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176, 989 A.2d 256 (2010) ). "The overriding goal of all statutory interpretation ‘is to determine as best we can the intent of the Legislature, and to give effect to that intent.’ " State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67, 165 A.3d 722 (2017) (quoting State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 604, 92 A.3d 656 (2014) ). "[W]e begin with the statute's plain language and give terms their ordinary meaning[,]" permissibly "draw[ing] inferences based on the statute's overall structure and composition." Id. at 68, 165 A.3d 722 (first citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005) ; and then citing State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222, 231-32, 1 A.3d 640 (2010) ). "We do not view [statutory] words and phrases in isolation but rather in their proper context and in relationship to other parts of [the] statute, so that meaning can be given to the whole of [the] enactment." State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513, 533, 187 A.3d 123 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Rangel, 213 N.J. 500, 509, 64 A.3d 558, (2013) ). "If the Legislature's intent is clear on the face of the statute, then the ‘interpretative process is over.’ " S.B., 230 N.J. at 68, 165 A.3d 722 (quoting Hupka, 203 N.J. at 232, 1 A.3d 640 ).

However, "[i]f the language does not lead to a single, clear meaning, we can look to extrinsic evidence, including legislative history, for guidance."

State v. O'Driscoll, 215 N.J. 461, 474, 73 A.3d 496 (2013) (citing Rangel, 213 N.J. at 509, 64 A.3d 558 ).

The statute's purpose and context provide sources of extrinsic evidence of legislative intent, J.S., 444 N.J. Super. at 308, 133 A.3d 282, as does the policy supporting its enactment. State v. Thomas, 166 N.J. 560, 567, 767 A.2d 459 (2001). We may also consider extrinsic evidence of legislative intent "if a literal reading of the statute would yield an absurd result, particularly one at odds with the overall statutory scheme." N.B.,...