In re Hamilton's Estate
| Decision Date | 17 September 1919 |
| Docket Number | 15386. |
| Citation | 108 Wash. 326,184 P. 337 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re HAMILTON'S ESTATE. |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, Snohomish County; Ralph C. Bell, Judge.
In the matter of the estate of Eric Hamilton, deceased. A motion by William Hamilton to vacate or set aside an order granting petition of the administratrix, widow of deceased, to have certain property set aside to her as surviving spouse, was denied, and he appeals. Affirmed.
G. D Eveland, of Everett, for appellant.
Francis W. Mansfield, of Everett, for respondent.
Section 103, c. 156, Laws of 1917, provides:
On January 10, 1917, and before the above law went into effect Eric Hamilton died, leaving certain property, the heirs to which were his widow and several brothers and sisters, among them the appellant. On the 19th day of January of that year, the widow was appointed administratrix of the estate; decedent's will having been set aside by the court because of mental incompetency. February 20, 1918, and after the above law was effective, the widow petitioned the superior court to set aside to her, according to the terms of the foregoing section, the house in which she and the deceased had dwelt, together with certain household goods therein. Notice of hearing of her petition was given by posting under the order of the court, as permitted by the Probate Code of 1917. The court found that the provisions of section 103 as to the value of the property, the expenses of last sickness and for the funeral, etc., had been properly complied with, and entered its order, granting the petition, and setting aside the property as a homestead as prayed. The balance of the estate, of which there was considerable, proceeded to probate in the usual course of law.
Months thereafter, when it was too late for an appeal, William Hamilton, a brother of the deceased and one of his heirs, moved the superior court to set aside the order theretofore entered granting the administratrix's petition, principally upon two grounds: First, that William Hamilton had had no notice of the petition in question; and, second, that section 103 'either has no application to said matter or is unconstitutional and void.' The motion was denied by the superior court for the reason that, aside from any constitutional question, the vacating of the order was improperly moved; the remedy, as provided by the section itself, being by appeal from the order, or for fraud:
'* * * The order or judgment of the court making the award or awards provided for in this section shall be conclusive and final, except on appeal and except for fraud.'
The determining question emerging in this case is: Is the alleged error of the superior court in setting aside to the widow the property petitioned for properly attacked by a motion to vacate such order, or is the appellant restricted to an appeal; the matter of fraud not being involved either in fact or law in this case? Disposing briefly of the contention as to lack of notice, the superior court found, and we are satisfied with its finding, that the procedure under the section was sufficient to give it jurisdiction of the matter, and that it had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the persons concerned.
The language of section 103 clearly makes the order of the probate court, setting aside the property therein specified to the surviving spouse, a final judgment of the court:
'The order or judgment of the court making the award or awards provided for in this section shall be conclusive and final. * * *'
The trial court, having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, may have erred in law or fact. Possibly the superior court may upon timely motion vacate such final judgment upon other grounds than fraud to correct its own errors before the judgment is final. But when it acquired jurisdiction of the matter and of the...
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