In re Interest of D.S.

• Decision Date: 08 May 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-0908,18-0908
• Citation: 602 S.W.3d 504
• Parties: In the INTEREST OF D.S., a Child
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

602 S.W.3d 504

In the INTEREST OF D.S., a Child

No. 18-0908

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued February 27, 2020

OPINION DELIVERED: May 8, 2020

Lauren E. Melhart, Fort Worth, Katherine A. Kinser, Coyt (Randy) R. Johnston, Dallas, Charles (Chad) E. Baruch, for Respondent Andrew Greenhut.

Rebecca Tillery Rowan, Deborah G. Hankinson, Dallas, Wallace B. Jefferson, Harriet O'Neill, Austin, Rachel Anne Ekery, Houston, Nicholas B. Bacarisse, M.J. Vanden Eykel, for Petitioner Gita Srivastava.

Melody Brooks Royall, pro se, amicus curiae.

Donald Roth Royall, pro se, amicus curiae.

Kathleen Witkovski, for Amicus Curiae Ellen A. Yarrell.

Ellen A. Yarrell, pro se, amicus curiae.

Jeffrey C. Mateer, Austin, Kyle Highful, Kyle D. Hawkins, W. Kenneth Paxton Jr., Atty. Gen., for Amicus Curiae State of Texas.

Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court.

When parental rights are terminated based on an affidavit voluntarily relinquishing those rights, section 161.211(c) of the Texas Family Code limits collateral attacks on the termination order to specific grounds: fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution of the affidavit.¹ In this termination case, Father asserts a final order can be challenged on an additional ground: a trial court's erroneous determination that Texas is the child's "home state." The trial court rejected Father's bill of review as a collateral attack effectively barred by section 161.211(c), but the court of appeals reversed, finding a conflict between section 161.211(c) and provisions in Chapter 152 of the Family Code,² commonly known as the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).³ The court held that construing section 161.211(c) as barring a collateral challenge to the trial court's Chapter 152 findings in voluntary relinquishment cases would contravene the Legislature's intent in adopting the UCCJEA's jurisdictional provisions.⁴

We hold section 161.211(c)'s plain language forecloses a collateral attack premised on an erroneous home-state determination even if that determination implicates a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Texas has a compelling interest in resolving termination suits economically, efficiently, and with finality. By enacting section 161.211(c), our Legislature made a clear policy choice: when parents choose to relinquish their parental rights in accordance with the "exacting" and "detailed" statutory requirements for doing so,⁵ a collateral attack is limited to specific grounds relating to whether the relinquishment was knowing and voluntary.⁶ Chapter 152 jurisdictional defects are not one of the enumerated grounds for challenging an order effectuating a voluntary termination of parental rights. Accordingly, we hold the trial court properly rejected Father's bill of review and the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's judgment. We therefore reverse and render judgment denying Father's request for relief.

I. Background

D.S., a minor child, was born in January 2015 in Boston, Massachusetts. Her parents were married in Texas about eight years before her birth and lived in Texas for most of their marriage. However, shortly before D.S.'s birth, Father moved to Boston to pursue a job opportunity. Mother remained in Texas, maintaining employment at the same law firm and living in the family home, but she routinely visited Father in Massachusetts.

After D.S. was born, the family stayed in Massachusetts until Mother's maternity leave expired. Mother then moved back to Texas to resume her job, and D.S. split time between homes in both Texas and Massachusetts. In September 2015, when D.S. was eight months old, Mother filed for divorce in Collin County, Texas. She alleged that D.S. (1) was a child born of the marriage, (2) was not under the continuing jurisdiction of another state court, and (3) lived with Mother in Collin County. Father did not deny these allegations.⁷

At some point during the divorce proceedings, Father executed an affidavit voluntarily relinquishing his parental rights. Father's unrevoked affidavit provided the basis for Mother's amended divorce petition seeking to sever the parent–child relationship. Because Father was not a Texas resident at the time, Mother had the burden of pleading facts demonstrating the trial court's authority to exercise jurisdiction over the suit affecting the parent–child relationship.⁸

After considering the evidence,⁹ the trial court found it had jurisdiction over the proceeding and the parties involved and that no other court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over D.S. The court also found termination of Father's parental rights was in D.S.'s best interest. The court signed the agreed order terminating Father's parental rights on October 21, 2015. A few days later, the court issued a nunc pro tunc order bearing Father's signature. Mother was appointed D.S.'s sole managing conservator.

