In re Hunt, S19Y0099

Decision Date22 October 2018
Docket NumberS19Y0099
Citation304 Ga. 635,820 S.E.2d 716
Parties In the MATTER OF Richard Allen HUNT.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Jenny K. Mittelman, Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel, STATE BAR OF GEORGIA, 104 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 100, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, for Appellant.

Stephen Michael Friedberg, STEPHEN M. FRIEDBERG, ATTY AT LAW, LLC, 945 East Paces Ferry Road, Suite 2250, ATLANTA, Georgia 30326, for Appellee.

Herman Maddox Kilgore, KILGORE & RODRIGUEZ LLC, 36 Ayers Avenue, Marietta, Georgia 30060, Adam Marshall Hames, THE HAMES LAW FIRM, LLC, 511 East Paces Ferry Road, NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30305, for Other Party.

PER CURIAM.

Richard Allen Hunt (State Bar No. 378650) was admitted to practice law in 1973 and has been sanctioned for disciplinary violations five times. After an October 2015 hearing, a judge reported Hunt to the State Bar for alleged ethical violations. In October 2016, the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board issued a Notice of Finding of Probable Cause. Hunt filed a petition for voluntary discipline admitting several violations of a single rule and seeking a suspension of six months to one year, which this Court rejected. See In the Matter of Hunt, 301 Ga. 661, 802 S.E.2d 243 (2017). He filed a second petition for voluntary discipline admitting the same rule violations and seeking a suspension of 18 months to two years but later withdrew that petition with the Court’s permission. See In the Matter of Hunt, S18Y0326 (Feb. 5, 2018). The State Bar then filed a formal complaint in February 2018. Hunt filed a verified, pro se answer admitting virtually all the complaint’s factual allegations, and Special Master Adam Hames granted the State Bar’s unopposed motion for judgment on the pleadings. After an evidentiary hearing on mitigation, on July 23, 2018, the special master issued a report, recommending that this Court disbar Hunt. Hunt did not seek review by the State Disciplinary Review Board and thus waived his right to file exceptions with this Court. See former Bar Rule 4-217 (c).1

As the special master recounts, Hunt’s verified answer admitted the following facts, which the record supports. Hunt represented a client and her two minor sons in a wrongful death case, and in November 2002, Hunt settled the case for $100,000, with the client receiving $50,000 and each child receiving $25,000. Hunt then represented the client in probate court, helping her get appointed as her sons’ conservatrix (which at the time was called a "guardian of the property") and file some, but not all, of the required annual probate court reports. In 2011, when the client’s home was in foreclosure, she removed $737 from each child’s account to make a mortgage payment without the court’s permission. The court later cited her for removing the funds, mismanagement of the accounts, and not filing all the required reports, and after a January 2014 hearing, the court revoked her appointment as conservatrix and appointed Althea Caces as successor conservatrix. Hunt offered to deliver the children’s funds to Caces, so the client gave him her sons’ money—almost $60,000—which he deposited into his attorney trust account, and at the client’s request, he appealed the order revoking her appointment as her sons’ conservatrix. By the end of January 2014, Hunt had taken more than half of the children’s funds from his attorney trust account, and over time he took all but a few dollars, spending the money for his own personal and business expenses.

On March 4, 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s order revoking the client’s appointment as the children’s conservatrix in an unpublished opinion. See In re Estate of Gonzalez, A14A1665 & A14A1691. At the client’s request, Hunt filed a petition for certiorari, which this Court denied on June 1, 2015. See In re Estate of Gonzalez, S15C1036. The next month, Caces asked Hunt for the children’s money, and he sent her two checks for $29,903.86 drawn on his attorney trust account, even though the account had insufficient funds to cover the checks. The checks bounced, and Cobb County Probate Court Judge Kelli L. Wolk ordered Hunt to appear in court on October 19, 2015, and deliver the children’s money to Caces. Hunt appeared at the hearing, bringing a certified check for only half the funds, and he admitted to Judge Wolk that he had spent the children’s money for his own personal and business purposes. Hunt asked for a continuance to obtain counsel, which was granted, and Judge Wolk reconvened the hearing a week later, on October 26, 2015.2 Hunt appeared without counsel, and he had not turned over the rest of the children’s money to Caces. Hunt did not fully replace the funds that he misappropriated until several months later.

