in re House Bill No. 1,230

• Decision Date: 06 May 1895
• Parties: In re HOUSE BILL NO. 1,230.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

163 Mass. 589

40 N.E. 713

In re HOUSE BILL NO. 1,230.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 6, 1895

By resolution of the house of representatives, the supreme judicial court were required to give their opinion upon the following important question of law:

Is it within the constitutional power of the legislature to extend the application of the present law, relative to the weekly payment of wages by corporations, to private individuals and partnerships, as provided in the bill entitled "An act relative to the weekly payment of wages," now pending before the general court?

To the Honorable the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

OPINION

We, the justices of the supreme judicial court, received, on the 20th ultimo, your resolution, a copy of which is annexed, and in reply we respectfully submit the following opinion:

Your question implies that in your opinion the present law relating to the weekly payment of wages by certain corporations to their employés is constitutional, and your inquiry is whether it is within the constitutional power of the legislature to extend the law to private individuals and to partnerships.

We are not informed of the nature of the doubts which your request implies. It is well known that in some of the states of this country legislation similar to that proposed has been held unconstitutional by the courts, sometimes on the ground that it is partial in its character, but more frequently on the ground that it interferes with what is called the liberty of contract, which, it is said, either as a privilege or as property, is secured to the inhabitants of a state by its constitution, or by the constitution of the United States. In some of these decisions a distinction has been suggested or made between the rights of natural persons and the rights of corporations, and such legislation has been deemed valid with respect to corporations whose charters were subject to alteration, amendment, or repeal by the legislature, or which, being foreign corporations, were permitted to do business in the state under such conditions as the legislature might impose, while the legislation has been deemed void with respect to natural persons. Some recent decisions on this subject are the following: Leep v. Railway Co., 58 Ark. 407, 25 S.W. 75; State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W.Va. 802, 15 S.E. 1000; Hancock Yaden, 121 Ind. 366, 23 N.E. 253; State v. Brown & Sharpe Manuf'g Co., 18 R.I. 11, 25 A. 246; Shaffer v Mining Co., 55 Md. 74; Tilt v. People (Ill.; Feb., 1895) 40 N.E. 462.

The legislative power granted to the general court by the constitution of Massachusetts is perhaps more comprehensive than that found in the constitutions of some of the other states. The constitution of Massachusetts (part 2, c. 1, § 1 art. 4) provides as follows: "And further, full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the said general court, from time to time to make, ordain and establish, all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders laws, statutes and ordinances, directions and instructions, either with penalties or without, so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of this commonwealth, and for the government and ordering thereof, and of the subjects of the same, and for the necessary support and defense of the government thereof," etc. This provision was taken substantially from the province charter. There is not in the constitution of Massachusetts anything which in terms relates to the freedom or liberty of contract, as there is concerning the liberty of the press. The constitution declares that "all men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property: in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness"; and it is also declared that "no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled or deprived of his property, immunities or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." Declaration of Rights, arts. 1, 12. This last declaration was taken from Magna Charta, and in substance it has been incorporated in the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, in form as follows: "No state shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

In legal nomenclature, at the time of the adoption of the constitution of Massachusetts, the right to make a contract for personal services, if it can be regarded either as property or as a liberty or privilege, would perhaps have been regarded as the latter. So far as we are aware, the capacity to make such a contract was not, in the discussions concerning the constitution, ever spoken of as property, although that capacity may be necessary to the acquisition of property. The statutes existing in England at the time of the adoption of the constitution, regulating the employment of servants or laborers, were of ancient origin. The modern English statutes concerning the regulation of employment in factories undoubtedly rest on somewhat different political and economical principles from those formerly entertained. In Massachusetts, after the province became an independent state, and before the adoption of the constitution, the general court passed laws regulating minutely the prices of commodities, and in certain respects the prices of labor. St.1776-77, cc. 14, 46; 5 Prov.Laws (State Ed.) 583, 642. It never has been much considered by the courts of Massachusetts how far the provisions of the declaration of rights in the constitution have limited the power of the general court with respect to such legislation, but it generally has been thought that this power under the constitution is subject to some substantial limitations.

There never has been at any time in Massachusetts an absolute right in its inhabitants to make all such contracts as they pleased. Some contracts have always been held void at common law, and some contracts valid at common law have been declared void by statute. Married women at common law were under a general disability to make contracts during coverture; and, although they have been recently empowered by the statutes to make contracts as if they were unmarried still, at the present time, husband and wife cannot make contracts with each...