In re Interest of J.A.

Decision Date06 June 2018
Docket NumberA–38 September Term 2016,077383
Citation233 N.J. 432,186 A.3d 266
Parties IN the INTEREST OF J.A., Juvenile–Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Peter T. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant J.A. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Peter T. Blum, of counsel and on the briefs).

Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Steven A. Yomtov, of counsel and on the briefs).

Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, and Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic, attorneys; Alexander Shalom, Edward L. Barocas, Jeanne LoCicero, of counsel and on the brief, and Ronald K. Chen, on the brief).

Jonathan Romberg argued the cause for amicus curiae Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice (Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice, attorney; Jonathan Romberg, on the brief).

JUSTICE FERNANDEZ–VINA delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider the admissibility of evidence procured from a home after police officers' warrantless entry.

A man was attacked at a bus stop in Willingboro and his cell phone was stolen. He and a police officer tracked the phone's location to a nearby house using a phone tracking application.

Several officers arrived at the house, and one spotted the stolen cell phone's case through a window. When no one responded to their knocks on the door, the officers entered the house through an unlocked window. Once inside, they performed a protective sweep to determine whether the suspect was inside, and they found defendant, J.A., then seventeen years of age, under the covers of a bed. Shortly thereafter, defendant's mother and brother arrived home. After the officers explained their investigation, defendant's mother consented to a search of the house, and defendant's brother voluntarily retrieved the stolen phone. Defendant was later charged with second-degree robbery for theft of the phone.

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers' entry into his home was unconstitutional because the officers entered without a warrant and there were no circumstances that would justify an exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. The court found that, although the officers' search procedure may have been imprudent, it was ultimately defendant's brother—without any coercion or duress from law enforcement—who retrieved the cell phone. The court reasoned that defendant could not challenge the seizure of the cell phone in light of that lack of state action.

Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The panel held that the officers had probable cause to search and found that exigent circumstances justified the officers' warrantless entry into defendant's home. The panel also found that the fact that defendant's brother, and not law enforcement officers, retrieved the phone neutralized any potential problems with his mother's consent.

We disagree with the panel's determination that the officers' warrantless entry was justified by the claimed exigency faced by the officers. However, we agree that defendant's brother's actions did not constitute state action and were sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful police conduct. Because we find that the brother's independent actions operate to preclude application of the exclusionary rule to the evidence, we do not reach the question of defendant's mother's consent to search. Accordingly, we modify and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.

A.

On May 30, 2014, the victim was standing at a bus stop in Willingboro when he was approached by a young man in a hooded black sweatshirt and camouflage shorts. The young man asked to use the victim's cell phone, explaining that he was locked out of his house. The victim hesitated, then reached to take out his phone. As the victim was facing the other direction, the man punched him in the arm, took the phone, and ran.

A Willingboro Police Officer was dispatched to meet the victim at the bus stop. The victim explained that the phone was an Apple iPhone, which had been in a pink glittery case.

The officer and the victim used the "Find My iPhone" application to track the location of the phone. The application immediately identified a house about three blocks from the bus stop as the phone's whereabouts. After about two minutes, the phone was shut off, which prevented the application from further tracking the phone's location.

The officer went to the house, and other police officers were dispatched there as well. The officers decided to secure the perimeter of the house. While performing an exterior security check, an officer peered through a first-floor window and noticed a pink glittery phone case matching the victim's description on a nearby bed. At that point, the police thought that the young man who took the victim's phone may have been inside the house.

The officers believed that the house was abandoned: curtain blinds covered most of the windows, there were no signs of life inside or cars in the driveway, and no one responded to the officers' several knocks on the front door.

One officer found an unlocked window on the first floor, through which he and another officer entered the house. Another officer subsequently entered through the front door. Once inside, the officers began searching the house for the suspect. During their search, they observed the phone case that was previously seen through the first floor window, but did not take possession of it. The phone was not found during that initial search.

The officers found defendant, unarmed, upstairs in the master bedroom, lying under a blanket on the bed. The officers also found a hooded sweatshirt and a pair of camouflage shorts nearby.

The officers handcuffed defendant, brought him downstairs, and questioned him about his knowledge of the robbery. Defendant's family members subsequently arrived at the house, including his older brother and mother, who lived there. The latter appeared irate at defendant upon her arrival. She asked the police "what did [defendant] do now?" and said that she was "sick" of his antics and that she previously "told him if he comes here acting up he's got to go." She angrily informed the officers that they could search the house for the missing phone.

The officers explained to defendant's brother that they suspected that defendant had stolen the phone. Defendant's brother irritably responded that stealing a phone is something that defendant would be inclined to do. The brother asked if the officers had found the phone, and when they responded that they had not, he said that if it was not in defendant's bedroom, it was probably in the younger brother's room. Without encouragement from the police, he went to their younger brother's room accompanied by an officer, found a phone, and gave it to the officer. The phone matched the victim's description of his stolen phone.

Defendant's mother later provided written consent to search the house.

B.

Defendant was charged with an act that would have constituted second-degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1(a)(1), had he been an adult at the time. He filed a motion to suppress the phone, arguing that it was found as a result of an unconstitutional search and seizure.

At the suppression hearing, the court found that the police did not conduct a search of the residence until his mother gave consent. The court also found that defendant's brother's search was not driven by "coercion or duress from law enforcement," explaining that although "third parties acting on behalf of the State are bound by constitutional strictures," the brother's actions here did not constitute state action. The court opined that the officers' behavior in the house may have amounted to "sloppy search procedure." It held, however, that because defendant's brother retrieved the phone, and because he did not act as an agent of the officers, defendant could not bring a constitutional claim to challenge the seizure of the phone. Therefore, the court denied defendant's suppression motion.

The case went to trial and defendant was adjudicated delinquent and sentenced to two years of house arrest.

Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should have suppressed the cell phone evidence because the police officers' entrance into his home and subsequent search were unconstitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed. The panel concluded that the officers had probable cause to search and faced exigent circumstances, which justified their warrantless entry into defendant's home.

The panel explained that the "novel aspect of cutting-edge technology"—the Find My iPhone application—allowed the police to track the stolen iPhone, and that the police confirmed that the phone was inside the house when they spotted its case through a window. Together, those facts gave the officers "a reasonable and well-grounded belief that the person who robbed the victim minutes earlier was inside the home."

The panel stated that "[t]he technology that led police to [defendant's] home provided some of the exigency supporting their entry." In particular, the court found it significant that two minutes after the officer activated the "Find My iPhone" application, the phone was turned off. That led the officer to feel that "immediate action was required because once the phone was turned off, it could be moved and the GPS capabilities would not function." The panel found that this concern was reasonable, "as the small cell phone could easily have been destroyed or hidden, and was the only physical evidence linking [defendant] to the robbery." Thus, the panel concluded that, "in entering the residence to secure the area, determine whether there was any danger to anyone in the house, and prevent...

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