On June 29, 2018, the special master granted the State Bar’s unopposed motion for judgment on the pleadings. The special master concluded that Hunt violated Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct ("Rule") 1.15 (I) (a) by removing the children’s money from his attorney trust account and using it for his own personal and business purposes.3 The special master concluded that Hunt violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing to promptly deliver the children’s funds from the client, as conservatrix, to Caces, as successor conservatrix.4 The special master concluded that Hunt violated Rule 1.15 (II) (b) by withdrawing the children’s money from his attorney trust account and commingling his funds with the children’s funds.5 While Hunt admitted in his answer that he used the children’s money, he claimed that he did so "with notice to all interested parties." The special master assumed the truth of this factual allegation for purposes of the State Bar’s motion for judgment on the pleadings but said that it did not change Hunt’s admission of facts showing that he violated the Rules. Finally, the special master concluded that Hunt violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by telling the client that he would deliver her sons’ money to Caces and not doing so and by dishonestly taking fiduciary funds to which he was not entitled.6 The maximum sanction for a single violation of Rule 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II) (b), or 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment.

Hunt then requested an evidentiary hearing on mitigation, which the special master held on July 17, 2018. At the hearing, Hunt asked the special master to recommend a lengthy suspension in lieu of disbarment, while the State Bar argued that Hunt should be disbarred. Hunt’s counsel stated, without objection, that Hunt had been practicing law for 44 years, that he started his career as a public defender, that he worked in the public defender’s office for seven years before going into private practice, that he had been battling prostate cancer

for the last six-and-a-half years, and that he has done a great deal of pro bono work over the years, including helping a young immigrant with his immigration status. Hunt then testified and presented a short, written outline of his general personal and business history, a portion of which the special master sealed at the State Bar’s request. The State Bar cross-examined Hunt and presented a transcript, which the special master also sealed, of the October 26, 2015 hearing that prompted Judge Wolk to report Hunt to the State Bar.

In his written statement and testimony, Hunt said that he began buying real estate in college, eventually owning a number of properties; that he could not get bank loans as a result of the 2008 economic crisis and got a loan from a friend and fellow lawyer secured by his house, a quadraplex next door that he owned, and his office building, which he also owned; and that when he missed a payment, the friend initiated foreclosure proceedings against the properties, which Hunt unsuccessfully sought to block through litigation. Hunt stated that when his longtime secretary was hit by a MARTA bus on November 4, 2014, he filed a lawsuit on her behalf and continued paying her even though she could no longer work, and that it took longer to settle the case than he expected.7 Hunt testified that he later met with the client and her sons in his car; repeatedly played them video of his secretary’s accident that he had obtained from MARTA; told them that he had been using the children’s money to fund the secretary’s personal injury lawsuit against MARTA; and offered to pay each boy at least $5,000 and give the client a percentage of the settlement proceeds from the case against MARTA if they would agree to let him continue using the children’s money until the case settled. According to Hunt, the client and her sons orally agreed to this arrangement.

Hunt admitted that his use of the children’s funds was not a one-time incident but instead took place over several months, and he said that it caused him tremendous pressure and concern each time that he made a withdrawal, because he knew the Rules and understood that he was violating them each time he withdrew the money. Hunt also admitted that he knew that the client and her sons could not authorize him to violate the Rules by agreeing to his proposal and that he was responsible for his actions, not them. Hunt said that he rationalized that the recovery in the MARTA case would provide sufficient funds to allow him to "cure the delinquency" and honor his commitment to the client and her sons. Hunt added that he will turn 82 in January 2019 and understands that his ability to practice law will end when this disciplinary matter moves forward but said that "[i]t would just be nice to know that I died being a member of the Bar as opposed to being disbarred."8 He explained, "Unfortunately, I made a big gamble. I gambled that I could settle the MARTA case before I had to repay the funds. And that’s not how it developed." Hunt admitted on cross-examination that in the client’s testimony at the October 26, 2015 probate court hearing, she denied knowing until the week before that Hunt had used her sons’ money for his own personal and business purposes and denied any...

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  • In re Coggins
    • United States
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    ...the most egregious circumstances. In the Matter of Coulter , 304 Ga. 81, 83, 816 S.E.2d 1 (2018). See also, e.g., In the Matter of Hunt , 304 Ga. 635, 820 S.E.2d 716 (2018) (concluding that disbarment was appropriate where multiple aggravating factors existed and the attorney, who was entru......
  • In re Fagan
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    ...engaged in illegal conduct, including "theft, forgery, and wire fraud at a minimum." ABA Standard 9.22 (k). See In the Matter of Hunt , 304 Ga. 635, 643, 820 S.E.2d 716 (2018) (reciting that the Special Master had concluded that ABA Standard 9.22 (k) applied where "[b]ased on the admitted f......
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1 books & journal articles
  • To Err is Human, to Apologize is Hard: the Role of Apologies in Lawyer Discipline
    • United States
    • Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics No. 34-3, July 2021
    • 1 d4 Julho d4 2021
    ...to court, law partner, and bankruptcy trustee, but not to clients). 50. See In re Silva, 29 A.3d 924, 943 (D.C. App. 2011); In re Hunt, 820 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 2018) (noting failure to apologize to client and her sons during mitigation hearing); In re McCarthy, 938 N.E.2d 698, 699 (Ind. 20......

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