IN RE INQUIRY CONCERNING McMORMICK

• Decision Date: 24 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-1301.,01-1301.
• Citation: 639 N.W.2d 12
• Parties: In the Matter of the INQUIRY CONCERNING Patrick C. McCORMICK, District Associate Judge, Third Judicial District, Patrick C. McCORMICK, Respondent.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

639 N.W.2d 12

In the Matter of the INQUIRY CONCERNING Patrick C. McCORMICK, District Associate Judge, Third Judicial District,

Patrick C. McCORMICK, Respondent.

No. 01-1301.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

January 24, 2002.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Roxann M. Ryan and Harold Young, Assistant Attorneys General, for the commission.

Mayer Kanter, Sioux City, for respondent.

CADY, Justice.

This is a judicial disciplinary action against a district associate judge for engaging in a political activity and misrepresentation. It is before us on an application by the state Judicial Qualifications Commission. The Commission recommended the judge be publicly reprimanded. We grant the application and agree on our review that the appropriate sanction for the unethical conduct engaged in by the district associate judge is a public reprimand.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Patrick C. McCormick is a district associate judge in the third judicial district of Iowa. He primarily holds court in Woodbury County. He was appointed to the bench in 1996 after practicing law in Iowa for thirty years. His father was a district court judge before him, and his grandfather was an Iowa lawyer. He has had no prior discipline imposed against him either as a judge or as a lawyer. Judge McCormick is married and lives with his wife in Sioux City.

Prior to the November 2000 elections, Judge McCormick was contacted by a campaign worker for Woodbury County Sheriff David Amick. Sheriff Amick was seeking reelection to office and was involved in a contested race. The campaign worker asked Judge McCormick if the campaign could place a sign supporting Sheriff Amick in the election outside Judge McCormick's home. Judge McCormick and Sheriff Amick were close professional friends, and Judge McCormick was the chairperson of a local committee that was considering the construction of a new county jail. Judge McCormick also had a son who worked for the sheriff's office. Judge McCormick consented to the campaign worker's request, and a campaign worker subsequently placed a sign in the front yard of his home. Judge McCormick believed the sign was proper as long as his wife also consented. His wife did not object to the sign after it was placed in the yard of their home.

On January 16, 2001, the Commission wrote Judge McCormick to advise him it was investigating a complaint it received regarding the campaign sign in his yard. The investigation was conducted by the Iowa Attorney General's office, which was assisted by the Department of Criminal Investigation.

On February 5, 2001, Judge McCormick wrote a letter to the Commission. He acknowledged the presence of the campaign sign in his front yard prior to the November election, but explained that his wife had been contacted by a campaign representative and authorized placement of the sign.

On March 2, 2001, the chairperson of the Commission wrote Judge McCormick to inform him that the complaint against him had been dismissed based on a preliminary investigation. Coincidentally, on the same date, Judge McCormick wrote the Commission to explain that his earlier explanation for the sign was false, and that he was the person who consented to the placement of the sign in his yard. The two letters crossed in the mail.

Judge McCormick testified at the Commission hearing that he initially used his wife to excuse his conduct because he thought it was the easiest way to respond to the complaint. However, he decided to truthfully respond to the Commission after his conscience began to bother him. Judge McCormick said he had difficulty sleeping at night and working during the day after writing the first letter to the Commission. He finally wrote the second letter after seeking advice from another judge.

Following a hearing, the Commission found Judge McCormick violated the canons of judicial conduct by placing a political sign in his yard. See Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2(B) (lending prestige of office to advance interests of others); Canon 7(A)(1)(b) (judge should not publicly endorse a candidate for public office); Canon 7(A)(3) (judge should not engage in political activity). It also found Judge McCormick violated the canons of judicial conduct by misrepresenting the circumstances surrounding the sign placement to the Commission in his letter of February 5, 2001. See Canon 1 (judge should obey high standards of conduct); Canon 2(A) (judge should act to promote public confidence and integrity of the judiciary). The Commission also found both acts violated Iowa Code section 602.2106(3)(b) (2001) (willful misconduct in office and conduct which brings office into disrepute).

