In re Interest of T.A.

Decision Date11 March 2015
Docket NumberNo. A14A2175.,A14A2175.
Citation331 Ga.App. 92,769 S.E.2d 797
PartiesIn the Interest of T.A., a child.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Darice Marie Good, for appellant.

Penny Hannah, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Shalen S. Nelson, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Lytia Geiger Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nathan Andrew Hayes, Jamieson Stone Rogers, for Appellees.

Opinion

McFADDEN, Judge.

The mother of T.A. appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the evidence does not support the termination. She contends that the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that T.A.'s deprivation was likely to continue and that such deprivation would cause or was likely to cause serious physical, mental, or emotional harm to T.A. Although the mother met most of her case plan goals, the evidence of parental inability is sufficient to support the termination of her parental rights, and we must therefore affirm.

1. Facts.

On appeal from a juvenile court's order terminating parental rights, we view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's ruling, and our review is limited to addressing the question of whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's rights should have been terminated. In this review, we must necessarily defer to the juvenile court's fact finding, weighing of the evidence, and credibility determinations.

In the Interest of C.M., 325 Ga.App. 869, 869–870(1), 756 S.E.2d 5 (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Viewed in that light, the evidence shows that an authorization for shelter care for T.A. was filed on June 3, 2011, alleging that the mother had abandoned T.A. with a friend. A probable cause order granted temporary legal custody to the Department of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) based on the abandonment by the mother. T.A. was three years old at the time. Shortly thereafter, DFCS filed a deprivation petition. Following a hearing, the juvenile court held that T.A. was deprived based on numerous conditions, including the fact that the mother left T.A. overnight with a friend so that she could go to a nightclub and did not return in the morning to retrieve him. The friend also stated that the mother had physically abused T.A. and that she had witnessed a beating that resulted in a gash on T.A.'s head. In addition, an employee of a shelter where the mother previously lived stated that the mother physically abused T.A., did not keep T.A. clean, and failed to provide food for T.A. The deprivation order was made final in January 2012, and DFCS was ordered to submit a case plan for the mother to include a requirement that she complete a comprehensive parental skills training program, cooperate with a parent aide to help apply those skills, have regular and frequent visits with T.A., participate in individual and group therapy, maintain stable housing sufficient for her and T.A., and maintain a stable income. Temporary custody of T.A. remained with DFCS.

The mother completed her case plan, with the exception of obtaining stable, clean and safe housing large enough for her and T.A. She attended counseling to help with her parenting skills and anger management and worked with a parent aide. For the most part, the mother was consistent with her visitation with T.A., but she was excessively late a few times and missed some visits entirely. The mother's income consists of Supplemental Social Security.

The mother was evaluated twice for psychological and parental fitness. She has an IQ of 56, which is in the mild retardation range, and suffers from mild depression. The psychologist who evaluated her testified that the mother's limited cognitive abilities present a major risk factor in her ability to safely and successfully parent a child or respond appropriately to emergencies. She testified that the mother would need 24–hour in-home support to raise T.A.

T.A. was referred for a psychological/developmental evaluation to consider whether he has an autism

spectrum disorder. The psychologist who evaluated him determined that he exhibited signs and symptoms along the autism spectrum. T.A. has significant issues with his verbal and non-verbal communication, engages in repetitive play, has frequent temper tantrums over minor issues, and demonstrates an abnormal lack of fear. To thrive, T.A. would need a home where the parent would be able to provide substantial structure, routine, and consistency. The parent would need to be well-organized, have the ability to get T.A. to appointments, attend special education meetings, and understand T.A.'s special needs and how to apply strategies to address those needs in the home. According to the psychiatrist, it would be very difficult for a parent with a low IQ who cannot read to handle the challenges of a child with T.A.'s needs.

The parent aide who worked with the mother testified at a review hearing that the mother had not demonstrated that she could parent independently and that the mother needed constant reminders to keep the child within eyesight. She relayed an incident where T.A. almost ran into the street and the mother did not react until the aide told her what to do. The parent aide testified that she would not be able to provide the type of support that the mother needed if T.A. were to return home.

Based on the facts outlined above, DFCS filed a petition for termination of parental rights on December 13, 2012. After conducting a hearing, the juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights in an order filed on October 21, 2013.

2. Sufficiency of the evidence.

Former OCGA § 15–11–94 applies to this termination proceeding (a new Juvenile Code has been adopted and applies to all juvenile proceedings commenced on and after January 1, 2014). Former OCGA § 15–11–94(a) provides:

In considering the termination of parental rights, the court shall first determine whether there is present clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability.... If there is clear and convincing evidence of such parental misconduct or inability, the court shall then consider whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, after considering the physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and needs of the child who is the subject of the proceeding, including the need for a secure and stable home....

Pursuant to former OCGA § 15–11–94(b)(4)(A), to determine parental misconduct or inability, the court must find that:

(i) The child is a deprived child, as such term is defined in [former] Code Section 15–11–2; (ii) The lack of proper parental care or control by the parent in question is the cause of the child's status as deprived; (iii) Such cause of deprivation is likely to continue or will not likely be remedied; and (iv) The continued deprivation will cause or is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child.
(a) Deprivation.

The juvenile court determined that T.A. was deprived because he lacked proper parental care and supervision as defined in former OCGA § 15–11–2(8)(A). The mother has not challenged that finding on appeal.

(b) Cause of the deprivation.

The juvenile court concluded that the cause of T.A.'s deprivation was the mother's failure to provide adequate supervision and the mother's physical abuse of T.A. The mother has not challenged that finding on appeal.

(c) The cause of the deprivation is likely to continue.

The mother contends that the trial court erred by finding clear and convincing evidence that the deprivation would continue. She argues that she completed her case plan and that DFCS did not provide the specialized parenting classes that she needed to help her understand and care for T.A.'s disability.

The juvenile court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights was not based on her failure to complete her case plan. In fact, the court specifically found that the mother “has completed all [case plan] goals with the exception of housing,” but the mother's significant cognitive deficits left her “unable to incorporate what she has been offered in her case plan into her own understanding and abilities such that she is able to independently parent her child, who, because of his developmental issues, presents extraordinary parenting challenges.”

Although the mother contends that DFCS should have provided her with specialized training to address T.A.'s disability, she has not pointed to any evidence that the specialized...

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  • In re Interest of T. R.
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    ...the juvenile court therefore was authorized to evaluate the mother's past behavior in deciding this case. In the Interest of T. A. , 331 Ga. App. 92, 96 (3) (c), 769 S.E.2d 797 (2015). See also In the Interest of C. H. , 305 Ga. App. 549, 561 (2) (c), 700 S.E.2d 203 (2010) (a "parent[’s] co......
  • In re T. S.
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    • July 1, 2019
    ...the father's due process argument.Judgment reversed. Coomer and Markle, JJ., concur.1 (Punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of T. A. , 331 Ga. App. 92 (1), 769 S.E.2d 797 (2015).2 Neither the mother, nor the half-brother, nor the half-brother's father are parties to this appeal.3 The grand......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Navigating a Potentially Changing Landscape in Child Welfare Appellate Review
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 73-3, March 2022
    • Invalid date
    ...T., 327 Ga. App. 572, 760 S.E.2d 188 (2014); In re B. D. O., 343 Ga. App. 587, 807 S.E.2d 507 (2017) (abandonment case).25. In re T. A., 331 Ga. App. 92, 769 S.E.2d 797 (2015).26. In re E. G. M., 341 Ga. App. 33, 798 S.E.2d 639 (2017).27. In re C. A. B., 347 Ga. App. 474, 819 S.E.2d 916 (20......

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