In re Hanson

• Decision Date: 11 November 1916
• Docket Number: 20118[1]
• Citation: 99 Kan. 23,160 P. 1141
• Parties: IN RE HANSON.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

160 P. 1141

99 Kan. 23

IN RE HANSON. No. 20118^[1]

Supreme Court of Kansas

November 11, 1916

Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

If the language confessedly used by an attorney and officer of the Supreme Court in a petition for rehearing be such as to carry beyond question its own inherent and inevitable significance the user must have intended the natural and proper consequences of his use of such language.

Language used by attorney in application for rehearing in the Supreme Court held to show utter disrespect and the plainest intent to express contempt for the court.

It is one of the plainest and most primary duties of an attorney to be respectful to the courts in which he practices.

Under Laws 1913, c. 64, § 2, giving the Supreme Court power to disbar or suspend an attorney for a willful violation of his oath or any duty imposed on an attorney at law, an attorney who persists in the use of contemptuous language in briefs addressed to the court will be suspended until further order of the court.

Citation to John F. Hanson for contempt. Respondent suspended from practice as an attorney at law until further order of court.

S. M. Brewster, Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

John F. Hanson, of Lindsborg, for defendant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The Attorney General, having been directed by the court to take such steps as might be proper in the premises in the case of State of Kansas ex rel. Agnes Bjorn v. Robert Creager, filed after due and proper preliminary proceedings, an accusation against John F. Hanson, setting forth, among other things that the Creager Case, appealed from the district court of McPherson county, was heard and determined in this court, and that an opinion filed February 12, 1916, sustained the judgment of the lower court; that John F. Hanson was one of the attorneys for the plaintiff and appellant in that case, and as such filed his brief in this court, and after affirmance of the judgment there was filed in this court a petition for rehearing prepared by Hanson as attorney for the appellant; that John F. Hanson is an attorney at law, duly admitted to practice in the district courts and in the Supreme Court of this state, and as such is an officer of this court, and while acting as such attorney in such petition for rehearing made various and divers attacks and reflections upon this court, and willfully used towards this court contemptuous and insulting language, found in various portions of the petition set forth in numerous paragraphs thereof. The Attorney General alleged:

That this language was calculated to bring the court into disrepute and contempt, and was willfully and purposely used by Hanson for the purpose of bringing the court into contempt. That his attention had been directed to the use of such language and his conduct towards this court, and that he had been admonished in an opinion in State v. Linderholm, 95 Kan. 671, 149 P. 427, wherein it was said, among other things:

"But the writer finds in the pleadings, correspondence, and documents of counsel a persistent insolence and effrontery towards this court and the individual justices which are wholly inexcusable, and which must not be repeated. The very least that this court can do with such contumacious and insulting documents is to strike them from the files and consign them to the waste basket."

That notwithstanding this warning, Hanson willfully and maliciously persisted in maintaining towards this court and the individual justices thereof a "persistent insolence and effrontery" for the purpose of showing contempt of the court and its opinions.

In answer to this accusation respondent, after asserting that he appears specially and objects to and denies the jurisdiction of the court, and alleging that the accusation does not constitute contempt, pleads generally not guilty. Further answering, he admits, among other things, that--

"he prepared and filed the said petition for rehearing referred to in said affidavit, and that he did so intentionally, with the exception of a few minor clerical errors, which appear from the context and will be later herein referred to."

He referred to the petition for rehearing, and such parts of the record in the Creager Case--

"as can possibly pertain to or throw any light on the said language used in said petition for rehearing"; "but he specifically denies that he disregarded his duties and obligations while acting as such attorney, but, on the contrary, exerted his utmost efforts in behalf of his client’s cause, and further specifically denies that he intentionally made any improper, unlawful, or unjustifiable attacks and reflections upon the said Supreme Court in said petition for rehearing, or that he intentionally used insulting language toward them, or any language towards the court, or to the individual justices thereof, which was not warranted by the circumstances; that he further specifically denies that he willfully and maliciously persists in maintaining toward this court, or the individual members thereof, a persistent insolence and effrontery; and he further specifically denies that he has done anything with the purpose and intent of showing contempt for this court or the individual members thereof; and he further specifically denies that said language, or any part thereof, considered in the proper light and the surrounding circumstances constitutes contempt against this court, or any member thereof, and alleges that any holding, rule, or statute, to the effect that it does constitute contempt under the circumstances, would so restrict procedure and the right to be heard that it would not be due process of law, and would be in contravention of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution."

Another portion of his answer is as follows:

"The said John F. Hanson, further answering, alleges and says that the unusual and vehement language used in the said petition for rehearing is made necessary by what seems to be a persistent practice of the court of going to extremes adverse to him in their rulings and position in causes before them in which he is counsel or party, and in not giving them as full and careful attention as they seem to merit, and for want of other adequate remedy he is compelled to make the most out of the opportunity in presenting matters to the courts in the hope that they might be awakened to a greater sense of their duty and attention in these matters."

And, after referring to numerous cases in which he complains of the action of this court, the answer continues:

"That in view of this state of affairs the use of emphatic language such as set out in said affidavit should at least be excusable, as it is used with an honest purpose to get better and closer attention to the matters under consideration, and no disrespect is intended."

The answer closes thus:

"And, further answering, the said John F. Hanson says that the slang used in said language was not intended as any disrespect, and, though contending that it does not constitute contempt, he is willing to make due apologies therefor;

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