State v. Owens
| Decision Date | 24 May 1927 |
| Docket Number | 18081. |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. v. OWENS. SHORT, ATTY. GEN., |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
In any action where the ground of the necessity of the presiding judge's testimony is relied upon to disqualify the judge the application must by proper averment set out the materiality and necessity of such judge's testimony.
In any cause or proceeding a party is not entitled to call the presiding judge as a witness, without having theretofore made proper averments as to the materiality and necessity of such testimony, and thus destroy the court by the subtle proposed use of judges as witnesses.
In direct contempt proceedings, the court takes judicial notice of the records of the court and the acts of the respondent committed in court and those reflected by pleadings filed by him; therefore no proper purpose is to be had in calling presiding judges as witnesses.
The fact that the court instructed information of contempt to be filed against respondent does not entitle him to disqualify the court in proceedings to hear and determine the cause.
An action to punish for a direct contempt is prosecuted in the name of the state, in the interest of society, for the purpose of upholding the authority of courts as an instrumentality of government. There can be no pecuniary interest of individuals to be considered, nor interest of affinity or consanguinity. There can be no interest that disqualifies a court to proceed. The duty of the individuals comprising the court commands that they shall proceed in a summary manner.
It is the right of the people to cause their courts to be treated with respect, to enable lawful orders, judgments, and mandates to be obeyed, and to protect them from intimidation and the approach of insults and pollution, that establishes the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt.
Statutory provisions relative to change of venue have no application to proceedings to punish contempts unless such proceedings are expressly included eo nomine in the written law. Such provisions are not eo nomine included in section 2632 or section 2629, Compiled Oklahoma Statutes 1921, or in any other statutory provision.
A contempt proceeding is sui generis. It is neither civil nor criminal, but may partake of either in its nature. It is triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt is charged.
Neither the Constitution, art. 2, § 17, nor the statutes of this state, make provision for compulsory affidavits to support an information as a basis for a contempt action. An information for a contempt filed by the Attorney General, positive and specific in its charges and verified on information and belief, is sufficient.
This court, being created by the Constitution, has inherent power to punish for contempt, limited only by the Constitution.
Where the language used by a litigant in an instrument filed and presented in court is such as to carry beyond question its own inherent and inevitable significance, the user must have intended the natural consequences of his use of such language.
Language used by a litigant in his verified motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing, filed in this court, wherein it was charged that an opinion was not written by a member of this court, but by an attorney in the action, that said judgment was rendered without evidence to support it and without proper consideration of briefs or records in the case, and that a conspiracy existed between members of the court and outsiders to render a corrupt judgment, and that an opinion was promulgated by a number less than a majority of this court as the opinion and judgment of this court, constitutes direct contempt of court under the statute (section 1697 Compiled Oklahoma Statutes 1921) and the common law.
One charged with direct contempt is not entitled to a jury trial.
Disposition of action-judgment of conviction; punishment directed at 12 months' imprisonment in the county jail and a fine $5,000 and cost.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
"Prejudice," as used in Const. art. 2, § 6, providing that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice does not, in contempts committed by litigant after accepting forum, prevent justices of Supreme Court from punishing for contempt litigant who has filed motion therein alleging dishonesty and official misconduct by justices.
In proceeding to disqualify Supreme Court justices, evidence of interest, prejudice, or bias must be presented in application for mandamus pursuant to Comp. St. 1921, § 2633, regardless of apparent inconsistency, under Const. art. 7, § 2, of use of mandamus for this purpose.
Generally any act calculated to impede, embarrass, or obstruct court in administration of justice will be considered as direct in its presence, and will be held direct contempt.
Original action by the State of Oklahoma, on the relation of George F Short, Attorney General, against O. O. Owens for contempt. Judgment finding the respondent guilty as charged and assessing his punishment.
Chas. B. Cochran, of Oklahoma City, and D. H. Linebaugh, of Muskogee, amici curiæ.
