In re Hanson

• Decision Date: 12 December 1931
• Docket Number: 20118.
• Parties: In re HANSON. [*]
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

5 P.2d 1088

134 Kan. 165

In re HANSON. ^[*]

No. 20118.

Supreme Court of Kansas

December 12, 1931

Syllabus by the Court.

Order suspending attorney from practice of law, rendered in contempt proceeding, held not void on ground of insufficient notice and opportunity to defend (Rev. St. 1923, 7--112).

Order in contempt proceedings, suspending attorney from practice of law, held not void on ground suspension could not be made in contempt proceedings, nor joined therewith (Rev. St. 1923 7--115, 20--1203 to 20-- 1206).

Order suspending attorney from practice of law "until the further order of this court" held not void for indefiniteness (Rev. St. 1923, 7--115, 7--116).

Attorney found guilty of contempt of court may be punished by suspension from practice (Rev. St. 1923, 7--111, 20--1203 to 20--1206).

The judgment of suspension rendered in this action, November 11 1916, and reported in 99 Kan. 23, 160 P. 1141, considered upon the motion of the respondent to vacate, annul, and set it aside as void, and held not to be void.

Original proceeding against John F. Hanson for contempt. On motion to vacate judgment previously entered suspending respondent from practice as an attorney at law until the further order of the court.

Motion overruled.

For former opinion, see 99 Kan. 23, 160 P. 1141.

Roland Boynton, Atty. Gen., Everett E. Steerman and Dunkin Kimble Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

John F Hanson, of Lindsborg, pro se.

HUTCHISON J.

This is a motion to vacate, annul, and set aside the judgment and order of this court rendered November 11, 1916, wherein John F. Hanson was found guilty of contempt of this court, and was suspended from practice as an attorney at law in any and all of the courts of this state until the further order of this court, for the reason that said order is wholly void, and because the court was without jurisdiction or power to render such order.

The first reason assigned is because the order of suspension was made in a contempt proceeding, and the respondent had no intimation that any suspension was intended or involved until the ruling was handed down, and he cites In re Peyton, 12 Kan. 398, as strictly applicable, where it was said: "We do not think that the appellant had sufficient notice that this proceeding was instituted for the purpose of disbarring him. The whole proceeding, as it appears from the record brought to this court, would seem to be merely a proceeding for contempt." Page 408 of 12 Kan.

That was an action for contempt and deceit where the respondent had been admitted to the bar in Kansas on a forged certificate from the state of Indiana. It nowhere referred to his professional conduct or behavior.

The contention of the respondent in this case is not borne out by the record. The accusation was signed and filed by the Attorney General of the state, designated by Rev. St. 7--112 to conduct disbarment proceedings. The accusation contains the following allegations:

"*** That the said John F. Hanson is an attorney-at-law duly admitted to practice in the district courts and in the Supreme Court of the state of Kansas, and, as such, is an officer of said Supreme Court; that the said John F. Hanson, while acting as said attorney and in disregard of his duties and obligations as such attorney, in said petition for rehearing made various and divers attacks and reflections upon the Supreme Court, and wilfully, in said petition for rehearing, used toward said court contemptuous and insulting language; that said language is contained and found in various portions of said petition for rehearing; ***

"That the attention of the said John F. Hanson has been directed to the use of such language and to his conduct toward this court, and the court has admonished the said John F. Hanson against the use of contemptuous language, and in the opinion of the court, filed in the case of State v. Linderholm, 95 Kan. 670, 149 P. 427, the attention of the said John F. Hanson was particularly directed to the use of such language in the following words of the court:

"'*** the writer finds in the pleadings. correspondence and documents of counsel a persistent insolence and effrontery towards this court and the individual justices which are wholly inexcusable and which must not be repeated."'

The Linderholm Case, in which the warning quotation was given, was decided and the warning given this respondent on June 12, 1915, and the objectionable petition for rehearing in this case was filed by him March 4, 1916, about nine months thereafter. The following quotations from the answer show that the respondent plainly understood that his professional conduct was involved:

"*** That he admits that he is an attorney-at-law duly admitted to practice in all the courts of Kansas, that he was an attorney for said relatrix in said cause. ***

"But he specifically denies that he disregarded his duties and obligations while acting as such attorney, but on the contrary exerted his utmost efforts in behalf of his client's cause. ***

"The said John F. Hanson further answering alleges and says that the unusual and vehement language used in the said petition for rehearing is made necessary by what seems to be a persistent practice of the Court of going to extremes adverse to him in their rulings and position in causes before them in which he is counsel or party. ***"

Another paragraph of the answer undertakes to excuse and justify his use of such unusual and vehement language, as admitted to have been used by him in the petition for rehearing, because of his unfair treatment by the court in rulings in this and other cases mentioned by him, and because of his constitutional and legal rights as an attorney, and for the want of other adequate remedy for the purpose of getting better and closer attention to the matters under consideration.

Respondent refers to the decision in the case of State v. Root, 5 N. D. 487, 67 N.W. 590, 57 Am.St.Rep. 568, where the order of disbarment was reversed because it was rendered in an action where the attorney was tried for contempt, and because he was not at his urgent request permitted to demur to the accusation and make other defenses allowed under the disbarment procedure in contempt cases. That was very different from this case, in that the respondent here raised all kinds of legal questions, jurisdictional, constitutional rights, due process, and rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

In re Bradley, 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 364, 19 L.Ed. 214, was where the contempt was committed, if at all, before one of the judges while acting in a different court than that hearing the contempt matter, and in this case, like the North Dakota case, above cited, no opportunity for defense was afforded the respondent as to a disbarment matter.

Another case cited by respondent is Withers v. State ex rel. Posey, 36 Ala. 252, and it is a mandamus action to compel the mayor of a city, who sits as a court, to recognize an attorney whom he refused to recognize because of some past conduct not before him, and for which he had never had a hearing of any kind before any court.

With the issues as outlined above, formed by the answer to the accusation, there was a complete trial. The language of the petition for rehearing was admitted, and, in addition to the many legal points raised by the answer, there was the defense of justification and excuse for the unusual language, all of which points were fully considered in the opinion.

The next reason assigned by respondent is because suspension could not be made in a contempt proceeding nor joined with it. Respondent relies strongly upon the ruling in favor of his contention in the Root Case, supra, where the statutory procedure for the trial of contempt actions is so different from that in disbarment actions, as above indicated, where the former must be in the form of answers to interrogatories; and for this reason it was held that the two matters could not be heard together in the same action. No such distinction in procedure exists in this state.

Strong reliance is placed upon the ruling in State v Fisher, 103 Neb. 736, 743, 174 N.W. 320, 323, in effect overruling an earlier decision of that court rendered by a divided court, but the most that was determined in the case in this particular was that contempt and disbarment are distinct prosecutions, and that they "are not usually joined, in one complaint." There the attorney was objecting to his being tried for an offense, which apparently amounted to a contempt, until he had...