In re Hidalgo

• Decision Date: 25 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. 05-06-00966-CV.,05-06-00966-CV.
• Citation: 279 S.W.3d 456
• Parties: In re Leila Regenia Brown HIDALGO, Relator. Leila Regenia Brown Hidalgo, Appellant, v. Alvin Steve Hidalgo, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

279 S.W.3d 456

In re Leila Regenia Brown HIDALGO, Relator.

Leila Regenia Brown Hidalgo, Appellant, v. Alvin Steve Hidalgo, Appellee.

No. 05-06-00966-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

February 25, 2009.

Rehearing Overruled April 7, 2009.

Brad M. Lamorgese, McCurley, Orsinger, McCurley, Nelson & Downing, Dallas, for appellant.

Georganna L. Simpson, Law Offices of Georganna L. Simpson. Dallas, for appellee.

Before Justices WRIGHT, MOSELEY, and LANG-MIERS.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice MOSELEY.

Our original opinion in this case was based largely on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Porter v. Vick, 888 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.1994) (per curiam). Thereafter, however, the supreme court overruled Porter. In re Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, No. 06-0491, 2008 WL 3991132 (Tex. Aug.29, 2008). Alvin Steve Hidalgo filed a motion for rehearing and Leila Regenia Brown Hidalgo filed a response to the motion for rehearing. We grant the motion for rehearing and withdraw our opinion, order, and judgment of August 20, 2008. This is now the opinion of the Court.

In this consolidated proceeding, Leila Regenia Brown Hidalgo (Wife) filed a petition for writ of mandamus and an appeal from the trial court's order regarding her motion to enforce the terms of a California divorce decree against Alvin Steve Hidalgo (Husband). We conclude the trial court had plenary power to reinstate its original final order after timely vacating that order and returning the case to the docket. We deny the petition for writ of mandamus and affirm the trial court's final order.

BACKGROUND

Husband and Wife were divorced in California in 2002. Their divorce decree incorporated their marriage settlement agreement between the parties that, among other things, provided for Husband to pay: (1) spousal maintenance to Wife; and (2) premiums on a life insurance policy covering Husband for Wife's benefit. In 2003, Wife filed the California decree in Texas as a foreign judgment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 35.003 (Vernon 2008). She also filed a motion to enforce the decree against Husband for failure to pay spousal support. Thereafter, the parties signed an agreed order modifying the marriage settlement agreement, which the trial court signed on March 14, 2005. This order is not in dispute in this proceeding.

Months later, Wife again sought an order to enforce the divorce decree, claiming Husband failed to pay the life insurance premiums. She requested reimbursement for premiums she had paid to keep the policy in force and an order requiring Husband to continue paying the premiums. Husband disputed the motion, contending he was no longer required to pay the premiums because he retired in 2005. On January 3, 2006, the trial court signed an order denying Wife's motion for enforcement, stating that Husband's obligation to pay the insurance premiums terminated as of January 1, 2005.

Wife filed a motion for rehearing. She asked the court to change its January 3, 2006 order to state that in the event Husband returns to work before age 65, he will be required to pay spousal support and pay the premiums on a life insurance policy as required by the divorce decree.

On April 4, 2006, ninety-one days after the trial court signed the January 3, 2006 order, the trial court signed a written "Ruling" in favor of Wife. In that document, the court referenced its January 3, 2006 order, stated the court had jurisdiction under rule 329b, and "vacate[d] its prior ruling." The court found Husband was obligated to pay spousal support and maintain the life insurance policy until Wife's death. The court also stated Husband owed Wife all the premiums she had paid on the life insurance policy; the court stated this amount was approximately $7,900 at the time of the December 2005 hearing, plus additional premiums up to the date of the ruling. The ruling also awarded Wife $1,150 against Husband for attorneys' fees.

Within thirty days of the April 4 ruling, Husband filed a motion for new trial and a motion to confirm the January 3, 2006 order. The trial court signed an order granting Husband's motion on July 5, 2006. That order states:

The Court Grants the Respondent's Motion to Confirm the January 3, 2006 Order Denying Motion for Enforcement. The Court finds that the Petitioner's Motion for Rehearing filed January 9, 2006 did not extend the plenary power of this Court as it did not seek a substantive change in the Judgment and that the First Amended Motion for Rehearing filed March 22, 2006 was not timely. Accordingly, the Court lost jurisdiction on February 2, 2006. IF [sic] the motion were found to extend the plenary power of the Court under TRCP 329b, the Court finds that there was no Final Judgment entered before April 18, 2006 reflecting the April 4, 2006 Ruling.