H. B. Martin and A. Flint Moss, both of Tulsa, Hugh A. Ledbetter, of Ardmore, and Christy Russell, of Tulsa, for respondent.
On January 7, 1925, there was filed in this court an information on the part of the Attorney General of the state of Oklahoma, charging the respondent, O. O. Owens, with contempt of this court on two separate counts.
The first count avers that the respondent caused to be published on October 24 and 31, 1926, and on November 1 and 2, 1926, in the Tulsa World, a newspaper published in the city of Tulsa and having a general circulation in the state of Oklahoma, a certain printed article, an advertisement of and concerning the Supreme Court of the state of Oklahoma and the justices thereof, which article so published reflected upon the honor, integrity, and purity of this court, and was designed, intended, and calculated by the respondent to hold up to public opprobrium and to incite public contempt for this court and certain justices constituting the same, and for the purpose of leading the people of this state to distrust the fairness and impartiality of the decisions of this court, and for the purpose of influencing, intimidating, and coercing this court and the justices of the same in their future action in connection with the cause of V. V. Harris et al. v. R. D. Hudson, No. 17590 (Okl. Sup.) 250 P. 532, V. V. Harris et al. v. T. G. Chambers, No. 17409 (Okl. Sup.) 247 P. 695, and thus to impede and disrupt the due administration of justice with reference to said causes and others then pending in said court.
The second count charges the respondent with having filed in this court, on January 3, 1927, in cause No. 17409, V. V. Harris et al. v. T. G. Chambers, 247 P. 695, a "motion of defendants Riverside Oil & Refining Company, a corporation, O. O. Owens, and G. R. Lefever, for leave to file petition for rehearing in said cause and to stay the mandate and writ of mandamus in said cause," which instrument was signed and sworn to by the said O. O. Owens, respondent, and wherein it was alleged that the opinion in said cause was not written by Justice Charles W. Mason, but by counsel for plaintiff in the cause, and that said opinion was handed down without consideration of the evidence in this cause and without a consideration of either the pleadings or the briefs filed therein, either by Justice Charles W. Mason, or any other justices of this court. In said instrument respondent further alleged that, in an opinion of this court filed July 7, 1925, in cause No. 13646, styled Riverside Oil & Refining Company, a corporation, et al. v. S.D. Lynch et al., 114 Okl. 198, 243 P. 967, Justice J. W. Clark prepared an opinion under the direction and control of Chief Justice George M. Nicholson, who was alleged to be in conspiracy with one J. B. Dudley, counsel in said cause, and that the opinion and judgment therein was prepared without knowledge of the contents of the case-made therein and without consideration of the briefs in said cause and without a concurrence of a majority of this court, and that the same was filed and promulgated as the decision of this court, and that a mandate was issued therein, and that such acts constituted in law and in fact a fraud.
On March 29, 1927, the respondent filed a demurrer, objection to the jurisdiction of the court, and an application requesting certain members of the court to certify their disqualifications. On April 23, 1927, the application to disqualify certain of the justices was denied as to seven members of the court so challenged, and Mr. Justice Hunt thereupon certified his disqualification to further sit in said cause.
Our opinion shall be directed first to the application requesting certain members of this court to certify their alleged disqualifications. By the application it is asserted:
(1) That said justices and each of them are biased and prejudiced against the respondent.
(2) That said justices and each of them are interested in this cause.
(3) That Justice J. W. Clark and Justice Fletcher Riley are disqualified by reason of a certain judgment entered in cause No. 18080, State of Oklahoma ex rel. the Attorney General v. H. B. Martin, 256 P. 667, whereby said justices were adjudged to be disqualified to sit and try cause No. 18080, a companion case to the instant cause and growing out of the same controversy.
(4) That it will be necessary in the trial of this cause to use, and it is the intention of the respondent to use, the said justices aforesaid as witnesses.
(5) That the rule to show cause herein shows on its face...
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