State v. Caronna

• Citation: 469 N.J.Super. 462,265 A.3d 1249
• Decision Date: 03 November 2021
• Docket Number: DOCKET NO. A-0580-20, A-0581-20
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joelle D. CARONNA, Defendant-Respondent. State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Freddy Collado, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division

469 N.J.Super. 462

265 A.3d 1249

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Joelle D. CARONNA, Defendant-Respondent.

State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Freddy Collado, Defendant-Respondent.

DOCKET NO. A-0580-20, A-0581-20

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued October 14, 2021

Decided November 3, 2021

Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant State of New Jersey (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Nancy A. Hulett, of counsel and on the brief).

Scott M. Welfel, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent Joelle D. Caronna (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Scott M. Welfel, of counsel and on the brief).

Joseph M. Mazraani, North Brunswick, argued the cause for respondent Freddy Collado (Mazraani & Liguouri, LLP, attorneys; Joseph M. Mazraani and Jeffrey S. Farmer, of counsel and on the brief).

Sarah D. Brigham, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Adam D. Klein, of counsel and on the brief).

Alexander Shalom, Newark, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, argued the cause for amicus curiae (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).

Barry H. Evenchick, Hackensack, Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey, argued the cause for amicus curiae (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges Fasciale, Sumners and Vernoia.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FASCIALE, P.J.A.D.

This appeal requires us to determine, as a matter of first impression, whether under our State Constitution the exclusionary rule applies to an unconstitutional and flagrant violation of a search warrant's knock-and-announce requirement. A detective requested and obtained a warrant that required the police to knock and announce their presence before entering an apartment. The detective and two other officers arrived at the scene and saw defendant Freddy Collado outside approximately fifty yards from the apartment. As they detained him, Collado confirmed he did not "live around here," no one was in his house (which was in a different town), and that he did not have keys to the apartment. The three officers then went to the front door of defendant Joelle Caronna's apartment to execute the search warrant.

The police did not previously investigate the names of the lawful occupants of the apartment. But they had previously observed defendants utilize the apartment and knew Caronna's driver's license matched the apartment building address. Without any exigency or justification, and not knowing who was in the apartment, they did not knock on the front door and announce their presence. They simply opened the unlocked door and, in a normal tone, said, "Hello." Caronna, who was in an upstairs bedroom and naked from the waist down, responded by saying "Babe?" The police remained silent, climbed the stairs, entered her bedroom, and said, "How you doing, what's going on?"

Then for the first time, they announced they were police and were there to search the apartment.¹ The parties agree that the police acted unconstitutionally by inexplicably ignoring the warrant's mandate to knock and announce. They disagree on the remedy.

The motion judge concluded that the exclusionary rule applied to the violation and suppressed drugs seized during the search. Pertinent to our adjudication of the issue presented, Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution generally provides greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. That is undisputed. The primary legal question is whether New Jersey's increased state constitutional safeguards support suppression of the drugs.

The State—joined by the Attorney General (AG) as amicus—argues against application of the exclusionary rule. Instead of focusing on Article I, Paragraph 7, they primarily rely on the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591-94, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006), which held, in a sharply divided decision, that the exclusionary rule is not a necessary remedy for knock-and-announce violations. Even though the officers here unjustifiably ignored the knock-and-announce requirement, the State and AG contend that causation was too attenuated to justify exclusion, and they argue deterrence from this type of police misconduct is achievable by means other than suppression. They say deterrence is generally achieved by police wearing body cameras; by victims of these constitutional violations filing civil lawsuits against the police seeking compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; and by victims of the unconstitutional behavior filing civilian complaints before Internal Affairs (IA) seeking disciplinary action against law enforcement officers.²

Defendants—joined by amici Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL-NJ) and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation (ACLU)—disagree.

They implore us to apply the heightened protections available under Article I, Paragraph 7, not the minimum guarantees afforded by the Fourth Amendment. They emphasize that Article I, Paragraph 7 provides greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted in Hudson, and that the heightened state constitutional guarantees apply to police who unjustifiably violate a knock-and-announce warrant requirement. Defendants reiterate that Hudson interpreted the Fourth Amendment, not Article I, Paragraph 7. They argue that only the exclusionary rule effectively deters police from these violations, rather than wearing body cameras or the possibility of facing a civil lawsuit or disciplinary charge. Although their body cameras were on³ and these other remedies existed, the officers still entered the apartment without knocking or announcing their presence. In other words, body cameras, potential Section 1983 actions, or possible disciplinary actions did not effectively deter the flagrant violation that occurred here.

We hold that the exclusionary rule applies where police violate Article I, Paragraph 7 by unreasonably and unjustifiably ignoring a search warrant requirement that they knock and announce their presence before entering a dwelling. We also conclude that no exception to the exclusionary rule applies here, especially because of the flagrant violation. New Jersey's Constitution "provides greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment." State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 504, 255 A.3d 1139 (2021). Compliance with a knock-and-announce warrant requirement is a critical predicate for a reasonable search under our State Constitution. It is simply objectively unreasonable—without justification⁴ —for police to ignore a knock-and-announce requirement contained in a warrant that they requested and obtained. Ignoring the requirement contravenes the search and seizure rights of New Jersey residents. Our holding comports with New Jersey's Article I, Paragraph 7 law; effectively deters police from flagrantly violating knock-and-announce search warrant requirements; safeguards against unconstitutional, unreasonable, and illegal searches and seizures under New Jersey law; and, importantly, upholds the rule of law and integrity of our administration of justice.

In these back-to-back appeals, which we have consolidated for this opinion, we therefore affirm the interlocutory order entered by the motion judge suppressing the drugs.

I.

We understand that under the Fourth Amendment, our holding would be different. We certainly do not question the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. That Court is the final arbiter of the Federal Constitution. See Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez From the Off. of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79, 131, 7 A.3d 720 (2010). But it does not necessarily follow that applying the heightened liberty safeguards of Article I, Paragraph 7 requires the same result.

A.

Hudson does not comport with our State Constitution. In Hudson, police executed a search warrant of the defendant's home for narcotics and weapons. 547 U.S. at 588, 126 S.Ct. 2159. Upon arrival at the defendant's home, the police—unlike here—announced their presence, but waited only "three to five seconds," before entering the home through the unlocked front door.⁵ Ibid. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in the search on the ground that the police violated the Fourth Amendment and Michigan's knock-and-announce statute by failing to properly knock and announce before entering his home.⁶ Ibid.

The Michigan trial court granted the motion to suppress.⁷ Ibid. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed on an interlocutory review, based on recent Michigan Supreme Court cases holding that suppression was not the appropriate remedy when officers made entry without a proper "knock and announce." Id. at 588-89, 126 S.Ct. 2159. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and after the defendant's conviction,⁸ the defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 589, 126 S.Ct. 2159.

Writing for the majority, in a five-to-four decision, Justice Antonin Scalia held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to a knock-and-announce violation because causation was too attenuated to justify exclusion, and because the deterrence benefits did not outweigh the substantial social costs given that there were other ways to deter such violations. Id. at 594-99, 126 S.Ct. 2159. Justice Scalia reasoned that a victim of an unlawful police action may sue for damages based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 597-99, 126 S.Ct. 2159. According to Justice Scalia, there was "increasing evidence that police forces across the United...