Six months later, Father filed two bill-of-review suits: one seeking to set aside the trial court's termination order and the other arguing, in part, that revisiting child custody would necessitate a new division of the parties' marital estate. Only the former is at issue in this appeal, and in that bill-of-review proceeding, Father claimed, for the first time, that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Massachusetts—not Texas—was D.S.'s home state when the termination proceeding commenced.

The trial court denied relief in both bill-of-review suits following a bench trial. In written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court determined Father "failed to prove any element of his bill of review,"¹⁰ so his "challenge to the Agreed Order of Termination of Parent–Child Relationship [was] a collateral attack rather than a direct attack." Concerning D.S.'s home state, the trial court found that extrinsic evidence established (1) D.S. had no home state when the termination proceedings commenced; (2) Massachusetts had been D.S.'s home state within six months of commencement; and (3) under Family Code section 152.201, Texas courts lacked jurisdiction "to make an initial child custody determination." However, because the underlying termination proceeding did not reveal any jurisdictional defect, "the clear and definite recitals" on jurisdictional matters in the Agreed Order of Termination of Parent–Child Relationship were "conclusive of all issues of jurisdiction" in a collateral challenge.¹¹ The court further concluded that (1) Father failed to prove his "unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights was executed as a result of fraud, duress, or coercion"; and (2) the bills of review were barred as a matter of law under the affirmative defenses of estoppel, waiver, acceptance of the benefits, and unclean hands.

Father appealed the disposition of both bills. As to the termination order, Father focused exclusively on collaterally attacking jurisdiction, pointing out that the bill-of-review court's home-state findings materially differed from the trial court's original jurisdictional findings.¹² Claiming the new findings rendered the termination order void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Father persuaded the court of appeals to reverse and vacate the termination order.¹³ Relying on the extrinsic evidence Father offered in the bill proceeding, the court of appeals adopted the bill-of-review court's home-state findings, concluded Texas was not D.S.'s home state, and held the termination order was void and susceptible to collateral attack.¹⁴ Though section 161.211(c) of the Texas Family Code expressly limits the grounds for challenging a voluntary-relinquishment termination, the court declined to construe the statute as precluding Father from challenging the termination order on jurisdictional grounds, opining that such a construction would create a conflict with the jurisdictional requirements in Chapter 152 of the Family Code.¹⁵

On appeal to this Court, the parties disagree about several matters, including (1) whether Father's collateral attack on the termination order was proper even though section 161.211(c) specifically constrains such challenges to grounds that were decided adversely to Father and then abandoned; and (2) whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to collaterally challenge an agreed termination judgment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when no jurisdictional defect is apparent from the record and the record establishes that the trial court considered jurisdictional evidence, concluded it had jurisdiction, and rendered a judgment regular on its face. Because the first issue is dispositive of the appeal, we do not reach the second.

II. Discussion

"Collateral attacks" on orders terminating parental rights based on affidavits voluntarily relinquishing those rights are limited to "fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution of the [relinquishment] affidavit."¹⁶ By limiting collateral attacks to grounds relating to "whether the parent's waiver of parental rights was knowing and voluntary,"¹⁷ section 161.211(c) enhances reliability and finality of voluntary termination orders, allowing families to move forward with their lives with a measure of certainty.

In a collateral challenge to the agreed order severing his relationship with D.S., Father abandoned the three statutorily authorized grounds in favor of one not enumerated in the statute—lack of jurisdiction under Chapter 152. Father argues that section 161.211(c)'s limitations apply only if the trial court had jurisdiction to make a custody determination under Chapter 152 and does not preclude his collateral attack on the agreed termination order because (1) Texas was not D.S.'s home state when the termination proceeding commenced and (2) the trial court did not identify any other statutory basis for exercising jurisdiction under Chapter 152.

Mother contends the court of appeals judicially amended section 161.211(c) contrary to its plain and unambiguous language by reversing the trial court's bill-of-review judgment on...