In re Interest of E.H.

Decision Date23 October 2014
Docket NumberNo. 14–13–00622–CV.,14–13–00622–CV.
Citation450 S.W.3d 166
PartiesIn the Interest of E.H., A.H., and E.H., Children.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Dustin M. Howell, John B. Worley, Austin, for The State of Texas.

Emily A. Fisher, Michael L. Wilson, Galveston, for Shilomo Hamo.

Panel consists of Chief Justice FROST and Justices JAMISON and WISE.

MAJORITY OPINION

KEN WISE, Justice.

The Office of the Attorney General appeals the trial court's refusal to register an Israeli child support order awarded to Sara Hamo after Shlomo Hamo, Sara's former husband and the father of their three children, contested the registration, arguing that the Israeli court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he was never served and that he was denied due process. The Attorney General contends that the record establishes that Shlomo was served with notice of the Israeli proceeding but failed to appear in that tribunal, and therefore full faith and credit principles incorporated into the Uniform Interstate Foreign Support Act (UIFSA) and the equitable doctrine of comity require registration of the judgment. The Attorney General also argues that Shlomo's bare assertion that he was not served is an insufficient basis on which to deny registration. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Sara and Shlomo Hamo married in Israel in 1984. The couple had three children between July 1985 and July 1991, all of whom were born in Israel. From 1986 through 1988, however, Sarah and Shlomo lived in Tucson, Arizona, after which they returned to Israel. In February 1992, Shlomo left Sara and the children in Israel and moved to the United States. Shlomo originally lived and worked in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, but in September 1992, Shlomo moved to Galveston, Texas.

In June 1993, Sara obtained a judgment for child support against Shlomo in Israel, after allegedly serving Shlomo with the suit by registered mail as provided under Israeli law. Several years later, Shlomo was granted a rabbinical divorce in Galveston through proceedings initiated by Sara. One of Shlomo's sons, Amos, eventually came to live with Shlomo in Galveston, and in 2002, Shlomo was awarded conservatorship of Amos in the 306th District Court of Galveston County.

Sara did not receive any child support payments from Shlomo. The National Insurance Institute of Israel paid a portion of the monthly support ordered through a program in which a spouse may obtain a portion of unpaid child support awards from the Israeli government. Under Israeli law, the spouse is permitted to file suit against the non-paying spouse for the difference. Sara was granted permission by an Israeli court to seek arrearages from Shlomo equivalent to $144,763.82 as of August 30, 2010.

In June 2011, the Office of the Attorney General filed a “Notice of Registration of Foreign Support Order (UIFSA) and a Motion to Confirm Support Arrearage (UFISA) in the 306th District Court of Galveston County to register the 1993 Israeli court's order and confirm the child support arrearages. Shlomo contested the registration arguing, among other things, that he was never served with process for any child support action by Sara in Israel and that enforcement of the order would violate his right to due process. The Attorney General later filed an amended notice of registration of the foreign support order, as well as an amended motion to confirm the support arrearage as of September 29, 2012, now seeking the equivalent of $168,129.00. In December 2012, an associate judge initially heard the case and denied registration of the judgment.

The Attorney General sought a de novo hearing before the district court. At the hearing, Shlomo testified that the first time he had heard of the judgment against him for child support was in 2011, when he received the notice of registration from the Attorney General's office. Shlomo denied ever being served with documents from the Israeli court or signing a delivery confirmation card accepting service. Shlomo also contended that the Israeli judgment should not be registered because the record did not show compliance with Israeli rules of civil procedure.

On April 17, 2013, the district court signed an order denying registration of the foreign judgment, finding that Shlomo was denied due process in the underlying suit in Israel, he was never served with process in the underlying suit, and he had no notice of the suit. The district court also made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Issues and Analysis

In its first issue, the Attorney General argues that under the full faith and credit principles Texas adopted for foreign judgments in the UIFSA, the trial court was required to register the foreign child-support order against Shlomo because the record establishes that Shlomo was served with notice of the Israeli proceeding but failed to raise any challenge in that tribunal. In its second issue, the Attorney General argues that the trial court should have deferred to the Israeli tribunal's personal-jurisdiction determination under the equitable doctrine of comity. In its third issue, the Attorney General argues that the trial court should have registered the Israeli support order when Shlomo offered little more than his bald assertion that he was not served with process.

