In re I.C.

• Decision Date: 16 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. A09A1439.,A09A1439.
• Citation: 300 Ga. App. 683,686 S.E.2d 279
• Parties: In the Interest of I.C., a child.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

686 S.E.2d 279

300 Ga. App. 683

In the Interest of I.C., a child.

No. A09A1439.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

October 16, 2009.

Reconsideration Denied November 2, 2009.

Jimmonique R.S. Rodgers, Fort Gordon, for appellant.

Tommy K. Floyd, Dist. Atty., Mary Evans-Battle, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Appellee.

BERNES, Judge.

Following a bench trial and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated 15-year-old I.C. delinquent based upon his commission of aggravated assault¹ and determined that he was in need of restrictive custody with 30 months of confinement in a youth detention center.² I.C. appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the adjudication and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in imposing restrictive custody. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. I.C. first contends that the trial evidence was insufficient to establish his delinquency based upon his commission of aggravated assault. We disagree.

In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adjudication of delinquency, we construe the evidence and every inference from the evidence in favor of the juvenile court's adjudication to determine if a reasonable finder of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile committed the acts charged.

In the Interest of C.M., 290 Ga.App. 788, 789(1), 661 S.E.2d 598 (2008). Our determination is made in accordance with the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. In the Interest of A.A., 293 Ga.App. 827, 828, 668 S.E.2d 323 (2008).

So viewed, the evidence at trial showed that on April 19, 2008, I.C. and a group of his five friends were riding in a car together in the area of a local park. As the car approached the location where the eight-year-old victim and her family were standing on the sidewalk, I.C. pulled out a BB gun and told his friends, "[H]ey, guys, watch this." I.C. then aimed the gun out the window and fired several shots in the direction of the victim and her family. After the shooting, the victim's father saw the victim crying and bleeding from her head. The victim sustained a gunshot wound to her head, which she described as being painful and requiring medical treatment and stitches.

The victim's father followed the perpetrators' car and found it parked in the lot of a nearby church. The shooting incident was reported to a police officer, and I.C. and his friends were apprehended and identified as being the occupants of the car.

A delinquency petition was filed against I.C., alleging that he had committed the offense of aggravated assault. At trial, I.C.'s friends described the events leading up to the shooting and identified I.C. as being the person who had fired the gun. I.C. also testified at trial and admitted that he had fired the gun out the car window, but claimed that he was aiming at the bushes and did not intend to shoot the victim.

The trial evidence authorized I.C.'s delinquency adjudication. "A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he ... assaults ... [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury." OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2). Evidence that I.C. deliberately fired the gun in the direction where the victim and her family were standing established the offense. See Culler v. State, 277 Ga. 717, 719-720(4), 594 S.E.2d 631 (2004); In the Interest of A.A., 293 Ga.App. at 827-829, 668 S.E.2d 323; Thompson v. State, 281 Ga.App. 627, 628-629(1), 636 S.E.2d 779 (2006); Dukes v. State, 264 Ga.App. 820, 823-824(4), 592 S.E.2d 473 (2003).

I.C. nevertheless argues that his conduct amounted to criminal negligence rather than aggravated assault since there was no evidence that he intended to shoot the victim or that the victim was afraid of being shot before it occurred. His argument is without merit. Two of I.C.'s friends who had been in the car with him at the time of the shooting testified that I.C. "pulled out a BB gun and shot at the family" that was standing on the sidewalk in plain view. This evidence authorized a finding that I.C. intended to shoot at the individuals in the victim's family. By intentionally firing the gun in the direction of the family, I.C. was likely to seriously injure any of the family members present, including the victim. And,

[w]hen an unintended victim ... is subjected to harm due to an unlawful act intentionally aimed at someone else (such as [the other members of the family]), the law prevents the actor from taking advantage of his own misdirected wrongful conduct and transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was intended to the one who suffered harm.

Culler, 277 Ga. at 720(4), 594 S.E.2d 631. Accordingly, I.C.'s intent to assault any one of the family members is transferred to the victim who suffered the harm, regardless of whether he knew that the victim was in the line of fire or whether the victim was aware of the shooting as it occurred. Id. Because I.C. shot in the victim's direction, the aggravated assault offense was committed. See id.; Thompson, 281 Ga.App. at 629(1), 636 S.E.2d 779; Dukes, 264 Ga.App. at 823-824(4), 592 S.E.2d 473.

2. I.C. further contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering him to restrictive custody. He contends that the court failed to make proper findings as to his needs and best interests, as required under OCGA § 15-11-63(c), and made an erroneous finding of fact as to the nature and circumstances of the delinquent offense. Again, however, no reversible error has been shown.

Where a child is found to have committed a designated felony act, such as aggravated assault, the juvenile court is authorized to order restrictive custody as provided under OCGA § 15-11-63(e).³ See OCGA § 15-11-63(a)(2)(B)(ii), (b).

In determining whether restrictive custody is required, the court shall consider: (1) The needs and best interests of the child; (2) The record and background of the child; (3) The nature and circumstances of the offense, including whether any injury involved was inflicted by the child or another participant; (4) The need for protection of the community; and (5) The age and physical condition of the victim.

OCGA § 15-11-63(c). In its order, the juvenile court complied with this provision by making specific written findings of fact as to each of the aforementioned elements.

(a) In its findings as to the needs and best interest of the child, the juvenile court expressed that restrictive custody would address I.C.'s particular needs and was in his best interest. The court concluded that a significant time for rehabilitation was warranted based upon the seriousness of I.C.'s delinquent act in the instant case, combined with his extensive history of prior delinquent acts. The court further noted that I.C. had failed to respond to less intrusive means of rehabilitation provided over the three-year course of prior court intervention, and therefore, an alternative determination was not appropriate. The court also entered a finding as to I.C.'s mental health needs and noted that he had received counseling in various community settings and residential placements for crisis intervention and that a full psychological evaluation had been completed by the Department of Juvenile Justice that would be incorporated into his plan for treatment while in...