In re Interest of M.D.H., Nos. A15A1289

• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
• Writing for the Court: RAY, Judge.
• Citation: 779 S.E.2d 433,334 Ga.App. 394
• Parties: In the Interest of M.D.H., a child.
• Docket Number: Nos. A15A1289,A15A1908.
• Decision Date: 10 November 2015

334 Ga.App. 394
779 S.E.2d 433

In the Interest of M.D.H., a child.

Nos. A15A1289
A15A1908.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Nov. 10, 2015.
Certiorari Granted March 7, 2016.

779 S.E.2d 433

Cory P. Debord, Canton, for Appellant.

Cliff Head, Shannon Glover Wallace, for Appellee.

RAY, Judge.

334 Ga.App. 394

M.D.H., a juvenile, appeals from the juvenile court's order granting his motion to dismiss a delinquency petition filed against him. In its order, the juvenile court dismissed the petition without prejudice. On appeal, M.D.H. contends that the juvenile court should have dismissed the petition with prejudice because the State failed to comply with the deadline for filing a petition alleging delinquency under OCGA § 15–11–521(b). Because M.D.H. raises the same issue in both Case Nos. A15A1289 and A15A1908, we consolidate these cases on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

On December 5, 2014, a complaint was filed against M.D.H. with the Juvenile Court of Cherokee County. The complaint alleged that M.D.H. "sent threatening text messages telling people he was going to bring guns to school ... [and] threatened to kill his friend if he told

334 Ga.App. 395

anyone about his plans." On that same day, a detention hearing was held, and the child was not detained. On January 6, 2015, a petition alleging delinquency was filed in the juvenile court. On January 12, 2015, M.D.H. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the petition was not filed within 30 days of the complaint, as required by OCGA § 15–11–521(b). No request for an extension of time was filed. After a hearing, in which the State conceded that the petition had been filed a day late, the juvenile court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. In Case No. A15A1289, M.D.H. appeals from the juvenile court's dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under the terms of OCGA § 15–11–521.

779 S.E.2d 434

Prior to the filing of the appeal in Case No. A15A1289, the State filed a second petition on January 29, 2015, again alleging that M.D.H. committed the delinquent act of making terroristic threats. M.D.H. then filed a motion to dismiss this subsequent petition, which the trial court denied. The case then proceeded to trial, and M.D.H. was adjudicated and placed on probation for reckless conduct, a lesser-included offense of terroristic threats. In Case No. A15A1908, M.D.H. appeals from his adjudication and the denial of his motion for new trial, raising the same enumeration of error.

1. In Case No. A15A1289, the State, as appellee, contends that M.D.H.'s appeal from the trial court's initial dismissal of his motion to dismiss the petition against him with prejudice is moot because the State filed a subsequent complaint and petition alleging delinquency and the juvenile court adjudicated M.D.H. delinquent. We disagree.

"An appeal is moot when it seeks to determine an issue which, if resolved, cannot have any practical effect on the underlying controversy, or when such resolution will determine only abstract questions not arising upon existing facts or rights." (Footnotes omitted.) Pimper v. State ex rel. Simpson, 274 Ga. 624, 626, 555 S.E.2d 459 (2001). However, "[i]f an appellant ... will benefit by reversal of a case, his appeal is not moot." (Citation omitted.) Johnson & Harber Constr. Co. v. Bing, 220 Ga.App. 179, 181(1), 469 S.E.2d 697 (1996). Here, M.D.H.'s appeal from the denial of his first motion to dismiss the delinquency petition against him is not moot despite his adjudication prior to this appeal. If the trial court's order were to be reversed on appeal, he would benefit from having his adjudication declared a nullity. See OCGA § 5–6–48(b)(3). Accordingly, we cannot find M.D.H.'s appeal moot.

2. In both Case Nos. A15A1289 and A15A1908, M.D.H. argues that the juvenile court erred in interpreting OCGA § 15–11–521(b) as requiring it to dismiss the petition without prejudice.

334 Ga.App. 396

It is well-settled that

in all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly. In so doing, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words. Where the language of a statute is plain and susceptible to only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly. In fact, where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden .... [Further,] ... when we are interpreting a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly had full knowledge of the existing

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