The UIFSA

The UIFSA is codified in chapter 159 of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam.Code §§ 159.001 –.901. Under the UIFSA, a party may register a child support or income-withholding order issued by a tribunal of another state for enforcement in Texas. Id. § 159.601. A “state” includes “a foreign country or political subdivision that has been declared to be a foreign reciprocating country or political subdivision under federal law.” Id. § 159.102(21)(B)(i). It is undisputed that Israel qualifies as a state for purposes of enforcement of support orders under the UIFSA. See Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in Child Support Enforcement, U.S.-Isr. (Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/resource/israel-frc.

Once registered, a support order is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a Texas court. Tex. Fam.Code § 159.603. A party contesting the registration is required to request a hearing and has the burden of proving one or more of eight enumerated defenses. Id. §§ 159.606, 159.607. The defenses that may be asserted include the defense that “the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party.” Id. § 159.607(a)(1). If the contesting party does not establish a defense to the validity or enforcement of the order, the registering court must confirm the order. Id. § 159.607(c).

Analysis of the Attorney General's Issues
I. Full Faith and Credit and Comity

In its first issue, the Attorney General argues that under the UIFSA, child support orders of reciprocating countries are entitled to full faith and credit. Therefore, according to the Attorney General, the trial court should have registered the Israeli child support order because the record established that Shlomo was served with notice of the Israeli proceeding but failed to make any challenge in that tribunal. In its second issue, the Attorney General argues that, even if principles of full faith and credit do not apply, the trial court still should have registered the Israeli order under the comity doctrine.

A. Full faith and credit

The United States Constitution requires each state to give full faith and credit to every other state's public acts, records, and judicial proceedings. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 ; Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.1992). Generally, however, states are not required to give full faith and credit to foreign country judgments. See Duruji v. Duruji, Nos. 14–05–01185–CV, 14–05–01186–CV, 2007 WL 582282, at *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Schacht v. Schacht, 435 S.W.2d 197, 202 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1968, no writ) (stating that full faith and credit did not apply to require that Texas court recognize Mexican divorce decree). Once grounds for nonrecognition have been timely asserted, the foreign country judgment will not be recognized or enforced until those objections have been expressly overruled by the trial court. Duruji, 2007 WL 582282, at *4.

The UIFSA does not expressly require that full faith and credit be extended to qualifying foreign country judgments. Compare Tex. Fam.Code § 159.603(b) ( “A registered order issued in another state is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this state.”), with Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 36.004 (the Uniform Foreign Country Money–Judgment Recognition Act) (providing that a foreign country judgment which satisfies the statutory requirements “is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment of a sister state that is entitled to full faith and credit”); Tex. Fam.Code § 162.023 (“Except as otherwise provided by law, an adoption order rendered to a resident of this state that is made by a foreign country shall be accorded full faith and credit by the courts of this state and enforced as if the order were rendered by a court in this state unless the adoption law or process of the foreign country violates the fundamental principles of human rights or the laws or public policy of this state.”). The Attorney General concedes that it is unaware of any cases which have extended full faith and credit to international support orders under UIFSA. Nevertheless, the Attorney General argues that the Legislature intended to incorporate “full faith and credit principles” into the UIFSA because the Act defines “state” to include qualifying foreign countries. See Tex. Fam.Code § 159.102(21)(B)(i). According to the Attorney General, application of full faith and credit principles should have defeated Shlomo's challenge to the jurisdictional recitations in the Israeli record.

Spe...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Fuentes v. Zaragoza
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 31 May 2018
  • Carmona v. Carmona (In re Carmona)
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Texas
    • 19 January 2018
  • Nikolenko v. Nikolenko
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 17 February 2022
    ... ... reasonable minimum possession of the child and is in the best ... interest of the child. Id. § 153.252. A trial ... court has discretion to deviate from a standard possession ... order but must consider: "(1) ... ...
  • Ashfaq v. Ashfaq
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 28 April 2015
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT