In re Hunter H.
Decision Date | 17 June 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 12-0173,12-0173 |
Parties | In The Matter of Hunter H. |
Court | Supreme Court of West Virginia |
I concur with the majority's determination that, under the circumstances of this case, continued visitation between the grandmother and the child was not appropriate. However, I dissent from the majority's reasoning because it shows a complete lack of understanding of our existing body of law concerning the rights of children to continued association.
While the majority gives lip service to the viability of the significant body of law that this Court has developed on a child's right to continued association, it effectively ignores that body of law in the analysis of this case.
It is important to note that the certified question was very direct:
Does a child's right to continued association with individuals with whom he has formed a close emotional bond, i.e. his maternal grandmother, continue post-adoption by non-relatives, provided that a determination is made that such continued association is in the best interests of the child?
(Emphasis added). Notwithstanding the question posed by the circuit court, the majority simply ignores the question.
I dissent from the majority's absolute reliance on the Grandparent Visitation Act ("the Act"), West Virginia Code §§ 48-10-101 to -1201 (2009). Such slavish reliance solely on the foregoing statutory scheme is done with full abandonment of the well-established law by this Court concerning the child's right to continued association. Succinctly stated, the majority opinion only addresses the rights of grandparents as set forth in the Act and turns a blind eye to the rights of the child-rights that are wholly left unaddressed by Legislature in the provisions of the Act and now by the majority of this Court.
While the majority attempts to factually distinguish the instant case from some of the Court's earlier decisions involving continued association, they ignore an important case wherein the rights of children to continued association first emerged. In Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W. Va. 448, 388 S.E.2d 322 (1989), the natural father was challenging a six-month transition period in connection with the restoration of full custody of his child back to him. The child had been in the custody of her mother with reasonable visitation by the natural father. Id. at 449-50, 388 S.E.2d at 323. The child's mother remarried and the child lived during this marriage with her mother, stepfather and half-brother. The natural father, however, maintained his relationship with his daughter. Id. There was no contention orevidence that the natural father was unfit (or had abandoned his parental rights or responsibilities). Id. But after the child's natural mother was killed in an automobile accident, pursuant to her will, she named the child's stepfather as guardian and the natural father sought custody of his daughter. Id. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 323-24.
Honaker, 182 W. Va. at 452, 388 S.E.2d at 325 (footnotes omitted). Additionally, the Court stated:
The best interests of the child concept with regard to visitation emerges from the reality that Another concern is "the need for stability in the child's life . . . . [T]ermination of visitation with individuals to whom the child was close would contribute to instability rather than provide stability.["]
Id., 388 S.E.2d at 326 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the Court held that even though the custody of the child should be with the natural parent absent proof of abandonment, misconduct or neglect, "the child may have a right to continued visitation rights with the stepparent or half-sibling." Id. at 449, 388 S.E.2d at 323, Syl. Pt. 2, in part.
Thus, the Court upheld the right of continued association of a child with a stepfather (not even a blood relative), even in the face of the very strong parental right of a biological father.
Id. at 649, 408 S.E.2d at 401, Syl. Pt. 4. In so holding, the Court acknowledged the important concept that "[t]rends both in social work and the law relating to child placement indicate anincreased awareness of children's rights to such continued association with siblings and other meaningful figures." Id. at 658, 408 S.E.2d at 410.
Id. at 448, 460 S.E.2d at 694, Syl. Pt. 5 (emphasis added). Thus, once again in Christina L., like in Honaker, we reemphasized the importance of the visitation working in favor of the child's well-being and best interests, thereby implicitly recognizing that a court has an obligation to facilitate a child's right to human relationship when it is in his best interests.
Another case that is analogous to the instant case was In re Jonathan G., 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 893 (1996). In Jonathan G., the child was ultimately returned to the legal custody of his natural parents after the child had been in the care and custody of fosterparents for years. Upon the return of the child to his natural parents, the circuit court determined that it had no basis upon which to order continued association between the foster parents and Jonathon G. Id. at 734, 482 S.E.2d at 911. This Court disagreed with the circuit court and remanded the case for proceedings to consider whether continued association between the child and his foster parents was in the child's best interests. Id. at 736, 482 S.E.2d at 913.
We stated in Jonathan G.:
Id. (quoting in In re Custody of H.S.H.K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435 n.37 (Wis.), cert. denied sub nom. Knott v. Holtzman, 516 U.S. 975(1995)) (emphasis added).
Thus, we held in syllabus point eleven of Jonathon G. that "[a] child has a right to continued association with individuals with whom he has formed a close emotional bond, including foster parents, provided that a determination is made that such continued contact is in the best interests of the child." Jonathan G., 198 W. Va. at 720, 482 S.E.2d at 897, Syl. Pt. 11; see also In re Clifford K., 217 W. Va. 625, 646, 619 S.E.2d 138, 159 (2005) ( ...
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