In re Interest of M.D.H.

• Decision Date: 10 November 2015
• Docket Number: Nos. A15A1289,A15A1908.,s. A15A1289
• Citation: 779 S.E.2d 433,334 Ga.App. 394
• Parties: In the Interest of M.D.H., a child.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

334 Ga.App. 394

779 S.E.2d 433

In the Interest of M.D.H., a child.

Nos. A15A1289

A15A1908.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Nov. 10, 2015.

Certiorari Granted March 7, 2016.

Cory P. Debord, Canton, for Appellant.

Cliff Head, Shannon Glover Wallace, for Appellee.

RAY, Judge.

M.D.H., a juvenile, appeals from the juvenile court's order granting his motion to dismiss a delinquency petition filed against him. In its order, the juvenile court dismissed the petition without prejudice. On appeal, M.D.H. contends that the juvenile court should have dismissed the petition with prejudice because the State failed to comply with the deadline for filing a petition alleging delinquency under OCGA § 15–11–521(b). Because M.D.H. raises the same issue in both Case Nos. A15A1289 and A15A1908, we consolidate these cases on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

On December 5, 2014, a complaint was filed against M.D.H. with the Juvenile Court of Cherokee County. The complaint alleged that M.D.H. "sent threatening text messages telling people he was going to bring guns to school ... [and] threatened to kill his friend if he told anyone about his plans." On that same day, a detention hearing was held, and the child was not detained. On January 6, 2015, a petition alleging delinquency was filed in the juvenile court. On January 12, 2015, M.D.H. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the petition was not filed within 30 days of the complaint, as required by OCGA § 15–11–521(b). No request for an extension of time was filed. After a hearing, in which the State conceded that the petition had been filed a day late, the juvenile court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. In Case No. A15A1289, M.D.H. appeals from the juvenile court's dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under the terms of OCGA § 15–11–521.

Prior to the filing of the appeal in Case No. A15A1289, the State filed a second petition on January 29, 2015, again alleging that M.D.H. committed the delinquent act of making terroristic threats. M.D.H. then filed a motion to dismiss this subsequent petition, which the trial court denied. The case then proceeded to trial, and M.D.H. was adjudicated and placed on probation for reckless conduct, a lesser-included offense of terroristic threats. In Case No. A15A1908, M.D.H. appeals from his adjudication and the denial of his motion for new trial, raising the same enumeration of error.

1. In Case No. A15A1289, the State, as appellee, contends that M.D.H.'s appeal from the trial court's initial dismissal of his motion to dismiss the petition against him with prejudice is moot because the State filed a subsequent complaint and petition alleging delinquency and the juvenile court adjudicated M.D.H. delinquent. We disagree.

"An appeal is moot when it seeks to determine an issue which, if resolved, cannot have any practical effect on the underlying controversy, or when such resolution will determine only abstract questions not arising upon existing facts or rights." (Footnotes omitted.) Pimper v. State ex rel. Simpson, 274 Ga. 624, 626, 555 S.E.2d 459 (2001). However, "[i]f an appellant ... will benefit by reversal of a case, his appeal is not moot." (Citation omitted.) Johnson & Harber Constr. Co. v. Bing, 220 Ga.App. 179, 181(1), 469 S.E.2d 697 (1996). Here, M.D.H.'s appeal from the denial of his first motion to dismiss the delinquency petition against him is not moot despite his adjudication prior to this appeal. If the trial court's order were to be reversed on appeal, he would benefit from having his adjudication declared a nullity. See OCGA § 5–6–48(b)(3). Accordingly, we cannot find M.D.H.'s appeal moot.

2. In both Case Nos. A15A1289 and A15A1908, M.D.H. argues that the juvenile court erred in interpreting OCGA § 15–11–521(b) as requiring it to dismiss the petition without prejudice.

It is well-settled that

in all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly. In so doing, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words. Where the language of a statute is plain and susceptible to only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly. In fact, where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden .... [Further,] ... when we are interpreting a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly had full knowledge of the existing state of the law and enacted the statute with reference to it. We construe statutes in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection .... with reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts.

(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Chase v. State, 285 Ga. 693, 695–696(2), 681 S.E.2d 116 (2009).

With these principles in mind, we now turn to the language of the statute. OCGA § 15–11–521 provides that

(a) If a child is in detention prior to adjudication, a petition alleging delinquency shall be filed not later than 72 hours after the detention hearing. If no petition alleging delinquency is filed within the applicable time, such child shall be released from detention and the complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice. Such petition may be refiled as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section within the statute of limitations.

(b) If a child is not in detention prior to adjudication, a petition alleging delinquency shall be filed within 30 days of the filing of the complaint alleging violation of a criminal law or within 30 days of such child's release pursuant to a determination that detention is not warranted. Upon a showing of good cause and notice to all parties, the court may grant an extension of time for filing a petition alleging delinquency. The court shall issue a written order reciting the facts justifying any extension.

(Emphasis supplied.)

As M.D.H. was not in detention prior to adjudication, subsection (b) of OCGA § 15–11–521 applies in the present case. Under subsection (b), the State had 30 days from the filing of the complaint to file the petition alleging delinquency, but it did not meet the deadline in this case. As "[t]here must be scrupulous adherence to due process requirements in juvenile court proceedings[,]" In re B.A.P., 180 Ga.App. 433, 434(1), 349 S.E.2d 218 (1986) (citation and punctuation omitted), the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint against M.D.H.

M.D.H. argues on appeal that, because subsection (a) specifically provides for a dismissal without prejudice and subsection (b) does not, then the Legislature did not intend for any dismissals under subsection (b) to be without prejudice. M.D.H. also argues that a finding that a dismissal under subsection (b) shall be without prejudice would render the language allowing the trial court to grant an extension to file a petition meaningless. We disagree and find that the Legislature did not intend for the dismissal of a complaint with prejudice for the failure to comply with the filing deadline in OCGA § 15–11–521(b).

In construing a related statute in Georgia's former Juvenile Code,¹ former OCGA § 15–11–26,² our Supreme Court held that former OCGA § 15–11–26(a) did not constitute a speedy trial demand and, thus, violations of its provisions should not result in dismissal of the case with prejudice. In so holding, our Supreme Court reasoning is instructive.

In stark contrast to OCGA §§ 17–7–170 and 17–7–171 [Georgia's speedy trial statutes³ ], there is no explicit language in OCGA § 15–11–26 which mandates that the failure to comply with the statutory time limits provided therein will result in an adjudication of the juvenile's non-delinquency by operation of law. If the legislature had intended that a non-compliance with [former] OCGA § 15–11–26(a) would result in the automatic acquittal of a defendant in a delinquency case, it could have expressly provided for the comparable remedy afforded for a non-compliance with OCGA § 17–7–170. The legislature did not so provide.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of R.D.F., 266 Ga. 294, 296(3), 466 S.E.2d 572 (1996) (superceded by statute in In the Interest of A.H., 332 Ga.App. 590, 593(2), n. 6, 774 S.E.2d 163 (2015) ). See, e.g., Butler v. State, 207 Ga.App. 824, 824–825, 429 S.E.2d 280 (1993) (After defendant's case was not docketed for retrial...