In re Incorporation of Table Rock

Decision Date08 September 2006
Docket NumberNo. 27261.,27261.
PartiesIn re Petition for INCORPORATION OF VILLAGE OF TABLE ROCK. State of Missouri ex rel. Lisa Reed and Alan Skeen, Respondents, v. The County of Stone, The County Commission of Stone County, Missouri, George Cutbirth, Denny McCrorey, and Jerry Dodd, constituting the Stone County Commission, Appellants.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

William McCullah, Galena, for appellant.

Gary W. Allman, Allman, Ingrum & Wilson, P.C., Branson, for respondent.

ROBERT S. BARNEY, Judge.

Lisa Reed ("Ms. Reed") and Allen Skeen ("Mr. Skeen") (collectively "Respondents") filed a "Petition for Incorporation of Village of Table Rock" with the County Commission of Stone County, Missouri ("the County Commission").1 The County Commission denied Respondents' petition and Respondents appealed the matter to the Circuit Court of Stone County, Missouri. Following a hearing, the circuit court reversed the County Commission's decision denying Respondents' petition and required the issue of the incorporation be submitted to a vote of the residents of the proposed village. The County Commission now brings four points on appeal. Point Four is dispositive; accordingly, only it will be reviewed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Respondents filed their "Petition for Incorporation of Village of Table Rock" with the County Commission on February 3, 2004, utilizing the provisions of section 72.080, after having previously filed two, similar petitions to incorporate the proposed village under section 80.020 without success.2

The County Commission held a hearing on March 30, 2004. The record reveals that the area proposed to be incorporated (hereinafter referred to as "the proposed village") is composed of "a little over 700 acres . . . ." At the hearing, Mr. Skeen testified that "seven or eight" people lived in the proposed village, including himself, his wife, and his son. He testified that his family had lived in the proposed village for approximately six months and that they moved there from Taney County, Missouri, so he could take a property management position working for Robert Plaster. Evergreen National Corporation appears to own all of the land in the proposed village.3

Mr. Skeen further testified that Ms. Reed is also employed by Robert Plaster. In addition to his own home, Mr. Skeen stated that in the proposed village there was a "big glass house;" Ms. Reed's home; several maintenance buildings; two unoccupied A-frame houses; and another unoccupied house. Mr. Skeen related that both he and his wife were registered voters, but that his twenty-one-year-old son was not registered to vote. He also stated he believed the proposed village was "about 10 miles . . ." from Kimberling City, Missouri, by road.

Henry Geblin, the geographic information system administrator for Stone County, testified that, based on his "Auto CAD Map" calculations, the proposed village was, at its nearest point, located "5,185 feet or .98 miles" from Kimberling City, Missouri. He also stated that "[j]ust about all of [the distance between the proposed village and Kimberling City]" is covered by the water of Table Rock Lake.

On April 27, 2004, the County Commission entered its "Order Denying Petition for Incorporation of Village of Table Rock." The County Commission found, inter alia, that the proposed village "is surrounded by forested areas and lake, and is not connected with lands used for town or city purposes;" that "there is no evidence that any more than two of the residents of [the proposed village] were registered to vote, or could even vote if an election was ordered . . .;" that the petition violated section 72.130 in that the proposed village "is, at its nearest point, 5,185 feet or .98 miles from Kimberling City, a city of the fourth classification;"4 and that the proposed village "is populated by only seven or eight full-time residents, one or more part-time residents, and occasional visitors." Additionally, the County Commission noted in its Order that it had received a letter from the Army Corps of Engineers "advising [it] that approximately 300 acres of Corps of Engineers property was included in the legal description of [the proposed village]" and "that Engineer Regulation # 405-1-12 . . . provides that requests for annexation [of Corps of Engineers land] can only be considered from state political subdivisions." As such, the County Commission found Respondents "cannot include Corps of Engineers property in their proposed incorporation . . . ." In conclusion, the County Commission declared that

[r]ather than recognizing and legitimizing an existing city, town, or village, the effect of granting [Respondents'] petition would be to create a land development tool that could avoid County ordinances and regulations that would otherwise be applicable to [the proposed village]. Public policy is not well served if landowners are permitted to incorporate sparsely populated areas, thereby possibly avoiding the County's planning and zoning ordinances . . . Owners and developers of land should not be allowed to create their own entities that will allow them to enact ordinances, establish police forces, or lend the authority of a municipal corporation to their development activities.

