In re A.H.L.
| Decision Date | 03 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. COA13–172.,COA13–172. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In The Matter of A.H.L., E.C.L., L.R.L., Juveniles. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal by respondents from orders entered 24 September 2012 and 26 November 2012 by Judge Monica H. Leslie in Haywood County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 June 2013.
Rachael J. Hawes for Haywood County Department of Social Services.
J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-mother.
Michael E. Casterline for respondent-father.
Administrative Office of the Courts, by Tawanda N. Foster, for guardian ad litem.
Respondent–Father Scott L. and Respondent–Mother Elizabeth L. appeal from orders adjudicating their minor children, A.H.L., E.C.L., and L.R.L.,1 to be abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles and adopting a disposition and a permanent plan involving legal guardianship for the children. On appeal, Respondent–Parents allege that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition; that the trial court's determinations that the children were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles lacked adequate support in the trial court's findings of fact; that the trial court erred by failing to make the findings necessary to support a decision to authorize DSS to cease attempting to reunite the children with Respondent–Parents; and that the trial court committed numerous errors stemming from the breach of an alleged agreement between Respondent–Parents and the Haywood County Department of Social Services. After careful consideration of Respondent–Parents' challenges to the trial court's orders in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's orders should, with the exception of the trial court's determination that the children were abused juveniles, be affirmed.
On 14 June 2007, DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging that the children were neglected and dependent juveniles. On 2 August 2007, Judge Bradley B. Letts entered an order adjudicating Allison, Elsie, and Lucas to be neglected and dependent juveniles. On 22 October 2008, Judge Richard K. Walker entered an order relieving DSS of the responsibility for making further efforts to reunify the children with Respondent–Parents. After obtaining a favorable home study pursuant to the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, Judge Richlyn D. Holt entered an order on 15 April 2009 awarding legal guardianship to the children's adult half-sister, Beth Nelson, who resided in Texas. The Haywood County District Court held review hearings through 13 October 2009, a period during which Texas Child Protective Services monitored the condition of the children while they lived in Ms. Nelson's home. On 22 April 2010, the court entered an order “waiv[ing] further review hearings in this matter, pursuant to N.C. [Gen.Stat. § ] 7B–906(b), unless a party to this action files a[m]otion for review.”
On 28 June 2012, DSS filed new petitions alleging that Allison, Elsie, and Lucas were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles after learning that they were living with their former foster parents in Haywood County. In addition, DSS alleged that Texas CPS had failed to inform DSS that Ms. Nelson had returned the children to Respondent–Parents in April 2010; that Texas CPS had obtained custody of the children after filing a juvenile petition in Texas on 9 August 2010; and that a Texas court had appointed Respondent–Parents as the children's Joint Managing Conservators, “with all regular rights available to custodial parents,” on 3 October 2011. After the children ran away from Respondent–Parents' home on 19 April 2012, Texas CPS approached the Haywood County foster parents with a request that they allow the children to live with them while Respondent–Parents sought employment in Florida. Despite the fact that the foster parents understood that this arrangement was a temporary one, the Texas court found that permanency had been achieved by placing the children with their former foster parents. According to DSS, the children had been living with their former foster parents since early May 2012. Although Respondent–Parents agreed to this placement in a meeting with Texas CPS held on 25 April 2012, “Texas CPS did not inform ICPC of this plan, did not request ICPC services or approval, and did not inform [DSS].” At the time DSS filed the juvenile petitions, Respondent–Father was staying in a motel in Haywood County while Respondent–Mother's whereabouts were unknown.
After a hearing held on 4 September 2012, the trial court entered an order on 24 September 2012 adjudicating the children to be abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. The trial court continued the dispositional hearing until October 2012, at which time a combined dispositional and permanency planning hearing was to be held. In a disposition and permanency planning review order entered 26 November 2012 following a hearing held on 30 October 2012, the trial court concluded that it had “continuing jurisdiction” in this matter after determining that Respondent–Parents had “received custody of the children [in Texas] in violation of valid North Carolina Orders;” that, since it had relieved DSS of any obligation to attempt to reunify the children with Respondent–Parents in 2008, guardianship remained the permanent plan for the children; and that the children's Haywood County foster parents should serve as the children's guardians. Respondent–Parents noted appeals to this Court from the trial court's orders.
As an initial matter, we must address the adequacy of Respondent–Mother's notice of appeal from the 24 September 2012 adjudication order and the 26 November 2012 disposition and permanency planning review order. Respondent–Mother's notice of appeal provided, in relevant part, that she was appealing from “the Review Order relieving DSS of further reasonable efforts and changing to a permanent plan of legal guardianship that was filed on November 26, 2012.” DSS has requested that this Court dismiss Respondent–Mother's appeal from the adjudication and disposition and permanency planning orders on the ground that her notice of appeal failed to designate either the 24 September 2012 adjudication order or the 26 November 2012 disposition and permanency planning order as orders from which her appeal had been taken. Although we agree with DSS' contention, in part, we conclude that we should review the issues raised in Respondent–Mother's brief.
According to N.C.R.App. P. 3(d), a notice of appeal “shall designate the judgment or order from which appeal is taken.” We have previously found that a notice of appeal that only specified a single order from which an appeal had been noted did not suffice to provide this Court with jurisdiction to review the parent's challenge to a number of different orders. See In re D.R.F., 204 N.C.App. 138, 141, 693 S.E.2d 235, 238 (), disc. review denied,364 N.C. 616, 705 S.E.2d 358, 359 (2010). As a result, given that Respondent–Mother's notice of appeal makes no reference whatsoever to the 24 September 2012 adjudication order, her notice does not suffice to give this Court jurisdiction over her challenge to that order. However, we exercise our discretion under N.C.R.App. P. 21 to allow Respondent–Mother's petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari in order to consider her challenge to the trial court's adjudication order.
Although she could have designated the 26 November 2012 dispositional and permanency planning order with greater clarity in her notice of appeal, we are able to infer from Respondent–Mother's notice of appeal that she intended to seek appellate review of that order. Simply put, Respondent–Mother's notice of appeal gives the correct date for the order in question and adequately describes certain of the decisions which are embodied in that order. As a result of that fact and the fact that DSS does not appear to have had any trouble responding to Respondent–Mother's challenges to the 26 November 2012 order, we conclude that Respondent–Mother's notice of appeal was sufficient to give this Court jurisdiction over her challenge to that order. See Chee v. Estes, 117 N.C.App. 450, 452, 451 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1994) (). Thus, we will consider Respondent–Mother's challenges to both the 24 September 2012 and 26 November 2012 orders.2
As an initial matter, Respondent–Parents challenge the trial court's orders on the grounds that the UCCJEA precluded the trial court from modifying the 2011 Texas order making Respondent–Parents conservators for the children. According to Respondent–Parents, the fact that the Texas courts had jurisdiction over the relationship between Respondent–Parents and the children deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter the 24 September 2012 adjudication and 26 November 2012 disposition and permanency planning orders. We do not find Respondent–Parents' argument persuasive.
“The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be considered by the court at any time, and may be raised for the first time on appeal.” In re T.B., 177 N.C.App. 790, 791, 629 S.E.2d 895, 896–97 (2006). The extent to which a trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular case is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. In re K.U.-S.G., 208...
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