The Court ORDERS that the January 3, 2006 Order Denying Motion for Enforcement is Confirmed as the Final Order of this Court and ORDERS that the April 4, 2006 Ruling is set aside.

Thereafter, Wife filed a notice of appeal and also filed a petition for writ of mandamus. We consolidated the original proceeding and the appeal.

In a single issue, Wife contends the trial court erred by "retroactively determining it lacked jurisdiction to render the final orders it intended to render." Wife contends (1) the January 9, 2006 motion for rehearing extended the trial court's plenary power under rule 329b; (2) the April 4, 2006 ruling was an order vacating the January 3, 2006 order; and (3) the trial court's July 5, 2006 order setting aside the April 4, 2006 ruling and confirming the January 3, 2006 order as the final order of the court was void. We agree with the first two contentions, but reject the third.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Mandamus issues only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy at law. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex.2003) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992) (orig. proceeding).

Whether a trial court has jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. See Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.2002); Mullins v. Mullins, 202 S.W.3d 869, 873 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).

DISCUSSION

We begin with some preliminary observations. First, the California divorce decree, filed in Texas under the Uniform Enforcement of Judgments Act, has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures as a judgment of the Texas court where filed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 35.003(c). Second, in resolution of Wife's first motion to enforce that decree and with the consent of the parties, the trial court modified that judgment on March 14, 2005.

Third, there can be only one final judgment in a case. TEX.R. CIV. P. 301. However, the trial court retains both statutory and inherent power to enforce its judgment. See TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. §§ 9.001-.014 (Vernon 2006); TEX.R. CIV. P. 308 ("the court shall cause its judgments and decrees to be carried into execution"); Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.1982) (courts have inherent power to enforce judgments); Hines v. Villalba, 231 S.W.3d 550, 553 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (same). To the extent an order enforcing a final judgment disposes of all the issues of all the parties before the court, that order constitutes a final order and is also appealable. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 860 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied) (citing Starr v. Starr, 690 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, no writ) (per curiam)).

With this background in mind, we first address the effect of the January 3, 2006 order. Both parties treat this order as a final order. We agree. The order constituted the trial court's ruling disposing of all the issues of all the parties before it, namely: Wife's second motion to enforce a prior final judgment. Thus we conclude the January 3, 2006 order was a final order, and treat it as a judgment for purposes of determining the trial court's continuing jurisdiction.

We next consider whether Wife's "motion for rehearing" extended the trial court's plenary power over its January 3, 2006 final order. Husband argues the motion is neither a motion for new trial nor a motion to modify, correct, or reform the January 3, 2006 order. TEX.R. CIV. P. 329b(a), (g). However, we look to the substance of a pleading or motion, not its title, to determine its effect. See Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex.1999) (courts "look to the substance of a motion to determine the relief sought, not merely to its title"); Doctor v. Pardue, 186 S.W.3d 4, 16 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

Although entitled a motion for rehearing, Wife's motion did not ask for a new trial or a new hearing on her enforcement motion. Rather, it argued the trial court's final order should be changed to state that Husband will have the obligation to pay the premiums on a life insurance policy if he returns to work before age 65. We conclude Wife's motion sought a substantive change to the January 3, 2006 final order. Thus, her motion was a motion to modify under rule 329b(g) and had the effect of extending the trial court's plenary power over that final order. Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip. Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex.2000) (timely filed post-judgment motion seeking a substantive change in existing judgment qualifies as a motion to modify under Rule 329b(g)); see also TEX.R. CIV. P. 329b(g).

If not decided by a written order, a timely motion for new trial or to modify, correct, or reform the judgment (or final order) is overruled by operation of law seventy-five days after it is signed. TEX.R. CIV. P. 329b(c). Wife's motion, which was not decided by a written order, was overruled by operation of law on March 19, 2006. However, the trial court retained plenary power over its final order for an additional thirty days after the last timely filed motion for new trial or ...