Thereafter, on May 10, 2004, Respondents appealed the County Commission's decision to the Circuit Court of Stone County pursuant to section 49.230.5 At the ensuing hearing before the trial court "no evidence was presented except to provide the transcript of the hearing before [the County Commission] with all the Exhibits introduced at said hearing" followed by brief oral arguments from both parties.

The trial court entered its "Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment" on May 26, 2005. The trial court overruled the County Commission's order which denied the incorporation of the proposed village; found the petition was filed "pursuant to [section] 72.080 . . ." and that the petition "contains the required number of signatures and otherwise complies with the requirements of [section] 72.080 . . .;" held that the proposed village "is more than two miles from any entity described in [section] 72.050 . . . other than Kimberling City . . ." but that "Table Rock Lake lies between the [proposed village] and Kimberling City . . . and the distance from the [proposed village] by road to Kimberling City . . . is more than two miles;" and ordered that the issue of the incorporation of the proposed village be submitted to the voters. Further, the trial court attached what it termed "a corrected legal description for the [proposed village] to correct the inclusion on the Western boundary of the [proposed village] to be contiguous with the Fee Taking Line of the Corps of Engineers boundary for Table Rock Lake." This appeal followed.

Both parties are in agreement that this matter derives from a non-contested administrative hearing before the County Commission.6 On appeal of a non-contested case, such as the matter at hand, this Court reviews the trial court's judgment, not the decision of the County Commission. State ex rel. Rice v. Bishop, 858 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Mo.App.1993). Accordingly, the scope of our review is dictated by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). Mosley v. Members of Civil Serv. Bd. for City of Berkeley, 23 S.W.3d 855, 860 (Mo.App.2000); see Rule 84.13(d).7 "Consequently, we review the circuit court's judgment to determine whether its finding that the agency decision was unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or the product of an abuse of discretion rests on substantial evidence and correctly declares and applies the law." Cade, 990 S.W.2d at 37. As such, we will affirm the circuit court's judgment unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32.

Turning now to the County Commission's fourth point relied on, the County Commission maintains the trial court erred "in interpreting and applying [section] 72.080 . . . ." Specifically, it argues that

the language `a city of the class to which its population would entitle it pursuant to this chapter' and `be incorporated pursuant to the law for the government of cities of that class' requires consideration of the size factor in [section] 72.050. The `third element' of [section] 72.080 requires a consideration of factors appropriate under [section] 72.050, [section] 80.020, and the Duquesne[8] case.

Preliminarily, we observe that "`[t]he fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.'" Clanton v. Teledyne Neosho, 960 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Mo.App.1998) (citation omitted). "Furthermore, `every word, clause, sentence and provision of a statute must have effect.'" Stith v. Lakin, 129 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Mo.App.2004) (quoting Civil Serv. Comm'n of St. Louis v. Members of the Bd. of Aldermen of St. Louis, 92 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Mo. banc 2003)). "`[I]t will be presumed that the legislature did not insert idle verbiage or superfluous language in a statute.'" Id. at 917 (quoting Civil Serv. Comm'n of St. Louis, 92 S.W.3d at 788). Additionally, "[w]here one statute deals with a particular subject in a general way, and a second statute treats a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the more general should give way to the more specific." Casey v. State Bd. of Reg. for the Healing Arts, 830 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Mo.App.1992). "The general presumption is that the legislature acts with the knowledge of statutes involving similar or related subject matters." Mid-America Dairymen, Inc. v. Payne, 990 S.W.2d 648, 654 (Mo.App.1999).

We begin our analysis by observing that the statutes in Chapter 72 deal with the "Classification and...

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2 cases
  • Miller v. Miller
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • January 2, 2007
    ...be presumed that the legislature did not insert idle verbiage or superfluous language in a statute." In re Incorporation of Village of Table Rock, 201 S.W.3d 543, 547 (Mo.App.2006) (internal quotation marks and citation The appellant contends that the references to Section 452.410 and to Se......
  • State v. Redifer, WD 65665.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • December 26, 2006
    ...we cannot do in that in interpreting a statute, we are to give meaning to each and every word used. In re Incorporation of Village of Table Rock, 201 S.W.3d 543, 547 (Mo.App.2006). We presume that in enacting the statute, the legislature did not include superfluous language. Id. The State c......

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