In re Harris
| Decision Date | 15 September 1943 |
| Docket Number | No. 26833.,26833. |
| Citation | 50 N.E.2d 441,383 Ill. 336 |
| Parties | In re HARRIS. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Proceeding in the matter of Arnold B. Harris, an attorney. On commissioners' report, exceptions thereto, and briefs filed.
Respondent disbarred.
Charles Leviton, of Chicago, amicus curiae.
George A. Gordon, of Chicago, for respondent.
The committee on grievances of the Chicago Bar Association, acting as commissioners under Rule 59 of this court, Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, c. 110, § 259.59, have recommended disbarment of Arnold B. Harris because of unprofessional, unethical and dishonorable conduct. Respondent has excepted to the report of the commissioners. The cause is here on the report, exceptions and briefs filed.
There are twelve specific charges of unprofessional conduct against respondent, all relating to cases of arrest of individuals on sex charges and detention by the police of the city of Chicago, in which cases it is charged that respondent extorted money from those persons by soliciting law business under circumstances amounting to duress, and receiving exorbitant fees. It is also charged that this was done in conspiracy with the police officers and other persons unknown.
Respondent filed an answer denying the allegations of each specification, admitted he represented each of these persons, and made explanation of the manner in which he obtained employment, though he gives the name of no person as his informant or sponsor in these cases. Nine of the twelve charges were held by the commissioners to have been proved and their report is based on those charges.
The record is large, the testimony, findings and exceptions covering more than one thousand pages of record, while the abstract contains over four hundred pages. It would serve no useful purpose and would unduly lengthen this opinion to discuss each of the specifications and the evidence on each. It is sufficient to say that they are all of the same general type. The individual was charged with a sex offense; respondent appeared to represent him, procured money and thereafter, without defendant being required to appear in court, an entry of not guilty was made or a nominal fine was assessed, which was paid from a cash bail bond. In some instances the defendant did not know until the hearing before the commissioners, what had become of the so-called case against him. In two instances the persons arrested admitted, when arrested, that they were homosexuals, but were discharged as not guilty.
The point is raised in respondent's exceptions that not all the commissioners were present at each hearing. Rule 59 of this court does not so require. The record shows that the division which heard the cases against respondent was composed of six commissioners. The record does not disclose that any objection was raised at the time of the hearing to the absence of any of the commissioners. This court in the case In re Goodman, 377 Ill. 178, 36 N.E.2d 259, held that the attendance of all commissioners is not necessary.
There is complaint that the commissioners were biased and that this was evidenced by the fact that they asked questions of witnesses presented. There was no impropriety in their so doing, as an examination of the evidence shows that questioning by the commissioners was for the purpose of bringing out certain details in the evidence offered rather than for the purpose of bringing out new evidence. There is no evidence of hostility or bias on the part of the commissioners.
The nine persons who were arrested, and whom respondent represented, testified. Respondent admits he had never met any of the defendants before they were arrested and none of them had ever heard of him before he appeared at the lockup. There is much evidence tending to indicate that the man arrested was prevented from communicating with anyone outside until respondent appeared. There is no evidence to the contrary. In five of the cases respondent could not tell the name of the person who called him to appear at the police station on behalf of the defendant. As to one of the remaining four, respondent claimed on the hearing that he discovered him while looking for another man with a similar name. As to another of the four, respondent testified that he was sent by another lawyer, who did not know the name of the accused and whose name respondent did not divulge. As to still another he testified that a man who had witnessed the arrest of the defendant requested him to go to the police station and look after the matter, although he does not explain who the other person was or the interest of such party in the case. In one instance he gave the name of the party who had called and requested him to visit the accused. However, when that party was questioned as a witness, it appeared that he did not know the name of the accused, but testified that he was called up by some anonymous person.
The method by which these employments were procured, according to the evidence brought out by the amicus curiae, was practically the same in all of the cases. In some of them a certain officer by the name of O'Malley was the arresting officer. This is the same O'Malley who figured in the Goodman case, which was much the same type of case. The methods followed were very similar to those followed in the Goodman case. To illustrate this method it is necessary only to refer to the testimony regarding a few of the cases.
One James F. Kveton and one Eugene Calazzo were arrested in the alley adjacent to the Boston Store and taken to the police station at 1121 South State street, locked up and remained there for 48 hours. Kveton's request to be allowed to call his home was denied and he was not permitted to communicate with anyone while incarcerated. The day after his arrest Kveton was questioned by officer O'Malley, who recommended respondent. Shortly thereafter the lockup keeper advised him that someone was there to see him. Respondent entered and introduced himself as a lawyer and told Kveton that he was in a jam and inquired as to how much money he had with him. Respondent fixed his fee at $600. Kveton, being unable to contact his wife by telephone, wrote a note to her on the back of respondent's card, advising her respondent had been retained as his lawyer and to pay him $100. This sum respondent received from Mrs. Kveton. About three o'clock the following day respondent reappeared and demanded $500. Thereupon Kveton, in writing, agreed to pay respondent $500 before the disposition of the case. Shortly thereafter Kveton was released without knowing how his release was accomplished. Several days later Kveton paid respondent $200 by check and the case was continued for one week. At the subsequent hearing before the court Kveton paid respondent the additional $300 by check and the charge against Kveton was dismissed.
The second specification is that respondent took advantage of the position of one Stanley M. McMurtrie, who found himself in jail, and extorted money from him under circumstances which amounted to...
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Heirich, In re
...reputation will not overcome evidence establishing specific charges, particularly if the offense involves moral turpitude, In re Harris, 383 Ill. 336, 50 N.E.2d 441; nevertheless, where the evidence is conflicting and the charge does not import criminality or moral turpitude the court shoul......
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In re Donaghy
...though not controlling in the face of proof of specific improper acts (In re Amaden, 380 Ill. 545, 558, 44 N.E.2d 558;In re Harris, 383 Ill. 336, 50 N.E.2d 441;In re McCallum, 391 Ill. 400, 64 N.E.2d 310), is highly proper and carries due weight where the proof of the foundation of the char......
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Krasner, In re
...obligation to take proper disciplinary action if the charges of improper and unprofessional conduct are found to be true. (In re Harris, 383 Ill. 336, 50 N.E.2d 441.) We are aware, too, that respondent has had no dealings with Vogele or Skidmore for a number of years, and that he apparently......
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Melin, In re
...re Feldman, 373 Ill. 563, 27 N.E.2d 471, but it is not sufficient to overcome any positive facts evidenced by the record. In re Harris, 383 Ill. 336, 50 N.E.2d 441. It is only to be considered with all the other facts of the It is shown by the record that the respondent did commingle the fu......