In re H.D.

• Decision Date: 17 March 2020
• Docket Number: 082254,A-73/74 September Term 2018
• Citation: 241 N.J. 412,228 A.3d 1235
• Parties: In the MATTER OF Registrant H.D. In the Matter of Registrant J.M.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

241 N.J. 412

228 A.3d 1235

In the MATTER OF Registrant H.D. In the Matter of Registrant J.M.

A-73/74 September Term 2018

082254

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued November 18, 2019

Decided March 17, 2020

Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant State of New Jersey in A-73-18 (Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat, of counsel and on the brief).

David M. Galemba, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant State of New Jersey in A-74-18 (John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney; David M. Galemba, of counsel and on the brief).

Fletcher C. Duddy, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent H.D. in A-73-18 (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Fletcher C. Duddy of counsel and on the briefs).

Jesse M. DeBrosse, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent J.M. in A-74-18 (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Jesse M. DeBrosse of counsel and on the briefs).

Emily R. Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Emily R. Anderson, of counsel and on the brief).

Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).

JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) (subsection (f) ) allows Megan's Law registrants to petition the Superior Court "to terminate the [registration] obligation upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." This case requires us to determine whether subsection (f) permits the termination of sex offender registration for registrants who commit an offense during the fifteen years following conviction or release but who then remain offense-free for fifteen years.

The Appellate Division held that H.D. and J.M., two Megan's Law registrants who committed non-predicate Megan's Law offenses within fifteen years of their sex offense convictions but then remained offense-free for a fifteen-year period, satisfied subsection (f). We conclude the judgment of the Appellate Division is inconsistent with subsection (f)’s plain language and therefore reverse.

I.

In 1994, J.M. pled guilty to third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a). In 1997, H.D. pled guilty to endangering the welfare of a child in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4. Both H.D. and J.M. were sentenced to probation and required to register as sex offenders pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a) and (c). In 2001, J.M. pled guilty to a computer crime in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-29, and H.D. pled guilty to failure to register as a convicted sex offender in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a) and (e). They were both sentenced to probation. Neither registrant has since been convicted of a crime.

In 2017, H.D. and J.M. petitioned in Essex and Salem Counties, respectively, for release from their Megan's Law registration obligations, contending that they had satisfied subsection (f)’s requirement that they remain offense-free for fifteen years. Their motions were opposed by the county prosecutors’ offices. J.M.’s motion was denied in a brief order. In denying H.D.’s motion, the Essex County Superior Court held that Megan's Law registrants "must remain offense-free for 15 years following their convictions or release from incarceration on the underlying offense that obligates them to register."¹ H.D. and J.M. both appealed.

The Appellate Division consolidated the appeals and reversed, determining that subsection (f) is ambiguous as to whether its requirement of fifteen years of offense-free conduct resets following an offender's subsequent criminal conviction. It found that the Legislature's use of an "indefinite term -- ‘any’ --" in subsection (f) compelled "consider[ation of] other interpretive aids" to glean subsection (f)’s meaning. In re H.D., 457 N.J. Super. 205, 214, 198 A.3d 1007 (App. Div. 2018). The Appellate Division held that the Superior Courts’ rejections of H.D. and J.M.’s motions were inconsistent with Megan's Law's remedial purpose. The panel concluded "that the Legislature never intended to forever bar relief from Megan's Law registration requirements to every person who commits an offense, however minor, within the first fifteen years following conviction of a sex offense or release from custody after that conviction." Id. at 218, 198 A.3d 1007.

The Essex and Salem County Prosecutors’ Offices (prosecutors) filed petitions for certification, which this Court granted. 237 N.J. 582, 206 A.3d 970, 971 (2019). We granted the Office of Attorney General (Attorney General) and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) leave to appear as amici curiae.

II.

The prosecutors challenge the Appellate Division's determination of statutory ambiguity. They claim that only a tortured reading of subsection (f) permits the fifteen-year clock to restart following a new offense within fifteen years of the predicate sex offense. The prosecutors note that the Legislature utilized plain language in the Violent Predator Incapacitation Act to specify that the fifteen-year time period in that statute restarts after a subsequent offense -- "15 years since the last conviction or release from incarceration." (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c) ). In their view, the absence of similar language in subsection (f) is telling.

The Attorney General echoes the prosecutors’ arguments and advocates for a contextual reading of subsection (f)’s operative time period, under which subsection (f)’s reference to "conviction or release" must be read together with its earlier reference to individuals "required to register under this act," indicating the Legislature's intent to tie the beginning of the fifteen-year period to punishment for the sex offense requiring registration.

H.D. and J.M. point to the Legislature's use in subsection (f) of "any" to qualify "term of imprisonment imposed" as proof the Legislature did not limit registrants seeking relief to a single fifteen-year offense-free period. H.D. and J.M. suggest "any" connotes the absence of limitations. Additionally, H.D. and J.M. assert that the prosecutors’ interpretation of subsection (f) would render subsection (g) superfluous.

Lastly, the registrants advance a policy argument. They contend that reversal of the Appellate Division would hamper efforts to reintegrate into society sex offenders with little risk of reoffending, unmoor Megan's Law from any rational basis, and jettison this Court's conclusion in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 662 A.2d 367 (1995), that the registration scheme is remedial.

Like H.D. and J.M., the ACLU contends that the prosecutors’ interpretation of subsection (f) is not necessary to promote public safety and flouts the New Jersey and United States Constitutions.

III.

At issue here is whether subsection (f) permits relief for Megan's Law registrants who commit a new offense within the first fifteen years they are required to register as a sex offender.

Resolution of this issue turns on the meaning of "conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed" in subsection (f). The State argues that phrase denotes "the underlying offense that obligates them to register"; in the registrants’ view, it encompasses subsequent offenses that would re-start the fifteen-year clock.

A.

We review this question of statutory interpretation "de novo, unconstrained by deference to the decisions of the trial court or the appellate panel." State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 329, 106 A.3d 466 (2015). Our review, however, must follow the well-settled rules of statutory construction "to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent." DYFS v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 20, 59 A.3d 576 (2013).

Generally, "the best indicator of that intent is the plain language chosen by the Legislature," State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566, 575, 90 A.3d 1281 (2014) (quoting State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176, 989 A.2d 256 (2010) ), "giv[ing] words ‘their ordinary meaning and significance,’ " State v. Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591, 192 A.3d 961 (2018) (quoting Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 467, 95 A.3d 210 (2014) ). We will not "rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature [or] presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language." State in Interest of K.O., 217 N.J. 83, 91-92, 85 A.3d 938 (2014) ).

Where "a statute's plain language is clear, we apply that plain meaning and end our inquiry." Garden State Check Cashing Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Banking & Ins., 237 N.J. 482, 489, 206 A.3d 375 (2019). However, if the plain language is ambiguous, the Court will look to extrinsic evidence, Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 592, 46 A.3d 1262 (2012), including "legislative history and relevant canons of statutory construction," to determine the Legislature's intent, State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320, 325, 15 A.3d 818 (2011). Additionally, we interpret statutes "in context with related provisions," DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005), since "the context is [often] determinative of the meaning," McDonald v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 99 N.J.L. 170, 172, 122 A. 801 (E. & A. 1923).

B.

Here, we apply those principles of statutory interpretation to a provision of Megan's Law, which was enacted in 1994 in response to the abduction, rape, and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka by her neighbor. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) ; Poritz, 142 N.J. at 12, 662 A.2d 367. The neighbor "had prior convictions for sex offenses against...