The Commission recommended that Judge McCormick be publicly reprimanded. It relied on Judge McCormick's efforts to rectify his misrepresentation to the Commission as a mitigating factor.

II. Scope and Standard of Review.

Our standard of review of a recommendation of judicial discipline by the commission on judicial qualifications is de novo. In re Inquiry Concerning Holien, 612 N.W.2d 789, 790 (Iowa 2000). Ethical violations must be proven by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. In re Inquiry Concerning Stigler, 607 N.W.2d 699, 705 (Iowa 2000).

III. Violations.

A. Political activities.

The strength of our judicial system is due in large part to its independence and neutrality. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 17.5.1, at 980 (1986) [hereinafter Wolfram]. These twin qualities help remove outside influences from judicial decision-making, and promote public respect and confidence in our system of justice. Yet, judicial independence does not come without some personal sacrifice by judges. Judicial independence and neutrality require judges to limit or abstain from involvement in a variety of activities commonly enjoyed by others in the community, including politics.¹ See id. Thus, beyond voting, judges must generally eschew most political connections. Id. § 17.5.4, at 986. The only exceptions in Iowa are political activities geared toward improving the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, and some limited activities by judges in response to active opposition in their own retention elections. See Canon 7(A)(3), 7(B)(2). Canon 7(A) of the judicial code prohibits other political activities by judges, as a means to help maintain an independent judiciary and public respect and confidence in it. See Wolfram, § 17.5.4, at 986-87.

Under Canon 7(A)(1)(b) and (3), a judge may not publicly endorse a candidate for public office or engage in any other common political activities. Thus, a judge who allows a candidate for public office to place a sign in support of the candidate outside the judge's home publicly endorses a candidate for public office and engages in a prohibited political activity.² Judge McCormick clearly violated Canon 7. This activity also violated Canon 2(B). A judge lends the prestige of his or her office to advance the private interests of others by publicly endorsing a candidate for a public office. See Canon 2(B).

B. Misrepresentation.

A judge who makes a false statement to a judicial commission engages in conduct that adversely impacts the integrity of the judiciary and erodes public confidence in the judicial process. See Canon 1 (judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary); Canon 2(A) (judge should act in a manner promoting public confidence in the judiciary). Truth and honesty lie at the heart of the judicial system, and judges who conduct themselves in an untruthful manner contradict this most basic ideal. Consequently, a judge who misrepresents the truth tarnishes the dignity and honor of his or her office.

The evidence in the case clearly reveals Judge McCormick made a false statement in the letter he wrote to the Commission. He violated Canon 1 and Canon 2(A). The false letter also constituted willful misconduct, as well as conduct which brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of section 602.2106(3)(b). Thus, we turn to consider the sanction to impose.

IV. Sanction.

The focus of sanctions in judicial disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the individual judge, but to restore and maintain the dignity, honor, and impartiality of the judicial office, and to protect the public from further excesses. In re Stigler, 607 N.W.2d at 710; In re Harned, 357 N.W.2d 300, 302 (Iowa 1984). Thus, the sanction imposed must be commensurate with the conduct involved so that the integrity of the entire judicial process will be vindicated and reaffirmed. See In re Inquiry Concerning Eads, 362 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Iowa 1985).

Our prior cases have identified both aggravating and mitigating factors that bear upon the appropriate sanction in a particular case. See In re Holien, 612 N.W.2d at 793 (conduct in the performance of judicial duties prejudicial to the administration of justice); In re Stigler, 607 N.W.2d at 710 (conduct that denies individuals fundamental procedural rights; length and character of judge's service); In re Carstensen, 316 N.W.2d 889, 895 (Iowa 1982) (persistent pattern or practice of conduct). Some courts have distilled these factors, and others, into a nonexclusive list to consider in imposing discipline on a judge. This list is a helpful guide in structuring the appropriate discipline in a particular case. The factors include:

(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern of [mis]conduct; (b) the nature, extent and frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's official capacity or in his [or her] private life; (e) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (f) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his [or her] conduct; (g) the length of service on the bench; (h) whether there have been prior complaints about this

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