In re Interest of J.S.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-20-00038-CV,06-20-00038-CV |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF J.S. AND K.H., CHILDREN |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Bowie County, Texas
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
The Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights to his two-year-old daughter, K.H.1 The trial court terminated Father's parental rights after finding that (1) he knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered her physical or emotional well-being, (2) he engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered her physical or emotional well-being, (3) he failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the child's return after she had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of her removal for abuse or neglect, (4) his parental rights to another child were previously terminated based on a finding that his conduct violated Grounds D or E or substantial equivalent provisions of the law of another state, and (5) termination of Father's parental rights was in the best interests of K.H. K.H.'s mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights and does not appeal the trial court's order terminating them.2 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (M), (b)(2) (Supp.).
On appeal from the termination of his parental rights, Father argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings. Because we find the evidence sufficient to support both the trial court's findings on predicate Grounds D and E andits conclusion that terminating Father's parental rights was in the child's best interest, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
At trial, Erica Young, an investigator with the Department, testified that she became involved in the case after receiving reports that Father, a drug-dealer, and Mother were both using methamphetamine. Young said that, while Father refused to take a drug test, both J.S. and K.H. tested "positive for some illegal substances." According to Young, Father had two other children who were adopted after his parental rights were terminated due to "concerns for domestic violence."3 Young also testified that Father was previously charged with possession of marihuana and assault causing bodily injury.
Chantel Finley, the Department's conservatorship worker, testified that Father was incarcerated at the beginning of the case for child endangerment of J.S. and K.H. after they tested positive for drugs, but was placed on community supervision in August 2019. Finley testified at the June 2020 trial that Father had not completed much of his court-ordered family-based service plan, but cross-examination showed that Father had been incarcerated for several months at a Substance Abuse Felony Punishment Facility (SAFPF). Mother, who was ordered into drug rehabilitation, relapsed after her release and was incarcerated at the time of trial.
Father informed the trial court that he was incarcerated not only for child endangerment, but also for possession of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm. He testified that hesmoked drugs in the home where J.S. and K.H. lived and that, "if anybody's in the house, they're going to get drugs in their system." Father said he was incarcerated for the nine months preceding trial, had a projected release date in July 2020, and planned to live with a cousin after his release, but Patricia Smith, the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), testified that Father currently had no income and could not provide the children with a safe and stable home. Father also testified about the classes and mandatory programs he was participating in while in SAFPF. Even though he admitted that he had a long-time problem with drugs, Father testified that he loved K.H. and promised the court that he would never take drugs again.
Finley and Smith testified that K.H. was thriving in a foster care that was meeting her emotional and physical needs after her removal from Mother and Father and that termination of their parental rights was in the child's best interest. Finley added that K.H.'s half-sister, J.S., was also doing well in foster care and that both children were "having pre-placement visits in an adoptive home."
After hearing this evidence, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights.
"The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions." In re E.J.Z., 547 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). "Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning 'the care, custody, and control of their children.'" Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). "Because the termination of parental rights implicates fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—is required attrial." Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014)). This Court is required to "engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is . . . sufficient to support the termination of parental rights." Id. (quoting A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 500). "[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent." Id. (quoting In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied) (quoting Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20)).
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest." Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001; In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2012)). "'Clear and convincing evidence' is that 'degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.'" Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (citing In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009))). "This standard of proof necessarily affects our review of the evidence." Id.
"In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven." In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 920 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). "We assume the trial court, acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could havereasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted." Id. (citing J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573).
"In our review of factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the trial court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing." Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). "We consider only that evidence the fact-finder reasonably could have found to be clear and convincing and determine 'whether the evidence is such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the . . . allegations.'" Id. (quoting H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)) (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264, 266 (Tex. 2002))). "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact[-]finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact[-]finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." Id. (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). "'[I]n making this determination,' we must undertake 'an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.'" Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (quoting C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26)).
"Despite the profound constitutional interests at stake in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, 'the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is paramount.'" Id. (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003) (quoting In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994)) (citing In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003))). "A child's emotional and physical interests must not be sacrificed merely to preserve parentalrights." Id. ().
"Only one predicate finding under Section 161.001[b](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest." Id. at 923 (). Even so, in In re N.G., the Texas Supreme Court held that due process demands that we review the evidence supporting findings under Grounds D and E when they are challenged on appeal because termination of parental rights under these grounds "may have implications for . . . parental rights to other children." In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). As a result, we focus our analysis on Grounds D...
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