In re Hayer's Estate

• Decision Date: 04 August 1941
• Docket Number: 45472.
• Citation: 299 N.W. 431,230 Iowa 880
• Parties: In re HAYER'S ESTATE. v. REDENBAUGH. DANIELSON et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

299 N.W. 431

230 Iowa 880

In re HAYER'S ESTATE.

DANIELSON et al. v. REDENBAUGH.

No. 45472.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

August 4, 1941

GARFIELD and OLIVER, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from District Court, Decatur County; Homer A. Fuller, Judge.

Contestant filed objections to probate of will of Ellen B. Hayer. Trial court submitted the case to the jury upon the sole question of the mental capacity of decedent to make a valid will. The jury found for the contestant. The trial court overruled proponents' motion for new trial. Proponents have appealed.

Reversed.

R. B Hawkins, of Leon, and Herrick, Sloan & Langdon, of Des Moines, for proponents-appellants.

Messer & Cahill, of Iowa City, and O. M. Slaymaker, R. E. Killmar and D. D. Slaymaker, all of Osceola, for contestant-appellee.

WENNERSTRUM Justice.

Ellen B. Hayer, whose will is the occasion for this litigation, was a resident of Lamoni, Iowa. She died on February 8, 1940. Her purported will had been executed on February 7, 1939. Objections to the probate of this instrument were filed by Vera Hayer Redenbaugh, an adopted daughter of Ellen Hayer. There were no children born to Ellen B. Hayer and her husband, Christian Hayer, who predeceased her on October 29, 1928. Vera Hayer Redenbaugh was the only adopted child. Mrs. Hayer was past 81 years of age at the time of her death.

The original objections to the probation of the will of Ellen B. Hayer were based on two grounds: First, that Mrs. Hayer was of such unsound mind at the time of the execution of the instrument that she did not have testamentary capacity to make a will and was wholly incompetent and incapable of making a valid will; second, that the purported will as executed by Mrs. Hayer was induced to be made through fraud, duress and undue influence. The court withdrew the issue of undue influence from the jury on the basis of insufficient evidence and the only question that was submitted for consideration was as to the mental capacity of the decedent at the time of the execution of the purported will.

The record in this case is very voluminous, it having taken two weeks to complete the trial of this case in the lower court. The briefs and arguments are also voluminous inasmuch as counsel for both proponents and the contestant have manifested pronounced industry in the presentation of their various contentions relative to this litigation. It will be impossible to set out in detail the various questions raised or enumerate the various phases of the evidence presented. However, inasmuch as the primary question that is before us is as to the mental capacity of the decedent at the time of the execution of the purported will it seems incumbent upon us to first pass upon the question as to whether or not a jury issue was presented at the close of all the evidence and as to whether or not the court should have directed a verdict for the proponents on the question of the mental capacity of the decedent to make a valid will.

In passing upon any controverted issue, and in this particular case upon the question as to the sufficiency of the evidence relative to the submission of this case to the jury, certain guides or tests should be set up. Consideration should then be given to the evidence presented to the trial court for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether or not the facts presented bring them within the rules announced.

In this connection attention is called to the case of In re Fitzgerald's Estate, 219 Iowa 988, 996, 259 N.W. 455, 459, where this court makes the following pronouncement:

" * * * The best test we know of for determining such a question is whether or not, had the case gone to the jury and it had found adversely to what it did in this case, the presiding judge would feel that, under all the record in the case, he would be warranted in setting aside such a verdict.

It is one of the fundamental rules laid down by our cases that the burden of proof is on the contestant to show that the deceased did not have sufficient mental capacity to comprehend the nature of the instrument he was executing, to recollect the property he meant to dispose of, the objects of his bounty, and the manner in which he wished to distribute his property among them. Our last expression on this proposition was in Re Will of Johnson, 201 Iowa 687, 207 N.W. 748, 749. Mere old age, or some deterioration in physical or mental power, peevishness, childishness, or eccentricity, is not sufficient to carry to the jury the issue of mental unsoundness of the testator. Such was our pronouncement in Re Estate of Shields, 198 Iowa 686, 200 N.W. 219, and cases there cited. We further said:

‘ It is not the duty of the court, in disposing of a motion for directed verdict, to submit the case to the jury because there is some evidence introduced by the party having the burden of proof, unless that evidence is of such character that it would warrant the jury in finding a verdict in favor of the party introducing such evidence. Before the question is left to the jury for its determination, the preliminary question for the court is whether there is any evidence to support the verdict, and if so, whether, upon such evidence, the jury can find a verdict for the party producing it, that will stand." ’

See, also, Bishop v. Scharf, 214 Iowa 644, 653, 241 N.W. 3, and cases there cited. Attention is also called to the case of In re Estate of Johnson, 222 Iowa 787, 793, 269 N.W. 792.

As previously stated the occasion for this litigation was the purported will of Ellen B. Hayer. However, the evidence as permitted to be considered by the jury went far afield in connection with the consideration of matters pertaining to the will of Christian Hayer, the husband of decedent, which had been admitted to probate in 1928; and the deeding of a 320-acre farm in Wright County, Iowa, by Ellen B. Hayer in 1930 to the general church organization of the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints of Independence, Missouri, commonly known as the Latter Day Saints Church. A great deal of consideration was given to this character of testimony during the trial but it shall be our purpose in passing upon the question of the mental capacity of the decedent to endeavor to restrict our consideration to the question as to the testamentary capacity of the decedent at the time of the execution of her will.

Upon the question of the necessary mental capacity of a person to make a valid will at the particular time a will was executed this court has frequently spoken. Our holdings, however, are thoroughly commented upon in the case of Bishop v. Scharf, supra, at page 652 of 214 Iowa, at page 7 of 241 N.W. where it is stated:

" The important and controlling fact in the case is the condition of testatrix at the very time the will was executed. It is not sufficient to impeach the validity of the instrument merely to show that testatrix had cerebral hemorrhage in the front part of the brain on the right side; that her mentality was to some extent weakened and impaired; that she had defective memory; that she was unable, upon all occasions, to recognize her acquaintances and friends; that she manifested some change from the quiet dignity and culture formerly observed to an altered personality and an inclination toward facetiousness and, to some extent, indifference to the character of her speech and conversation.

The test of mental capacity has been many times stated by this court. Testamentary capacity exists if the testator has sufficient mentality to understand the nature and purpose of the instrument about to be executed, to remember and possess sufficient capacity to know the extent and nature of his property, to know and comprehend the distribution which he desires to make thereof; and to remember and know those having claims upon his bounty. Capacity to transact business generally, to make contracts, and to carry on difficult negotiations are not essential to testamentary capacity. [Citing cases.]

Mental weakness due to disease does not deprive one of testamentary capacity until it has progressed to the extent that the power of intelligent action has been destroyed. Mere forgetfulness and enfeeblement of the body are not alone sufficient to disqualify one from making a will. The disqualification which deprives one of testamentary capacity must exist at the very time of the execution of the instrument . [Italics supplied.] * * *"

Although a detailed statement of the evidence cannot be presented perhaps it is advisable to state briefly certain facts relating to the execution of the will.

On February 6, 1939, Ellen B. Hayer went to the bank at Lamoni Iowa, and consulted with Verne Deskin, a member of the Iowa bar and the cashier of that bank. On that occasion Mrs. Hayer inquired of the witness, Deskin, as to the making of a will for her and commented concerning a former will or a copy thereof that she had with her. According to Mr. Deskin's testimony in referring to a portion of the former will that pertained to a bequest to Vera Redenbaugh, the decedent is quoted as saying, " I want that part changed that gives Vera Redenbaugh $5,000 to $1,000." Further inquiry was made as to other portions of the old will and statements were made by Mrs. Hayer as to the manner in which she wished her property to be disposed of by a new will. In the old will which had been executed during the year 1930 she had made provision for the residue of her estate to go to the Latter Day Saints Church, after the payment of certain bequests, but in her conversation with Mr. Deskin relative to the new will, she told him, " I want the church left out." There was further conversation between Mrs. Hayer and Mr. Deskin relative to the deeding of the Wright County farm to an official of the Latter...