In re House Bill No. 537

• Decision Date: 05 December 1923
• Docket Number: (No. 4076.)
• Parties: In re HOUSE BILL NO. 537 OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH LEGISLATURE.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 573

256 S.W. 573

In re HOUSE BILL NO. 537 OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH LEGISLATURE.

(No. 4076.)

Supreme Court of Texas.

December 5, 1923.

In the matter of House Bill No. 537 of the Thirty-Eighth Legislature of the State of Texas. Act held void.

GREENWOOD, J.

The Thirty-Eighth Legislature passed an act, chapter 146: (1) Imposing the duty on the Chief Justice or either Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to designate district judges to hold special terms of the district court in districts other than their own, when required in the public interest, by reason of either the urgency of pending business or an accumulation thereof; (2) empowering the Chief Justice or either Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to require the regular judge of the court considered in need of a special term to call such special term; (3) authorizing the judge designated by a justice of the Supreme Court to discharge, during the special term, all the duties of the regular judge, it being provided that two or more judges may hold the district court in a district at the same time; (4) imposing the duty on the district clerks of the state to make semiannual reports to the clerk of the Supreme Court of the number of cases on their file dockets, jury dockets, and nonjury dockets, besides such special reports as the Supreme Court or any of its members may require, under penalty of being held in contempt of the Supreme Court.

Without at least an implied determination of the validity of the act, the Supreme Court could not rightly exact of the district clerks performance of the duties imposed on them, and the Justices of the court could not with propriety proceed to discharge the functions which the act requires of them. We therefore feel impelled to consider whether the act is valid or invalid, and to announce our conclusion.

Section 3 of article 5 of the State Constitution declares "the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, except as herein specified." The section explicitly defines both the court's "appellate jurisdiction," and its "original jurisdiction." As defined, such appellate jurisdiction can extend no further than to questions of law in cases of which the Courts of Civil Appeals have appellate jurisdiction; and such original jurisdiction can extend no further than "to issue writs of habeas corpus," and "to issue writs of quo warranto and mandamus in such cases as may be specified, except as against the governor of the state." The section also grants power, to be exercised as prescribed by the Legislature, to the Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as to the court, to issue writs of habeas corpus and writs for the enforcement of the jurisdiction of the court. The court is also empowered to appoint and remove its clerk and to ascertain all matters of fact necessary to the proper exercise of its own jurisdiction. By section 25 of article 5, the Supreme Court is empowered to make and establish rules of procedure, not inconsistent with the laws of the state, for the government of all courts, to expedite the dispatch of business therein.

It is not an open question that the Constitution does not empower the Legislature to confer further power on a single justice of the Supreme Court than to issue writs of habeas corpus and writs for the enforcement of the court's jurisdiction. Griner v. Thomas, 101 Tex. 38, 104 S. W. 1058, 16 Ann. Cas. 944; Hines v. Morse, 92 Tex. 196, 47 S. W. 516. The fact that the makers of the Constitution thought an express grant necessary before the Legislature could empower a justice to enforce the court's own jurisdiction is conclusive against any implication of an intent for the Legislature to grant powers to the Justices in matters unrelated to the enforcement of the court's jurisdiction, save in the single specially excepted instance of necessity for the grant of the writ of habeas corpus to protect human liberty.

It is obvious that such powers as the act undertakes to confer on the single justice do not come within the court's appellate jurisdiction, nor within the court's original jurisdiction specified in the Constitution. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is its power to hear and determine causes. Its original jurisdiction is exercised in cases instituted in the Supreme Court in the first instance. Its appellate jurisdiction is exercised to review orders or judgments of the Courts of Civil Appeals. Pickle v. McCall, 86 Tex. 218, 24 S. W. 265; Brownsville v. Basse, 43 Tex. 449. Therefore the explicit language of the Constitution puts it beyond the power of the Legislature to confer on the Supreme Court such powers as this act attempts to confer on each justice, that is, to determine...